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Abstract 
In the modern global environment of rapid technological change and quickly evolving business 
practices, new issues frequently arise that challenge the operation of patent law. Understanding how 
patent law operates in this global environment is vital because the patent system plays an important 
role in the way new technology is developed and brought to market. The accepted rationale for the 
patent system is that it is an economic tool to incentivise innovation and thereby enhance social 
welfare. It follows, then, that if patent law handles emergent issues (or is likely to handle them) in 
ways that conflict with its underlying rationale, the development of new technology may be 
hindered.  
Six diverse emergent issues that challenge the operation of patent law in Australia are examined in 
this thesis. They take two forms: technological, originating from development of new technology; 
and legal, resulting from recent case law or legislative amendment (either foreign or domestic). 
Technological and legal issues arise frequently and it is impossible to evaluate them all. Thus, this 
thesis focuses specifically on issues that are relevant to aspects of Australian patent infringement law 
and are amenable to doctrinal legal analysis and qualitative economic reasoning. The aspects of 
patent infringement law examined are: standing to initiate infringement actions; infringement by 
exploitation; secondary infringement; innocent infringement; and false representations about 
patents. In addition, to give perspective on reasoning in this study and, in some circumstances to 
identify solutions to defects in the law, analysis of each issue also involves a foreign comparative law 
component.  
This study demonstrates that many of the emergent issues examined are not, or are unlikely to be, 
dealt with under current Australian patent law in a manner consistent with the justifications that 
underpin it. Accordingly, various refinements to the law are proposed to ensure the Australian 
patent system is kept up to date. 
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Introduction 
I. Context
In 1904, the famous Australian poet Henry Lawson wrote an ironic poem about how young 
Australians were ‘born to be thinkers and doers, and makers of wonderful things’ but were consigned 
to ‘the pick and the shears’.1 At the time, Lawson was making reference to the newly federated 
colony deriving income from mining and sheep farming, and relying on the rest of the world for 
technological innovation. It is quite clear that at the heart of Lawson’s piece was a call for domestic 
innovation. Coinciding with Lawson’s poem, Australia’s first federal patent legislation was assented 
to in 1903.2 Between Lawson’s time and now, much has changed, for example, Australia’s reliance on 
agriculture for economic prosperity is less pronounced.3 Yet, much has remained the same. For 
instance, Australia’s reliance on primary industries, particularly mining, has been cause for concern 
over the past few years.4 
In 1992, Professor Sam Ricketson wrote on the past, present and future of intellectual property law 
reform in Australia.5 Citing Lawson’s poem, Ricketson wrote of the then political desire to progress 
from a ‘lucky country’ which relies on good fortune for prosperity, to a ‘clever country’ or even an 
‘intelligent country’, which derives prosperity through innovation.6 Through no accident, Ricketson’s 
article approximately coincided with the enactment of Australia’s third major (and current) patents 
statute, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Patents Act’).7 In his article, Ricketson emphasised the 
importance of intellectual property laws for innovation and for modern society more generally,8 and 
recounted the way Australian intellectual property reform had occurred from inception until writing.9 
Although he noted that since the 1970s the reform process had improved,10 he commented that the 
formulation of new laws continued to be ‘haphazard’ and ‘inadequate’, particularly at the 
governmental level.11 Ricketson concluded with recommendations for a range of government level 
changes to improve this.12  
1 Henry Lawson, ‘Australian Engineers’ in Leonard Cronin (ed), A Fantasy of Man: Henry Lawson Complete Works, 1901–
1922 (Lansdown, 1984) 228, 228. 
2 Patents Act 1903 (Cth). 
3 Australian Bureau of Statistic, Australian Social Trends: Using Statistics to Paint a Picture of Australian Society (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 2–3. 
4 See for eg, Christopher Kent, Australian Economic Growth – The How, What and Where (11 March 2015) Reserve Bank of 
Australia <http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2015/sp-ag-2015-03-11.html>. 
5 Sam Ricketson, ‘The Future of Australian Intellectual Property Law and Reform’ (1992) 3 Australian Intellectual Property 
Journal 3. 
6 Ibid 4–5. 
7 Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Australia’s second piece of patent legislation, excluding amending acts, was the Patents Act 1952 
(Cth). 
8 Sam Ricketson, ‘The Future of Australian Intellectual Property Law and Reform’ (1992) 3 Australian Intellectual Property 
Journal 3, 5–9. 
9 Ibid 9–26. 
10 Ibid 17. 
11 Ibid 26. 
12 Ibid 26–30. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, Ricketson did not specifically refer to the role of academia in the law reform 
process. However, writing in the third volume of the newly minted Australian Intellectual Property 
Journal, he may have thought that Australian academic contributions to the development of new 
laws were not a weakness. Consistent with this conclusion, he praised detailed research papers that 
contributed to the drafting of the Patents Act, especially those that looked at broader economic and 
social issues.13 Indeed, these broader perspectives are important given that patent law directly 
affects the way many inventions are developed and brought to market. Assuming that academic 
commentary continues to be valued in the law reform process,14 this thesis aims to contribute to this 
body of work by evaluating whether, in light of emergent issues, the law operates consistently with 
justifications that underpin it. Secondarily, where deficiencies are identified in the current operation 
of the law, solutions, within the context of the analysis, are provided. In this way, this thesis aims to 
evaluate the boundaries of current patent infringement law and, where defects are identified, 
recommend new ones. 
The emergent issues identified in this study arise in two forms: technological and legal. The 
technological issues arise due to the development of new technology and the legal issues emerge 
due to recent case law or legislative amendment. Evaluating the operation of patent law in light of 
emergent issues is a vital function. If the law is not evaluated at regular intervals, there is a chance 
that in this age of rapid technological advancement and evolving business practices, it will become 
outdated and not meet the requirements of modern research and development environments.  
The reference to ‘patent infringement law’ in the title of this study is intended to distinguish its focus 
from other areas of patent law. Notably, this study does not address the the interpretation of claims, 
or laws relevant to patent validity, especially patentable subject matter, novelty, utility, inventive 
step and disclosure requirements; these topics have been addressed in detail elsewhere.15 Rather, 
this thesis focuses on patent infringement law because it is only through the enforcement of patents, 
or the threat of enforcement, that patents are imbued with economic value;16 otherwise, they are 
13 Ibid 17–19. 
14 This is not a baseless assumption, academic scholarship is referenced throughout legislative materials that have led to 
Australia most significant changes to patent law in the last 10 years, for eg, Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, which led to Intellectual Property Amendment Act (Raising the Bar) 2012 (Cth). 
15 For eg, see, Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Patentable Subject Matter (December 2010); Community Affairs 
Reference Committee, Senate, Gene Patents, (2010); Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Senate, Patent 
Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Materials) Bill 2010 (2011); see generally volume 22(1) of the Journal of Law, 
Information & Science, and in particular reference to Australia, Dianne Nicol and John Liddicoat, ‘Legislating to Exclude 
Gene Patents,: Difficult and Unhelpful, or Useful and Feasible? (2012) 22(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science 32; 
Charles Lawson, ‘Quantum of Obviousness in Australian patent laws’ (2008) 19 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 43; 
Hazel Moir, ‘Empirical Evidence on Inventive Step’ (2013) 35(5) European Intellectual Property Review 246; Hazel Moir, ‘An 
Inventive Step for the Patent System’ (2013) 35(3) European Intellectual Property Review 125; Charles Lawson, ‘Quantum of 
Obviousness in Australian Patent Laws’ (2008) 19 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 43; Hazel Moir, ‘Empirical 
Evidence on Inventive Step’ (2013) 35(5) European Intellectual Property Review 246; David J Brennan, ‘Does a Requirement 
that the Description Fully Supports a Product Claim Raise Australia from “Mechanistic and Improvereished” Patent Rules?” 
38(1) Monash University Law Review 78. 
16 Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 571. 
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what some authors have described as ‘rights without remedies’.17 That is, if there is no right of 
enforcement then competitors would be able to emulate patented technology at will.  
There is no one universal definition of ‘patent infringement law’ and this study uses the phrase quite 
broadly. For the purposes of this study, the phrase includes laws pertaining to standing (to enforce 
patents), infringement causes of action,18 and exemptions to infringement liability. To this list, this 
study adds laws relating to false representations about patents, or more specifically laws prohibiting 
falsely marking products as patented, more commonly known as ‘false patent marking’. Its relevance 
to patent infringement law is that it can create the illusion of infringement by indicating to market 
participants that a product is protected by patent rights.19  
The reference to ‘boundaries’ in the title is also used to indicate that each aspect of patent 
infringement law is not comprehensively reviewed. Rather, within each of the aspects of patent 
infringement law enumerated above (standing, infringement causes of action and others) this study 
identifies emergent issues that provide cause to evaluate whether the law operates consistently with 
the justifications that underpin it. For example, although ‘exemptions to infringement liability’ were 
raised as an element of patent infringement law above, this study does not address every defence or 
exemption to infringement, but focuses only on innocent infringement.20  
Before any aspects of patent infringement law can be properly examined in light of emergent issues, 
the justifications for patent law must first be described. What follows is a concise account of the 
primary economic justifications in patent law, including the trade-offs that such justifications entail. 
This account is necessary because it outlines fundamental assumptions that this thesis is based upon, 
thereby setting broad foundations for each chapter to build on, and, in certain circumstances, 
extend.  
II. Background
The Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organisation in 2003, Kamal Idris, stated: 
Intellectual property could be called the Cinderella of the new economy. A drab but useful servant, 
consigned to the dusty and uneventful offices of corporate legal departments until the princes of 
globalisation and technological innovation – revealing her true value  – swept her to prominence and 
gave her an enticing new allure.21 
17 For a similar conclusion drawn from the perspective of ‘divided infringement’ see, Lemley et al, ‘Divided Infringement 
Claims’ (2005) 33 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 255, 261. 
18 The nomenclature used to describe the various causes of action in this thesis are defined in this Introduction, see, pt VI. 
19 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 540 F Supp 2d 649, 654 (ED Va, 2008); Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False 
Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 480–1. 
20 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123. 
21 Kamal Idris, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool For Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 24. 
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The significance of this comment is that intellectual property, and in particular patent law, is no 
longer seen as an esoteric area of law. The reason for this, as economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, 
Robert Solow and Paul Romer have demonstrated,22 is that a significant part of economic growth is 
built on technological innovation. However, innovation is not only relevant to gross domestic product 
(or a company’s profit margin) it is vital for other aspects of social welfare too. This is visibly 
demonstrated in the development of technologies such as telecommunication and information 
technology. It is also clear in the human health setting, through the production of new drugs and 
vaccines that allow people to live longer, healthier lives. In this context then, it is not surprising that 
Australia’s patent regime is justified on economic grounds as a general welfare enhancing tool.23  
The primary economic justification for patent law is that inventions are desirable public goods, but if 
creation of them is not incentivised, expenditure of resources in them may occur at a sub-optimal 
rate.24 The reason sub-optimal investment may occur is due to the nature of inventions, which, at 
their heart, are applications of ideas or information.25 The properties of information that contribute 
to this problem are that information is ‘non-rival’, which means that use by one person does not 
diminish the opportunities for use by others, and it is ‘non-excludable’, which means that (in the 
absence of patent law) people cannot prohibit others from using it.26 It follows, then, that once an 
invention is revealed in a competitive market, other parties can usually understand how the 
invention works, emulate it, and sell it at a cheaper price than the inventor because they do not have 
to seek returns for the original expenditure in research and development.27 This mechanism of 
22 For example, see, Joseph A Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Harvard University Press, 1934); Robert M 
Solow, ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function’ (1957) 39 The Review of Economics and Statistics 312; 
Paul M Romer, ‘Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth’ (1986) 95 Journal of Political Economics 1002; Charles I Jones and 
John C Williams, ‘Measuring the Social Return to R&D’ (1998) 113 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1119; William M Landes 
and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 327. For a discussion 
on endogenous and exogenous growth theories and their role in innovation see, Idris, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool 
for Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 25–31. 
23 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual 
Property Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 May 1990, 1271 (Robert Ray); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 10 October 1990, 2565 (Simon Crean); Productivity Commission, Compulsory licensing of patents 
(2013) <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/patents> 35–6; JTI International SA v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 
250 CLR 1, 30 (French J). 
24 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
327; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 12–3. 
25 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v H N Norton & Co Ltd [1996] RPC 76, 79–80 (Lord Hoffman); Azuko Pty Ltd v Old Digger 
Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 72, 120 (Heerey J); Ann Monotti, ‘To Make an Article for Ultimate Sale: the Secret Use Provision in the 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth)’ (2005) 27(12) European Intellectual Property Review 446, 450. 
26 Productivity Commission, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, Report No 61 (2013) 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/patents> 36. 
27 Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 12–13; 
Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation Under the Competition 
Principles Agreement Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, 
Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Kenneth W Dam, 
‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247, 247–9; Arnold Plant, ‘The Economic 
Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions’ (1934) 1 Economica 30, 32. 
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copying inventions by competitors is commonly known as ‘free-riding’.28 Patent law is said to 
‘incentivise’ innovative activity by creating exclusive rights in inventions that prevent free riding for a 
20 year period and allow patentees to make a profit.29 
Beyond the ‘incentive’ nature of patents, there are a number of other factors that contribute to the 
efficiency of the patent system. One particularly important feature is that, although patent rights 
exist as the exception to a competitive market economy that, as a general rule, permits copying and 
imitation,30 they do not exempt inventions from other market forces. Indeed, a significant part of the 
economic utility of patents is owed to the fact that they operate like other pieces of property upon 
which market forces operate.31 Perhaps most critically, the grant of a patent does not mean a 
patentee becomes a monopolist in an entire market, but only in the specific technological invention 
that is described in their patent.32 The significance of this is that patentees’ products often compete 
with other substitutable products in a market. For example, a hypothetical new (patented) painkiller 
must compete with generic aspirin and ibuprofen. In the broader scheme of a large market, this 
means both that patentees often do not exercise monopoly power, and that they are susceptible to 
general market forces such as other innovative entrants and price competition.33 
Related to the notion that patents prevent free-riding, is the justification that patents create 
‘prospects’ to be exploited.34  The idea here is that patents create rights in innovative technology, 
but the technology to which they pertain often requires further development before it can be sold in 
a market product. However, this justification for patents is more complex than simply awarding 
patentees a right by which additional resources spent on commercialising an invention can be 
recouped.35 It continues that, through the patenting process, defined rights in inventions are 
efficiently allocated to people who have expertise in that technology, who then, operating as market 
participants, will choose an efficient method to bring products to market.36 Complementary to this 
28 See, eg, Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation Under the 
Competition Principles Agreement Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 23. 
29 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 67; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen 
Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 12–13; Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Kenneth W Dam, ‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247, 
249; Arnold Plant, ‘The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions (1934) 1 Economica 30, 32; contra Kenneth J 
Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in National Bureau of Economic Research (eds), 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (1962) 609. 
30 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
9; Gans et al, Principles of Economics (Thompson, 2nd ed, 2003) 22–3. 
31 See generally, Kenneth W Dam, ‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247. 
32 Ibid 249–51; see also, Thomas F Cotter, ‘Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between 
Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law’ (1999) 3 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 25, 28–34. 
33 Kenneth W Dam, ‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247, 249–51. 
34 See generally, Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 
265. 
35 Ibid 276–7. 
36 Ibid 266. 
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efficient allocation of resources, an important aspect of the processes by which patented inventions 
may be brought to market is that patentees often do not have all the necessary skills to do this.37 
Thus, in a division of labour, patentees often transfer their patent rights to parties that have 
complementary expertise.38 In this way, patents create prospective rights that can be exploited,39 
and create relatively well defined ‘modules’ that enable this through trade with other parties.40 
This brief examination of the primary positive economic effects of patents is incomplete without 
referring to their disclosure function.41 Although this thesis will not address the law relating to 
disclosure in detail, it is important to note its function.42 At its most basic the disclosure element of 
patent law satisfies the fundamental public good of information by disclosing how an invention 
works. However, it also serves several more specific economic outcomes. Notably, by informing third 
parties how the invention works, it can prevent duplicative efforts in creating inventions, can enable 
third parties to copy the invention when patent protection ends, and can enable parties to ‘invent 
around’ an invention when a patent is on foot.43 Although some commentators consider the 
disclosure element of patent law to be a secondary justification,44 Professors Landes and Posner 
argue that it should not be underestimated, especially when it is compared to a competitive market 
without patent law.45 The authors stress that without patent protection, firms would spend more 
resources maintaining secrecy, and that this in turn would prevent inventors from licensing-out 
technology that could improve other parties’ operations, or prevent other parties from finding new 
applications for the technology.46 They also suggest that without patents, it would be easier for large 
companies with economies of scale to dominate certain markets because through patented 
37 Ibid 277–8. 
38 Ibid; For an exploration in the Australian drug discovery and development sector see, Nicol et al, The Innovation Pool in 
Biotechnology: The Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation (Occasional Paper No 8, Centre for Law and Genetics, 2014) 48, 
49–50, 57–65, 76–80, 84–6, 87–9 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>. 
39 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(2). 
40 Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 277–9; 
Henry E Smith, ‘Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 
1742, 1747–8, 1756–66. 
41 For other positive economic effects that patents entail, see, Clarisa Long, ‘Patent Signals’ (2002) 69 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 625; F Scott Kieff and Troy A Pardedes, ‘Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the 
Anticommons Problem’ (2007) 48 British Colombia Law Review 11; Henry E Smith, ‘Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1742; Mark A Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ 
(2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709. 
42 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(a); Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceuticals v Eli Lilly & Co (2005) 225 ALR 416, 484–95; 
Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, 46–8. 
43 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
302; Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 276. 
44 See, eg, Alan Devlin, ‘The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law’ (2010) 23(2) Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology 401; Mark A Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709, 745–9. 
45 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
326–33. 
46 Ibid 328–29. 
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inventions (that prevent larger firms from free-riding) it is easier for smaller, emerging firms to 
compete.47 
Before discussing how these positive aspects of patents are traded-off against some negative 
aspects, three further points must be made. First, numerous other theories exist to justify patent 
law. These range from Locke’s labour theory48 to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,49 and beyond.50 It is 
quite likely that these justifications, or others, will continue to develop and perhaps grow in 
influence. However, as stated at the outset, the primary rationale for Australian patent law is 
currently economic.51 
Second, whilst few would argue against the importance of innovation and technology in society, 
whether patents do in fact incentivise innovation is not clear.52 In the words of Idris, ‘[c]urrent data 
regarding the importance of IP in economic development is still limited’.53 Notably, there is no doubt 
that innovation occurs without patents;54 for example many advances in computer software in the 
early 1980s were not patented,55 and one study in computer software indicates that patents may 
actually retard development.56 More broadly, various studies regarding the economic effects of 
patents, both in Australia and elsewhere, have shown that their economic utility is questionable,57 
and may be limited to certain industries, such as pharmaceuticals58 because, amongst other things, it 
47 Ibid 330; see also, Ashish Arora and Robert P Merges, ‘Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries’ 
(2004) 13 Industrial and Corporate Change 451, 471–2. 
48 See generally, John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing Company, first published in 1680, 1980 ed) 
ch 5; discussed in Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2011) 14–5, 34–48. 
49 See generally, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (H B Nisbet, Cambridge University 
Press, 8th ed, 2003) [trans of: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (first published 1821)]; discussed in Peter Drahos, A 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Ashgate Publishing, 1996) 74–82, 88. 
50 See, eg, Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2011); Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property (Ashgate Publishing, 1996); William Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ in Stephen R Munzer (ed), 
New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
51 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 May 1990, 1271 (Robert Ray); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 10 October 1990, 2565 (Simon Crean). 
52 The related point of whether patents increase social welfare is considered below. 
53 Kamal Idris, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool For Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 37; 
see also, William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 
2003) 326–7. 
54 See for eg, Michele Boldrin and David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 42–57. 
55 Ibid 15–22. 
56 See generally, James Bessen and Eric Maskin, ‘Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation’ (2009) 40(4) RAND Journal 
of Economics 611, 628.  
57 For a review, see, Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 572–5. 
See also, Edith Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Fritz Machlup, An 
Economic Review of the Patent System (Study no 15 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Government Printing Office, 1958); James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent 
Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) chs 4–6; Walter G Park and Juan Carlos Ginarte, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Economic Growth’ (1997) 15 Contemporary Economic Policy 51, 60; Arora et al, ‘R&D and the Patent Premium’ (2003) NBER 
(Working Paper 9431, The National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2004) 35–6 contra Keith E Maskus, Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International Economics, 2000) chs 4–5. For Australia see, T D 
Mandeville, D M Lamberton and E J Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian Patent (Report to the Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982). 
58 Levin et al, ‘Appropriating the Return from Industrial Research and Development’ (1987) 3 Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 783, 797. 
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raises the cost of imitation.59 In Australia, the government sponsored economic analysis of patent 
law that was conducted prior to the drafting of the Patents Act, ‘Report on the Economics Effects of 
the Australian Patent System’,60 considered that the ‘economic benefits of the patent system to the 
innovative process in Australia are not only small, but extremely subtle.’61 Nevertheless, as Indris has 
stated, ‘[i]t is difficult to analyse the role of IP in the economic development process because of 
complexities in separating or disaggregating the effects of IP protection from other factors’.62 
Idris’ statement on IP and its effects on economic development leads to the third point that must be 
made. The economists Professor Peter Carroll and Eduardo Pol outline five broad factors that 
influence innovation. These include: 
1. political environment; 
2. general economic framework; 
3. legal framework; 
4. technology distribution power; and 
5. other incentive regimes.63 
The ways in which these factors can, and do, interact is diverse, particularly when it is considered 
that within these factors are tax, education, finance, political stability, research subsidies and culture. 
For example, it is difficult for innovation to occur without an educated population, access to 
underlying technology, or funding. However, it is not just these wider economic and social factors 
that influence how innovation occurs. Various aspects of patent law — which come within Carroll 
and Pol’s ‘legal framework’ — can operate to prohibit or slow innovation. Important aspects of 
patent law that can negatively affect innovation are elaborated upon below, with a focus on those 
relevant to the emergent issues that will be discussed in this study. 
Generally speaking, market economies such as Australia’s rely on competition to lower prices, 
increase variety, increase socially valued items, and generally enhance social welfare.64 However, 
59 Ibid 811; see also, Mansfield et al, ‘Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study (1981) 91 The Economic Journal 907, 
913–4; Arora et al, ‘R&D and the Patent Premium’ (2003) NBER (Working Paper 9431, The National Bureau of Economic 
Research, November 2004) 35–6; cf Yi Qian, ‘Do Additional National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global 
Patenting Environment’ (2007) 89(3) Review of Economics and Statistics 436, 450. 
60 T D Mandeville, D M Lamberton and E J Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian Patent (Report to the Industrial 
Property Advisory Committee, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982). 
61 Ibid 211. 
62 Kamal Idris, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool For Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 37; 
see also, Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International Economics, 2000) 44; 
William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 9, 
310–26; Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 573–4;  D Mandeville, 
D M Lamberton and E J Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian Patent (Report to the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982) 214. 
63 Eduardo Pol and Peter Carroll, An Introduction to the Creative Economy (Innovation Planet, 2005) 52. 
64 Economic Planning Advisory Council, Promoting Competition in Australia (1989) 5–10; Philip L Williams, ‘Why Regulate for 
Competition?’ in Michael James (eds), Regulating for Competition? (Centre for Independent Studies, 1989) 13–18. 
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patent rights create 20 year barriers65 (subject to extension in some circumstances66) to commercial 
applications of inventions beyond those that patentees permit. Such barriers may occur when 
patentees charge high prices for licences, choose not to exploit an invention, or choose not to 
authorise others to exploit an invention. Of course, barriers such as these are intrinsic to the 
incentive nature of exclusive rights. But, in certain contexts, they may be quite problematic. For 
example, if an invention would be realised in a similar time period without the patent incentive, then 
the cost to society in awarding a patent may exceed any benefit the patent confers.67 In addition, if a 
product is the only solution to a technical issue, for example, a test or treatment for a particular 
disease, then the high cost or restricted access may mean people’s health is put at risk.68 More 
broadly, in cumulative industries such as software where products are often characterised by low 
cost, rapid, incremental improvements, and short lifecycles, 20 year patent barriers can be 
problematic for follow-on innovation.69 
However, it is more than just the exclusive rights of individual patents that may negatively affect 
innovation. At any one point in time, millions of granted patents may be on foot in some 
jurisdictions, with hundreds of thousands more awaiting examination.70 Reading one patent and 
identifying exactly what it means is time consuming and often requires legal and scientific expertise, 
which means that searching through a large volume of patents can be particularly difficult and 
resource expensive. Moreover, when determining patent infringement, these costs can be 
exacerbated by analysis of associated legal tests for patent validity and infringement which can be 
difficult to apply. It is a classic legal conundrum that human language will lead to linguistic 
uncertainty,71 and in patent scenarios, whether a patent exists, combined with patent claim language 
and tests for infringement means there can be significant uncertainty in the perimeters of patent 
rights.72 If it is too resource expensive to search patent databases and analyse what they mean, 
parties who would otherwise be willing to conduct a freedom-to-operate analysis to establish that 
their new product is not infringing a patent (or to obtain a licence if it does) may choose not to do 
65 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 67. 
66 Ibid ch 6 pt 3. 
67 Mark A Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709, 712–38; for a brief comment on 
the interaction between market power and competition law, see, Peter Heerey and Nicole Malone, ‘RPM for RPM: National 
Phonograph Company of Australia v Menck’ in Andrew T Keyon, Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Landmarks in 
Australian Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 52. 
68 Global Commission on HIV and the Law, Risks, Rights and Health (United Nations Development Programme, July 2012) ch 
6. 
69 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law (2003) 89(7) Virginia Law Review 1575, 1619–24. 
70 World Intellectual Property Office, World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO Economic and Statistics Series, 2013) 43–
87. 
71 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd, 1994) 124–36. 
72 Ibid; Mark D Janis and Timothy R Holbrook, ‘Patent Law’s Audience’ (2012) 97 Minnesota Law Review 72; Tun-Jen Chiang 
and Lawrence B Solum, ‘The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law’ (2013) 123 Yale Law Journal 530; Sir 
Robin Jacob, ‘Is Intellectual Preoprty the Grit in the Wheels of Industry?’ (Speech delivered at the Gray’s Inn Reading, 
Gresham College, 25 June 2002). 
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so.73 Alternatively, a freedom-to-operate analysis may be completed and incorrectly conclude that a 
new product is not infringing.74 In turn, either of these situations can lead to patent litigation, where 
parties are unsure whether they have infringed or not. Indeed, in the US, billions of dollars are 
directed to litigating patents each year.75 In this context, Professor Michael Meurer and James 
Bessen argue that this expense mitigates against the positive economic effects that patents may have 
because it means parties must continually expend significant resources identifying what the 
perimeters of patents actually are.76  
Large volumes of patents can also be a problem for parties that are developing new products in 
another respect. If a new product builds on patented technology, then the production and sale of it 
may infringe one or more patents. Accordingly, to avoid infringement, parties producing new 
products may need to seek licences (or ownership) from various patentees. In industries such as 
biotechnology, that may require a number of patent licences, this is problematic because bargaining 
breakdowns may mean the new product cannot be developed.77 This situation could arise through 
one patentee asking a price that is too high, or licence terms that are too restrictive.78 It could also 
arise through an accumulation of licences with different parties which together mean the price is too 
high or terms too restrictive.79 Such outcomes are known as an ‘anti-commons effect’ and put follow-
on innovation at risk.80 
Closely related to the idea of the anti-commons is that of ‘patent thickets’. These arise due to vast 
numbers of patents that are granted on similar or related technology with potentially overlapping 
claims.81 Patent thickets can slow or redirect innovation to other areas because it may be too costly 
to clear thickets by investing resources to conduct freedom-to-operate analyses and negotiate the 
right licences. Alternatively, the thicket may be too dense for any analysis to conclusively identify 
how many patents need to be licensed.82  
73 Michael Meurer, ‘Patent Notice and Cumulative Innovation’ in Manne GA and Wright JD (eds), Competition Policy and 
Patent Law under Uncertainty (Cambridge, 2011) 332. The brief review of companies undertaking patent clearance 
assessments here does not specifically say that companies do not undertake them because they are too expensive. Rather, 
it is implicit that if they could be achieved, quickly, easily and cheaply, and that they were reliable, than more firms would 
undertake them to ensure they are not infringing patents. 
74 See, Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2071 (2011). 
75 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) ch 6. 
76 Ibid 64–8, ch 4. 
77 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89(7) Virginia Law Review 1575, 1624–1627. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research' 
(1998) 280 Science 698, 699. 
80 See generally, ibid. 
81 Carl Shapiro ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ in A Jaffe, J Lerner, S Stern 
(eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy (MIT Press, 2001) 119–26; Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law (2003) 89(7) Virginia Law Review 1575, 1614–5. 
82 Carl Shapiro ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ in A Jaffe, J Lerner, S Stern 
(eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy (MIT Press, 2001) 126–29; see also, Nicol et al, The Innovation Pool in 
Biotechnology: The Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation (Occasional Paper No 8, Centre for Law and Genetics, 2014) 
89–92 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>. 
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There are three further negative aspects of patents that are not central to this study, but will be 
outlined for completeness. One issue is that, due to the cost of litigation, parties can sometimes 
strategically use patents to extract licence fees from alleged infringers when a cost-benefit analysis 
favours settlement over litigating validity and infringement.83 Second, a related phenomenon has 
also occurred, predominantly in the US, where firms acquire patents with no intention of producing 
products, and extract licence fees or financial relief in litigation that are in excess of the contribution 
the invention has made to society – this is commonly known as ‘patent trolling’.84 Third, if litigation is 
common in an area of research and development, the threat of litigation may discourage firms from 
entering such areas, or, if they have entered, cause them to adjust research interests.85 
The justifications and trade-offs for patent law outlined above, lay the ground work for further 
analysis in this thesis. This brief discussion also forms important background information on whether 
patents actually achieve their aim of enhancing innovation and enhancing social welfare. On this 
point, some commentators argue that patent regimes worldwide should be abolished.86 This position 
is taken primarily on the basis that overall, patent systems do not incentivise innovation and that the 
net social effects of patents are actually welfare-reducing.87 In the Australian context, the Report on 
the Economics Effects of the Australian Patent System concluded that the ‘benefit/cost ratio of the 
patent system in Australia is negative, or at the very best, in balance.’88 Despite this, as various other 
economists have pointed out, whether innovation is enhanced and whether social welfare is 
enhanced are questions that have yet to be conclusively answered and perhaps cannot be.89 
Moreover, abolishing the patent system carries its own costs. On this point, Professor Bronwyn Hall 
comments that ‘industrial organisation and firms adapt to the institutional regime in which they 
operate and changing this regime, whatever it is, involves substantial short-term costs that may not 
be outweighed by the long-term benefits.’90 It is interesting to note that the Australian government 
has recently requested that the Australian Productivity Commission review Australia’s intellectual 
property systems. The terms of reference for this review are quite broad, they include assessing 
whether appropriate ‘incentives for innovation, investment and the production of creative works 
exist’, and ensuring that they ‘do not unreasonably impede further innovation, competition, 
83 Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 571. 
84 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, ‘The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes’ (Boston University School of Law Working 
Paper No. 12-34, 28 June 2012) 24–5. 
85 See, Josh Lerner, ‘Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors’ (1995) 38(2) Journal of Law and Economics 463. 
86 See eg, Michele Boldrin and David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 6–7. 
87 Ibid 10–11.  
88 T D Mandeville, D M Lamberton and E J Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian Patent (Report to the Industrial 
Property Advisory Committee, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982) 213. 
89 Kamal Idris, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool For Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 37; 
see also, William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 
2003) 326–7; Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 575, 583. 
90 Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 575, 575. 
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investment and access to goods and services.’91 Thus, in the absence of this review, or any other 
other research, debunking the economic justifications for the patent system, or the creation of a 
better alternative, this thesis operates under the assumption that the economic rationales for 
patents are justified and aims to ensure Australia’s patent laws reflect them. Indeed, as this thesis 
points out, in some instances it is possible to enhance the positive effects of patents and minimise 
the negative ones. 
III. Overview of this Study & Methodology 
As outlined above, this study narrows its focus to emergent issues relevant to patent infringement 
law. Beyond this narrowing, there are two further methodological matters that must be mentioned. 
The first relates to the identification of emergent technological and legal issues, and the second to 
the process of analysis adopted in each chapter. On the emergent technological and legal issues, the 
method of selecting these issues was based on two criteria. Each must have been: - amenable to doctrinal legal analysis and qualitative economic-based reasoning; and - open to the formulation of a plausible and desirable solution, if examination of the emergent 
issue warrants a change in the law. 
There is little doubt that additional emergent technological and legal issues to the ones addressed in 
this thesis could be identified using these criteria. However, this study is not intended to be 
exhaustive in this sense, but to continue scholarly commentary analysing whether the law handles 
emergent issues consistent with its underpinnings. Moreover, although there are many emergent 
legal and technological issues, not all lend themselves to doctrinal legal analysis and qualitative 
economic-based reasoning. For example, there is ongoing debate about whether exemptions to 
infringement should extend to not-for-profit uses of inventions in some circumstances, or to use in 
human genetic diagnostic services.92 However, how and when these exemptions are warranted, and 
whether they would improve the use of the invention without eroding the incentive to invent it, are 
not clear without more data. Similarly, whether these issues would be best resolved using legal 
mechanisms such as Crown Use93 or compulsory licences94 are not clear either. 
With regard to the methodology, the approach throughout this thesis is almost exclusively 
qualitative. An exception to this is in chapter 7 where a quantitative assessment of law suits in the US 
is undertaken to examine the provision in the Patents Act prohibiting false patent marking (the 
91 Intellectual Property Arrangements (18 August 2015) Productivity Commission 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/intellectual-property/terms-of-reference>. 
92 Nicol et al, The Innovation Pool in Biotechnology: The Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation (Occasional Paper No 8, 
Centre for Law and Genetics, 2014) 181 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>; US Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Genetics,  Health and Society, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and their Impact on Patient 
Access to Genetic Tests (2010) Washington DC, 87, 97. 
93 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch 17. 
94 Ibid ch 12. 
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methodology of collecting and analysing these data is included in the chapter). More generally, each 
chapter includes a close doctrinal analysis of an emergent issue in combination with consideration of 
relevant underpinning economic rationales (and trade-offs) for patent law. Pursuant to both the 
economic and legal perspectives, each chapter also involves a foreign comparative law component. 
Depending on the context of the analysis, this comparative law component gives perspective on the 
reasoning within each topic and, in some circumstances, is used to identify solutions to any 
deficiencies in the law that the analysis may expose. Indeed, in the context of patent law, 
comparative law forms an economic perspective itself because harmonisation of patent laws is 
pursued to increase the efficiency of the global patent system.95 The next section of this introduction 
outlines the main methodological features of each chapter in greater detail and introduces the 
emergent issues. 
Chapter 1 analyses standing to initiate patent infringement actions under s 120(1) of the Patents Act. 
This provision permits patentees and exclusive licensees to initiate infringement actions. However, 
recent Australian case law has highlighted an issue with the definition of ‘exclusive licensee’. More 
specifically, litigants have queried whether an ‘exclusive licensee’ is only constituted by a party who 
controls the full complement of rights conferred in a patent, or whether it also includes a licensee 
who receives exclusivity to a partitioned sphere of rights within a patent. This is important because if 
licensees who exclusively control partitioned elements of patent rights, such as the ability to exploit 
an invention in a geographic area, cannot initiate infringement actions, the economic value of a 
patent may be eroded. This in turn may negatively affect the utility of patents as assets or ‘prospects’ 
to be exploited by exclusive licensees. This chapter compares the current operation of the provision 
to the economic justifications for patent law as they apply to standing, with particular emphasis 
placed on the use of patents in market economies. This chapter also contrasts the operation of the 
Australian provision against its equivalents in the US and UK. Based on these insights, in particular 
the economic reasoning, recommendations are made to reform the provision. 
Chapters 2 to 5 explore the boundaries of specific infringement causes of action. As explained in 
detail below, infringement actions can be grouped into two categories: infringement by exploitation; 
and secondary infringement.96 Chapter 2 explores the boundaries of these causes of action in the 
context of 3D printers. 3D printers are a relatively new technology that allows users to print tangible 
objects from digital computer files. This ‘printing’ process is broadly analogous to the way an inkjet 
printer reproduces text on paper from digital computer files. The primary enquiry in this chapter is 
whether the creation or distribution of files that can instruct 3D printers to create tangible objects 
95 B+ Sub-Group, ‘Objectives and Principles, with Commentary on Potential Outcomes’ (Group B+ Sub-Group on Patent 
Harmonisation, 27 May 2015) 2; Jeremy Phillips, Harmonious Global Patent Harmonisation? B+ Subgroup Asks for 
Comments (17 June 2015) IPKat <http://ipkitten.blogspot.com.au/2015/06/harmonious-global-patent-
harmonisation.html>; Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and Patent Policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 568, 569. 
96 The specific terminology used in this thesis is explained in pt V of this Introduction.  
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may constitute infringement of patents that claim the objects printed. This is a key issue because as 
3D printing technology develops, the ability for people to easily share files that are capable of 
instructing a 3D printer to print tangible objects may lead to wide scale infringement of objects that 
are protected by patent rights. In turn, this infringement may mean that the economic value of 
certain patents is diminished. As this analysis demonstrates, at the heart of this issue is whether 
patent infringement law should be extended to protect more abstract features of information than it 
currently does. Infringement liability for distributing these files in Australia is also compared to the 
position in the US. In all, this approach permits an evaluation of whether Australian infringement 
actions balance the economic interests of patentees, with the interests of third parties to use 
information without specifically re-creating patented inventions. 
Chapter 3 investigates a contentious element of secondary infringement law that arises when two 
parties, who are in an arm’s-length relationship, jointly perform all the steps in a method patent – 
this has become known as ‘divided performance’. This issue has recently come to light due to a series 
of US cases. Controversially, the US Federal Circuit found liability in these circumstances under a 
legislative form of ‘induced infringement’, but the Supreme Court reversed this finding.97 These cases 
have received significant commentary in the US because they raise the prospect that parties can 
arrange their affairs to have a client or customer perform a step of a method patent and thereby 
avoid infringement liability. As described in the chapter, this finding may be problematic because 
patentees to a wide variety of technologies, in particular, computer networking and Internet 
mediated communications, potentially rely on divided performance constituting infringement. 
Accordingly, this lack of protection may mean the patent incentive to create certain technologies is 
diminished. On the other hand, the majority’s finding in the Federal Circuit has been criticised for 
unnecessarily extending the boundaries of patent infringement law and opening it up to abuse.98 
Given this controversy in the US, this chapter analyses whether the facts from these cases might 
create infringement liability in Australia. Finding that no clear liability pathway exists, this chapter 
continues to examine this outcome in the context of patent law’s underpinnings and the current 
operation of ‘procured infringement’99 in Australia. From the analysis in this chapter, conclusions are 
then drawn on how procured infringement should operate in the future. 
Chapter 4 focuses on a specific type of secondary infringement that exists under s 117(2)(b) of the 
Patents Act. This provision can, in certain circumstances, make the act of supplying non-patented 
products that can be put to both non-infringing and infringing uses, constitute infringement itself. 
One of the key reasons to implement this provision was to give patentees additional protection for 
97 See generally, Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111 (2014); Akamai Technologies Inc v 
Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
98 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1325 (Fed Cir, 2012) 1333 (Newman J). 
99 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 263; Danisco AS v Novozymes 
AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–45; Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72. 
27 
Introduction 
patented uses of known products. However, in light of recent Australian case law and comparative 
law in the US, the analysis in this chapter shows that the provision’s current operation extends too 
far. Of particular concern is the ability of patentees to use the provision to foreclose supply of certain 
non-patented products by third parties, even though the products have substantial non-infringing 
uses.  
Chapter 5 builds directly on chapter 4, with the broad aim of recommending a legislative solution to 
the problem with s 117(2)(b) and thereby balance its ability to protect patented uses of known 
products with supply of them for non-infringing uses. Since one of the primary reasons for legislating 
the provision was the drive of international harmonisation, this chapter evaluates foreign approaches 
to the equivalent of s 117(2)(b) in the US and UK. A wide variety of legislative mechanisms are 
analysed and one is identified as a solution to further refine the operation of the provision. 
Chapter 6 examines the exemption to infringement liability known as innocent infringement, which is 
legislated in s 123 of the Patents Act. Broadly speaking, this provision is designed to absolve 
infringers from monetary relief for their infringing actions if, at the time, they were unaware that 
they were infringing a patent. Although this provision is infrequently litigated, it has come to notice 
recently due to one Australian case and a legislative amendment to the equivalent provision in the 
US. This chapter focuses on the role of marking products as patented in determining whether 
infringers were aware that their activities constituted infringement. Through the use of the term 
‘marking products as patented’ this thesis is referring to the practise of physically marking products 
as ‘patented’. Since little case law exists on the issue, and the topic has received little scholarship, 
this chapter offers an expansive analysis of the provision, including quite an extensive interpretation 
of it with reference to the foreign legislation it was based on. This chapter also extends the 
economic-based rationale for patents to the law of innocent infringement, incorporating Bessen and 
Meurer’s idea of demarcating the perimeters of patents.100 From the observations made in this 
chapter, recommendations are made to improve the operation of the provision.  
Chapter 7 addresses law relating to false representations about patents, with a specific focus on the 
law prohibiting false patent marking under s 178(2) of the Patents Act. As alluded to above, false 
patent marking can operate to illegitimately exclude competitors from markets by deceiving them 
into believing that they risk patent infringement. False patent marking has recently come to global 
notice due to a recent boom and bust cycle of litigation in the US. Very little scholarship has been 
conducted on s 178(2), as a result this chapter explores the provision’s history, interpretation, 
economic underpinnings, and overlapping operation with consumer law. This chapter also uses the 
causative factors of the litigation cycle in the US to examine the effectiveness of the Australian 
100 See generally, James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) ch7. 
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provision. In light of the economic basis for the law, and insight gained through the comparison, 
recommendations for law reform are made to improve the operation of the provision. 
IV. Scope
In conducting this study, two limitations have narrowed its scope. First, although all the chapters
build on foreign domestic material to some extent, this thesis does not purport to offer an exhaustive
assessment of foreign domestic law. Second, throughout this thesis, short historical evaluations of
various laws are provided. In each circumstance the historical evaluation is not provided as an
exhaustive account of the development of the law, but draws on historical fact to inform various
arguments.
V. Nomenclature and Footnoting Issues
Most terminological matters are dealt with in each chapter, however, at this stage it is advantageous 
to draw attention to two specific uses of terminology. Section 13(1) of the Patents Act confers on 
patentees the ‘twin rights’ to ‘exploit’ a patent, and to ‘authorise’ others to ‘exploit’ a patent.101 
‘Direct infringement’ is a term commonly used in patent law, and in Blueport Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Sewerage Management Services Pty Ltd,102 Barker J directly addressed the meaning of it under the 
Patents Act. His Honour classified infringement of both the right to ‘exploit’ a patent and the right to 
‘authorise’ others to ‘exploit’ a patent, as ‘direct infringement’.103 Barker J did clarify that these rights 
are different ‘species’ of ‘direct infringement’,104 however, this definition raises the possibility of 
ambiguous use of the term ‘direct infringement’. This ambiguity occurs because extrinsic material to 
the Patents Act105 and modern case law use the term ‘direct infringement’ as a synonym for when a 
party encroaches upon a patentees right to ‘exploit’ a patent.106 As a result, when discussing 
Australia law, this thesis will eschew the terms ‘direct infringement’ and ‘direct infringer’. Instead it 
will use the terms ‘infringement by exploitation’ and ‘infringer by exploitation’.  
Whilst this nomenclature makes sense when discussing Australian patent law, it does not in the UK 
and US. ‘Direct infringement’ is a term of art in these countries. More specifically, it refers to 
infringement under s 60(1) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK)107 and 35 US § 271(a) respectively.108 Thus, 
the term ‘direct infringement’ will be retained when discussing law in these jurisdictions, as will the 
term ‘indirect infringement’ which, as case law in both jurisdictions indicates, refers to infringement 
101 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1, 33. 
102 Blueport Nominees Pty Ltd v Sewerage Management Services Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 631 (24 June 2015). 
103 Ibid [84]–[88]. 
104 Ibid [85]. 
105 See, eg, Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Parliament of Australia, Patents, Innovation and Competition in 
Australia (1984) 67. 
106 See, eg, Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 612, 642 (Crennan J). 
107 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 60(1). 
108 Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177, 184 (Neuberger J); Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 
134 S Ct 2111, 2115–7 (2014). 
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in the UK under s 60(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK)109 and infringement under 35 US §§ 271(b)–
(c).110 Related to this nomenclature, the phrase ‘contributory infringement’, as far as possible, will 
not be used in this thesis because it can be confusing.111 Not using the term ‘contributory 
infringement’ can, in itself, cause some confusion when discussing US law because this terminology is 
commonly used to refer to certain causes of action there. However, by outlining this nomenclature 
now, hopefully any ambiguity can be avoided. 
The term ‘indirect infringement’ is used in Australian law but its meaning can also be ambiguous. In 
Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2),112 Bennett J used the term to refer to ‘authorised 
infringement’.113 But clearly, this conflicts with Barker J’s assessment in Blueport Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Sewerage Management Services Pty Ltd. Consequently, this thesis will only use the term ‘indirect 
infringement’ to describe causes of action in the US and UK. When referring to causes of action other 
than infringement by exploitation in Australia, this thesis will use the term ‘secondary infringement’. 
This means that ‘secondary infringement’ refers to supply infringement under s 117 of the Patents 
Act, as well as ’authorising’ others to ’exploit’ the invention under s 13(1) of the Patents Act, and the 
common law causes of action ‘common design’114 and ‘procurement infringement’.115 In this way, 
infringement by exploitation results from exploitation of a patented invention by one party, whereas 
secondary infringement results from a party’s involvement with the exploitation of the invention that 
may be wholly or partially performed by another. Table 1 summarises the nomenclature used in this 
thesis. 
Table 1 Terms used in this thesis 
Infringement 
Terminology 
Used In This 
Thesis 
What The Term Refers To 
Infringement by 
exploitation 
Encroachment upon a patentees right to ‘exploit’ a patent under s 13(1) of the 
Patents Act. 
Authorised 
Infringement 
Encroachment upon a patentees right to ‘authorise’ others to ‘exploit’ a patent 
under s 13(1) of the Patents Act. 
Secondary 
infringement 
Authorised infringement under s 13(1) of the Patents Act, supply infringement 
under s 117 of the Patents Act, and the common law causes of action ‘common 
109 Ibid. 
110 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2116 (2014). 
111 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1341 (Fed Cir, 2012); Ann Dufty, Report to the 
Industrial Property Advisory Committee (Monash University Law School, 1983) vol 1, 208. 
112 Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209. 
113 Ibid 215, 244–5; see also, Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 848 (1 August 2011) [5]; 
Apotex v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 280. 
114 Apotex v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 277; SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water 
Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 118–9; see also, Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 510–11. 
115 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 263; Danisco AS v Novozymes 
AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–45; Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72. 
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design’ and ‘procured infringement’. 
Direct 
infringement 
Infringement under s 60(1) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37 and infringement 
under 35 US § 271(a). 
Indirect 
infringement 
Infringement under s 60(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37 and 35 US §§ 271(b)–
(c). 
The citation guide followed by the University of Tasmania Law School is the Australian Guide to Legal 
Citation.116 This guide recommends that in certain circumstances when citing a reference that has 
already been cited, ‘above n’ should be used to abbreviate that resource. This recommendation 
applies to books and articles, amongst other sources, when they are used in a previous footnote 
other than the immediately preceding footnote.117 Whilst the Australian Guide to Legal Citation 
generally sets the benchmark in Australian legal referencing, this practice causes significant 
inconvenience to readers because if they want to obtain citation details, including simply observing 
the title of what is cited, they must often turn (or scroll) several pages to find such details. This often 
causes readers to lose track of where they were up to and interrupts their train of thought. For these 
reasons, this thesis will not cite sources using ‘above n’. 
VI. External Publications & Contributions from Co-Authors
Modern legal research involves considerable team work. It is also very common to publish work as it
develops. Aspects of this thesis have been published in peer-reviewed journals and some work has
benefited with assistance from others. Where this has occurred, it is recorded in Table 2.
Table 2 Details of publications and contributions from co-authors 
Chapter Publication 
Details 
Co-Authors and Their 
Contribution to the 
Chapter 
Proportion of the Chapter Published (or in 
preparation) 
2 In preparation 
for submission 
Professor Dianne Nicol 
and Dr Jane Nielsen both 
contributed critical 
revisions 
The chapter is currently being significantly 
re-written for publication, but around half 
of the chapter is being retained as written 
in this thesis. 
4 Monash Law 
Review118 
N/A The chapter is effectively published as 
written here, with minor differences 
limited to those necessary for publication 
as an article 
6 Australian 
Intellectual 
N/A The chapter is effectively published as 
written here, with minor differences 
116 Melbourne University Law Review Association, Australian Guide to Legal Citation (Melbourne University Press, 3rd ed, 
2010). 
117 Ibid 8–9. 
118 Johnathon E Liddicoat, ‘Reluctance Realised? Emerging Problems with s 117(2)(b) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth)’ 
forthcoming Monash Law Review. 
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Properly 
Journal119 
limited to those necessary for publication 
as an article 
7 Journal of 
Law, 
Information & 
Science120 
Professor Dianne Nicol 
contributed critical 
revisions. 
The chapter is effectively published as 
written here, with minor differences 
limited to those necessary for publication 
as an article. 
119 Johnathon E Liddicoat, ‘Re-Evaluating Innocent Infringement in Australia: Patent Numbers and Virtual Marking’ (2014) 
24 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 18. 
120 Johnathon E Liddicoat and Dianne Nicol, ‘Re-Evaluating False Patent Marking in Australia’ (2012–2013) 22(2) Journal of 
Law, Information and Science 128. 
32 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1  
Standing on the Edge: What Type of ‘Exclusive Licensees’ Should Be 
Able to Initiate Patent Infringement Actions? 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 34 
I. Australian Law ........................................................................................................................... 36 
A. Preliminary Aspects to Standing ....................................................................................... 36 
B. Standing to Initiate Patent Infringement Suits Under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ........... 38 
II. Jurisprudence & Justifications ................................................................................................... 41 
A. Economic Reasoning ......................................................................................................... 42 
B. Related Legal Aspects ........................................................................................................ 47 
C. Arguments Against Standing for Partitioned Exclusive Licensees..................................... 48 
D. Summary on Jurisprudence & Justifications ..................................................................... 50 
III. Foreign Comparisons ............................................................................................................. 51 
A. US ...................................................................................................................................... 51 
B. UK ...................................................................................................................................... 53 
C. Summary on US and UK Standing Law .............................................................................. 55 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 56 
 
 
33 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis, the substantive analysis in this study begins with 
an examination of standing in patent law. This is a logical place for a thesis on patent infringement 
law to begin, because if a party alleging infringement does not satisfy the relevant standing 
requirements, then, even if the infringing actions are beyond doubt, no finding of infringement can 
be made by a court.  
Standing is a requirement of many legal actions. Essentially, a party has to show that they have a 
certain threshold of interest in a case before they will be eligible to litigate. For Australian lawyers, 
standing is often associated with constitutional and administrative law actions. However, a recent 
series of judicial decisions addressing the issue have now arisen in patent law. The Patents Act 1990 
(Cth) (‘the Patents Act’) specifies various standing requirements for different actions. Standing to 
revoke a patent is open to any party,1 as is opposition.2 In contrast, applications for relief from 
unjustified threats of infringement, and to rectify the register via a court are limited to ‘aggrieved’ 
persons.3 The focus of this chapter is on standing to initiate infringement actions under s 120(1) of 
the Patents Act, which states, ‘infringement proceedings may be started in a prescribed court … by 
the patentee or an exclusive licensee.’4 Relevantly, ‘patentee’ is defined as ‘the person for the time 
being entered in the Register as the grantee or proprietor of a patent’5 and ‘exclusive licensee’ 
means, ‘a licensee under a licence granted by the patentee and conferring on the licensee, or on the 
licensee and persons authorised by the licensee, the right to exploit the patented invention 
throughout the patent area to the exclusion of the patentee and all other persons.’6  
The Australian decisions alluded to above have highlighted issues with the definition of ‘exclusive 
licensee’. More specifically, the question that has arisen is whether an exclusive licensee is only 
constituted by a party who controls the full complement of rights conferred in a patent — this type 
of exclusive licence will be referred to in this chapter as a ‘panoplied exclusive licence’, in reliance on 
the etymological root of ‘panoply’ as a complete suit of armour.7 Or, in the alternative, the definition 
of ‘exclusive licensee’ also includes a licensee who receives exclusivity to a partitioned sphere of 
rights in a patent (a ‘partitioned exclusive licence’).8 Three variations of partitioned exclusive licences 
have been litigated in Australia. The first, and most litigated type, arises when a licensee exclusively 
1 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 138(1). 
2 Ibid s 59. 
3 Ibid ss 128(1), 192. 
4 Ibid s 120(1). Other non-statutory mechanisms to obtain standing have been outlined in theory, see, Emory University v 
Biochem Pharma Inc (1998) 86 FCR 1, 10 (Lindgren J); Uprising Dragon Ltd v Benedict Trading & Shipping Pty Ltd (1987) 16 
FCR 93, 102 (French J). 
5 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1 (definition of ‘patentee’). 
6 Ibid sch1 (definition of ‘exclusive licensee’) (emphasis added). 
7 Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Online 6th ed, Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2013). 
8 For the remainder of this chapter, unless otherwise indicates, the term ‘standing’ will be used to refer solely to the ability 
to initiate infringement proceedings. 
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controls less than the full list of ‘actions’ specified in the definition of ‘exploit’.9 As explored in more 
detail below, this type of licence arises, for example, when a licensee has the exclusive ability to sell 
an invention but not make or import it. The second variation arises when a licensee has the right to 
exclusively exploit a patent in a geographic area less than the ‘patent area’,10 and the third occurs 
when a licensee has the right to exclusively exploit a patent in a specific field-of-use. These three 
types of licences will be referred to as ‘action exclusive licences’, ‘geographic exclusive licences’, and 
‘field-of-use exclusive licences’ respectively (see Figure 1).11 
 
Figure 1 Diagram of the licences analysed in this chapter. 
Unlike standing in constitutional law, there is sparse Australian commentary on standing in patent 
law,12 and none that engages with its justifications or jurisprudential underpinnings. Extrinsic 
material to the Patents Act has not addressed the issue either,13 and, until a spate of cases in the last 
10 years, there has been little case law. As a result, it is difficult to judge whether standing 
requirements meet legislative aims, or are consistent with patent jurisprudence. The aim of this 
chapter is to evaluate whether standing requirements under the Patents Act are coherent with its 
underpinnings, and if not, recommend reform. Accordingly, this chapter develops an economic-based 
analysis of standing to initiate patent infringement actions, and compares Australian patent standing 
requirements with law in other major common law countries.  
9 These actions are often referred to as individual exclusive rights, for example the ‘exclusive right to make’, however, the 
Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has recently specified that these are not rights in themselves but rather 
‘activities’ that fall under the right of ‘exploit’, see, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1, 33; 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
10 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(3), sch 1 (definition of ‘patent area’). 
11 Timothy Denny Greene, ‘”All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing’ (2012–2013) 22 Federal 
Circuit Bar Journal 1, uses a similar nomenclature, at, 6–9. 
12 For example, see, Meltzer et al, ‘Joint Ownership of IP – Is it the Best Option for Collaborators?’ (2005) 18(3) Australian 
Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 37, 40; Richard Aarons, ‘Further Analysis of Collaboration IP Ownership structures’ (2005) 
18(3) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 41; Adam Liberman, ‘Some Problems with IP Holding Companies’ (2005) 
18(3) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 45, 45–6.  
13 See, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 May 1990, 1271 (Robert Ray); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 10 October 1990, 2565 (Simon Crean); Industrial Property Advisory Committee, 
Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984); Ann Dufty, 
Report to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee, (Monash University Law School, 1983) vol 1; Explanatory 
Memorandum, Patents Bill 1990 (Cth); Statement of the Minister for Science, Government Response to the Report of the 
Industrial Property Advisory Committee, ‘Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia’ (1986) 56 The Australian Official 
Journal of Patents, Trade Marks and Designs 47;  
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Following this aim, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 canvasses relevant Australian case 
law and demonstrates that, in the absence of a High Court decision to the contrary, only panoplied 
exclusive licensees have standing. Part 2 develops an economic-based analysis of the jurisprudence 
underpinning patent licensing and standing. In particular, it examines patents as economic assets in 
market economies and the role of division of labour in bringing inventions to markets. Part 3 explores 
standing requirements for exclusive licensees in the US and UK. This chapter concludes by observing 
that, consistent with patent jurisprudence and harmonisation efforts, standing should be broadened 
in Australia to include any licensee who exclusively controls a sphere of patent rights. 
I. Australian Law  
A. Preliminary Aspects to Standing 
To put the issues addressed in this chapter in context, it is first necessary to outline related aspects of 
standing law. Patent licences, at their most basic, are a type of contract that operates as a 
mechanism for patentees to electively permit others to practise their invention. Within the broad 
confines of laws relevant to licences, such as competition and contract law, patentees have freedom 
to contract. Thus, they may include a variety of terms including those directed to panoplied or 
partitioned exclusive licences. Section 120(2) of the Patents Act specifies that, although a patentee 
may begin infringement proceedings alone, when an exclusive licensee initiates an action, the 
patentee must be ‘joined as a defendant unless joined as a plaintiff’.14 The Australian Law Reform 
Commission, in their report on gene patents and human health, stated that, in effect, an exclusive 
licensee ‘stands in the shoes of the patent holder, subject to any additional terms relating to 
enforcement of patent rights in the licence agreement (for example, allocation of any damages 
awards, liability for the costs of any infringement proceedings, or the right to control proceedings)’.15 
Section 120(3) continues that, ‘[a] patentee joined as a defendant is not liable for costs unless the 
patentee enters an appearance and takes part in the proceedings.’16  
There are various reasons why it is appropriate for patentees to be joined in any proceedings relating 
to their patents, including that it makes them bound by the judgment, avoids res judicata issues, 
gives them an opportunity to be heard, and allows discovery of documents that may affect validity, 
infringement, or the licensee’s standing.17 However, due to circumstance, they need not enter a plea 
because they may have no interest in the case that is being pursued by the licensee. Such a situation 
could arise, for example, if a patentee licenses a patent in return for lump sum payments not linked 
14 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 120(2). 
15 Australian Law Reform Commission, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004) vol 1,  
(ALRC Report 99) 230 [9.40] n 62.  
16 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 120(3). 
17 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 20.13; the application of joinder rules, Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 9.02–9.05, are 
consider in more detail below.  
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to the success of the product protected by the patent. In this scenario they will receive payments 
regardless of any enforcement. 
Section 187 of the Patents Act requires that licences, assignments and other particulars of patents 
must be registered.18 In Stack v Brisbane City Council (No 2),19 Drummond J held that the combined 
interpretation of ss 120 and 187 meant that an unregistered assignee could not ordinarily bring an 
infringement action in their own name,20 but went on to outline instances in which an unregistered 
assignee could obtain relief.21 However, the position is different for exclusive licensees. In Grant v 
Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd,22 Holmes J held that because the definition of ‘exclusive 
licensee’ does not include a reference to registration, it is not necessary for a licensee to be 
registered for them to initiate infringement actions.23 Despite this, s 195(1) states, ‘[t]he Register is 
prima facie evidence of any particular registered in it.’24 Thus, registration may make it easier for an 
exclusive licensee to initiate an infringement action, as any alleged infringer contesting the licensee’s 
standing will have to overcome this prima facie evidence. But irrespective of the Register, a licensee 
will have standing if they can prove their licence is exclusive.  
Three further ancillary aspects of licences should be noted. First, parties to a licence cannot 
retrospectively change the rights and obligations between them.25 This means that a contract written 
as a non-exclusive licence and which operates as one, cannot be amended to state that at any time in 
the past it operated as an exclusive licence. Second, whether a licence is sole, exclusive, non-
exclusive, or actually an assignment, will be determined by a court regardless of its title.26 Generally 
speaking, this assessment will be based on rights conferred, wording of the contract and the 
objective intention of the parties.27 Third, eligibility for financial relief is limited to time periods in 
which parties have standing.28 
18 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 187(1); Patent Regulations 1991 (Cth) 19.1(1). 
19 Stack v Brisbane City Council (No 2) (1996) 67 FCR 510. 
20 Ibid 513; see also Townsend Controls Pty Ltd v Gilead (1989) 16 IPR 469, 471–2 (van Doussa J). 
21 Ibid 513–5. 
22 Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd (2003) 59 IPR 170. 
23 Ibid 179–80. 
24 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 195(1); it is also worth noting that regardless of registration, under contract law, an exclusive 
licensee will usually have standing to pursue a patentee for relief from infringement via breach of contract, see, Hassall v 
Wright (1870) LR 10 Eq 509, 513. 
25 Black & Decker Inc v GMCA Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 99, 125 (Heerey J). 
26 For example see, Reid v Moreland Timber Company Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1; Re An Application by the Preformed Line 
Products Company for an Extension of Letters Patent No 160999 [1971] ALJR 6, 8. 
27 See generally, Reid v Moreland Timber Company Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1; Re An Application by the Preformed Line 
Products Company for an Extension of Letters Patent No 160999 [1971] ALJR 6, 8; KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd v Insta 
Image Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 615, 637–8. 
28 Black & Decker Inc v GMCA Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 99, 127 (Heerey J); discussing Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock 
Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 112 CLR 25, 36, 41 (Windeyer J). 
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B. Standing to Initiate Patent Infringement Suits Under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
The first federal Australian patent legislation, the Patents Act 1903 (Cth), contained no statutory 
standing provision for exclusive licensees. Statutory standing for exclusive licensees was introduced 
into the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), and the contemporary standing interpretation issues in Australia 
begin under it. Section 114(1) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) specified that an ‘exclusive licensee may 
bring an action or proceeding for the infringement of a patent’.29 ‘Exclusive licensee’ was defined to 
mean ‘a licensee under a licence granted by the patentee which confers on the licensee, or on the 
licensee and persons authorised by him, the right to make, use, exercise and vend the patented 
invention, throughout Australia, to the exclusion of all other persons, including the patentee.’30 For 
reasons that will become apparent below, it is convenient to note the exclusive rights conferred 
under s 69 of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) were to ‘make, use, exercise and vend the invention…’.31  
In the 1963 case, Ex parte British Nylon Spinners (‘British Nylon Spinners’),32 the High Court was asked 
to determine whether either of the two licensee applicants qualified as exclusive licensees for the 
purpose of patent term extension.33 Under s 95 of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), only exclusive 
licensees and patentees could apply for an extension, and the definition of exclusive licensee was the 
same for patent term extension as it was for standing.34 The patent in question related to an 
‘improved process for melt-spinning nylon yarn’.35 The contract with the first licensee allowed the 
licensee to exclusively ‘make, use, exercise and vend’ the invention when the filament of yarn was 
.09 mm or less36 — a field-of-use exclusive licence. The second licensee was permitted to control all 
the rights in the patent subject to the first licensee’s rights.37 The Court found that, since neither of 
the licensees could enforce the patent to the ‘exclusion of all other persons’, neither were ‘exclusive 
licensees’ for the purpose of the Act and therefore neither had the ability to make the extension of 
term application.38  
Field-of-use licences have not been specifically addressed in recent case law. However, in addressing 
the questions of whether action exclusive licensees, or geographic exclusive licensees have standing 
under the Patents Act, recent cases have revisited British Nylon Spinners and emphasised its 
importance. These cases begin with Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd. Before analysing 
the case law though, it is first necessary to note the definition of ‘exploit’ under the Patents Act: 
29 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 114(1). 
30 Ibid s 6 (definition of ‘exclusive licensee’). 
31 Ibid s 69. 
32 Ex parte British Nylon Spinners Ltd; Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd’s Patent (1963) 109 CLR 336. 
33 Ibid 338–9. 
34 Ibid; Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 95. 
35 Ex parte British Nylon Spinners Ltd; Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd’s Patent (1963) 109 CLR 336, 336. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 337. 
38 Ibid 340. 
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in relation to an invention it includes: 
(a) where the invention is a product--make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to 
make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of 
those things; or 
(b) where the invention is a method or process--use the method or process or do any act mentioned in 
paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use.39 
In Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd, the defendant sought summary judgment on their 
counter claim to infringement and defence.40 Amongst the defendant’s arguments was that the 
plaintiff/licensee did not satisfy the definition of ‘exclusive licensee’ under the Patents Act, because 
the licence did not confer on the licensee all the activities in the definition of ‘exploit’. Or more 
specifically, it did not confer the ability to import products.41 In her Honour’s decision, Holmes J 
noted that the rights conferred by a patent had changed between the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) and 
Patents Act. Relevantly, they were exhaustively listed in the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), whereas they are 
inclusively defined in the Patents Act.42 From this her Honour reasoned that because the definition of 
‘exploit’ under the Patents Act is not exhaustive, for a licence to be exclusive, it need not 
exhaustively list all of the actions under the definition of exploit.43 Accordingly, Holmes J concluded 
that the Patents Act was open to ‘a plurality of exclusive licences’44 and that the failure to include a 
right to ‘import’ in the contract, which neither of the parties may have contemplated, was not 
necessarily fatal to it being an exclusive licence.45 In deciding whether the licence was exclusive, 
Holmes J assessed various parts of the contract and the intention of the parties. Her Honour focused 
on the fact the contract left no residual rights to the licensor, referred to it as being exclusive, and 
included a provision to reduce the licence to a non-exclusive one.46 In all, her Honour found that for 
the purposes of summary judgment, the licence was exclusive and therefore the plaintiff had 
standing.47 
In Pharmacia Italia SpA v Interpharma Pty Ltd,48 a licensee sought an interlocutory injunction against 
the respondent for importing an anti-tumour drug.49 The respondent argued that the licensee lacked 
standing to bring the action because they failed to satisfy the definition of an ‘exclusive licensee’. 
Relevantly, prior to the applicant obtaining their licence, which was purported to be exclusive, the 
39 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
40 Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd (2003) 59 IPR 170, 171–2. 
41 Ibid 180. 
42 Ibid 182. 
43 Ibid 182–3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 183. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Pharmacia Italia SpA v Interpharma Pty Ltd (2005) 67 IPR 397. 
49 Ibid 398–9. 
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patentee granted a licence to another party, which remained on foot.50 Sundberg J engaged with 
Holmes J’s idea of multiple exclusive licences under s 120, and held that, based on this, the licensee 
had ‘an arguable case’ that it had standing to initiate proceedings.51  
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5)52 the first applicant was the commercialising 
company in Australia for the drug aripiprazole. The second applicant was the patentee and global 
manufacturer.53 The licence agreement between the applicants specified that the first applicant was 
the ‘exclusive licensee’, but it also reserved the right to manufacture aripiprazole to the second 
applicant.54 Accordingly, the respondent, who was contesting an infringement claim,55 argued that 
the first applicant was not an ‘exclusive licensee’ because it could not exclusively exercise the full 
range of activities under the definition of ‘exploit’.56 Being the first case to substantively decide the 
issue, Yates J reviewed the authorities, in particular, British Nylon Spinners, Pharmacia Italia SpA v 
Interpharma Pty Ltd, and Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd, and rejected Holmes J’s 
reasoning in Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd.57 Yates J stated that s 13(1) provides the 
‘twin rights’58 of exploitation and authorisation and ‘that the definition of ‘exclusive licensee’ 
operates in harmony with the rights conferred by the Act on the patentee.59 Consistent with this, his 
Honour stated that the Patents Act ‘speaks of "the right to exploit" the invention as a single, 
indivisible right. The word "exploit" is used in the Act as a hypernym to cover a range of activities.’60 
Expanding further on this reasoning, Yates J continued that:  
[the] use of disjunctive language in the definition of ‘exploit’ to identify particular activities falling 
within the scope of the term does not create separate rights with respect to those activities. It merely 
recognises that the right to exploit covers a range of activities, any one of which, if undertaken, would 
amount to the exercise of the right to exploit.61 
Yates J also found that this reasoning was consistent with the High Court’s finding in British Nylon 
Spinners. On this point his Honour stated that ‘the essential reasoning of the High Court in British 
Nylon Spinners with respect to the meaning of "exclusive licensee" in s 6 of the 1952 Act: [was that] 
the patentee has conferred on the licensee, exclusively, the exercise of the rights that the patentee 
itself has been granted under the patent.’62 Further, regardless of the replacement of ‘make, use, 
50 Ibid 400. 
51 Ibid 402. 
52 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23. 
53 Ibid 103. 
54 Ibid 102–3. 
55 Ibid 26. 
56 Ibid 101. 
57 Ibid 101, 105. 
58 Ibid 105. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 106. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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exercise and vend’ with ‘exploit’ between the 1952 and 1990 Acts, his Honour concluded that this 
does not change the fact that ‘the definition of "exclusive licensee" in each Act refers to the conferral 
by the patentee of a single licence that precludes the patentee, and any person deriving authority 
from the patentee, from exercising the rights granted by the patent.’63 Accordingly, his Honour found 
that because the first applicant did not have the right to manufacture, it did not have standing.64 On 
appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty 
Ltd,65 Besanko, Jagot and Nicolas JJs unanimously found no error in Yates J’s reasoning, and quoted 
his Honour’s judgment at length.66 
From the Full Court’s reasoning in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd, it is reasonable to infer 
that exclusive geographic licences are unlikely to confer standing because the ‘indivisible right of 
exploit’ would be divided. The case of KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd v Insta Image Pty Ltd (‘KD 
Kanopy’),67 which was decided before Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd, is consistent with this 
reasoning. However, the case warrants further scrutiny, because it raises an aspect of the law not yet 
detailed. In this case, the licence in question conferred exclusive control of the patent to everywhere 
in Australia except New South Wales.68  Since the Patents Act defines an exclusive licensee to be one 
that has ‘the right to exploit the patented invention throughout the patent area to the exclusion of 
the patentee and all other persons’, and ‘patent area’ is defined to include Australia and the 
Australian continental shelf,69  the respondent argued that the licensee did not have standing.70 On a 
close reading of this case it appears that, by itself, this evidence would have defeated the licensee’s 
claim to standing. However, evidence presented to the Court persuaded Kiefel J to find that an oral 
amendment had conferred exclusive rights across the patent area. Accordingly, her Honour found 
that the licensee had standing from the date of the amendment.71 
In all, the effect of the decisions discussed in this part is that, in the absence of overruling High Court 
authority, licensees that do not exclusively control the panoply of patent rights will not have standing 
under s 120.  
II. Jurisprudence & Justifications 
This part is divided into four sections: the first addresses economic-based justifications for patent law 
as applied to standing to initiate infringement suits; the second considers other related legal aspects 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 106–7; see also, Blue Gentian LLC v Product Management Group Pty Ltd (2014) 110 IPR 453, 486–8. 
65 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1. 
66 Ibid 28–33. 
67 KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd v Insta Image Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 615. 
68 Ibid 636–7. 
69 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1 (definition of ‘patent area’). 
70 KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd v Insta Image Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 615, 636. 
71 Ibid 638–9. 
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of standing; the third analyses arguments against standing for partitioned exclusive licensees; and 
the fourth summarises the discussion in this section. 
A. Economic Reasoning 
In an article by Professors Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter, the authors outline economic justifications 
for standing in intellectual property law, but do not comprehensively address standing for 
partitioned exclusive licensees.72 This chapter extends their reasoning. At the beginning of their 
article, the authors outline three assumptions that are also adopted here.73 First, the main 
contemporary justification underpinning patents is that the conferral of exclusive rights in inventions 
incentivises innovation and is welfare enhancing.74 Blaire and Cotter note that this justification is 
open to some doubt.75 However, they also acknowledge that whether patent regimes have a net 
positive effect is a complex question without a definitive answer.76 The introduction to this thesis 
explains that the aim of this work is to review and where necessary outline improvements to current 
laws based on the assumption that this justification is valid.77 Accordingly, this chapter will proceed 
under this assumption too.  
Blair and Cotter’s second assumption is that the ability to transfer exclusive patent rights is also 
generally welfare enhancing. The authors note that this assumption is ‘not immune from criticism’,78 
and that the validity of this second assumption is difficult to measure in practice, but the evidence of 
transferring patent rights being problematic is limited.79 They also argue that even if it was a genuine 
issue, it would be confined to certain industries in certain time periods and therefore would probably 
be better addressed elsewhere than in standing law.80  
Beyond Blaire and Cotter’s analysis of this second assumption, further support can be found for it in 
application of fundamental economic principles. In the background of patent law is the broad 
structure of a free market economy, which is based upon the assumption that, in the absence of 
market failure, it will efficiently allocate resources.81 Key features of market economies, relevant to 
72 Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–2000) 74 
Tulane Law Review 1323. 
73 Ibid 1330–6. 
74 Ibid 1330–5. 
75 Ibid 1332–5. 
76 Ibid 1333–5.  
77 See, Introduction, pt I. 
78  See, Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–2000) 
74 Tulane Law Review 1323, 1335 and references therein.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid 1335–6. 
81 Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3; 
Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–18; Economic Planning Advisory Council, Promoting Competition in Australia 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989) 5–6; Philip L Williams, ‘Why regulate for competition?’ in James 
M (ed), Regulating for Competition? (Centre for Independent Studies Ltd, 1989) 13–16; Johnathon E Liddicoat, ‘Re-
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the analysis here, include, division of labour, decentralised decision making, and Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’. ‘Division of labour’ refers to the development of specialised skill sets for efficient 
production of goods. As Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, observed, ‘the greatest 
improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and 
judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the 
division of labour.’82 ‘Decentralised decision making’, as it is used here, refers to individual actors 
being able to decide on how to manage property. It is critical to Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand,’ which, 
as it is commonly understood, is the idea that social benefits arise from self-motivated individual 
actions and trade.83 Thus, it makes sense for patentees to have the benefit of electing between, or 
using a mix thereof, commercialising themselves, assigning their rights, and licensing parties to 
exploit the invention, to enable them to participate in the broader market economy and realise 
efficient utilisation of their invention. Indeed, these features are key aspects of what is known as the 
‘prospect theory’ of patent law, which posits that patents create proprietary prospects in markets for 
patentees, and their licensees, to exploit.84 
The utility of transferring patent rights has also been empirically observed. Statistics from a recent 
survey of Australian inventors shows that of 2689 respondents who had a pending or granted patent, 
over 43% reported that attempts were made to licence or sell their invention.85 There is no doubt 
that some technology is licensed or sold because patentees want to move on to other projects. In 
general, however, the reality is that quite often patentees do not have the expertise to take an 
invention from concept to market.86 This is not a new revelation. In industries such as biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals, few companies have the ability to conceive an invention, reduce it to practice, 
create a prototype, receive funding, create appropriate business structures, and then market and 
distribute a product.87 These various areas of expertise, of which others also exist, provide an 
illustration of the division of labour that exists in modern innovation. Accordingly, without 
compelling evidence to the contrary, it is not difficult to subscribe to Blair and Cotter’s second 
assumption. 
Evaluating Innocent Infringement in Australia: Patent Numbers and Virtual Marking’ (2014) 25 Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal 18, 21–2. 
82 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Strahan and Cadell, 4th, 1776) vol 1, 8. More 
generally see, chs 1–3. 
83 Ibid vol IV, 349; Gans et al, Principles of Economics (Thompson, 2nd ed, 2003) 9–10; Eduardo Pol and Peter Carroll, An 
Introduction to Economics with a View to Innovation (Innovation Planet, 2005) ch 2. 
84 Kenneth W Dam, ‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247, 249–51; see also, 
Introduction pt II. 
85 Nicol et al, The Innovation Pool in Biotechnology: The Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation (Occasional Paper No 8, 
Centre for Law and Genetics, 2014) 48 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>; see also, Jensen et 
al, ‘Estimating the Patent Premium: Evidence from the Australian Inventor Survey’ (2011) 32 Strategic Management Journal 
1128. 
86 For an exploration in the Australian drug discovery and development sector see, Nicol et al, The Innovation Pool in 
Biotechnology: The Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation (Occasional Paper No 8, Centre for Law and Genetics, 2014) 48, 
49–50, 57–65, 76–80, 84–6, 87–9 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>. 
87 Ibid. 
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The first two assumptions lead naturally to the third, that patent rights should not have their value 
diminished based on the way they are transferred.88 A key consideration underpinning this 
assumption is that although exclusive patent rights are an exception to a free market economy, upon 
their creation, patentees choose how they are to be exploited and, patented products often directly 
compete with other substitutable products.89 If patents are welfare enhancing because of the 
exclusive rights they offer, then consistent with the operation of market economies,90 parties holding 
exclusive rights should be able to choose how to enforce them. In short, if exclusive rights are to 
operate as incentives, the exclusive nature of the rights must be enforceable, otherwise the value of 
patent rights is reduced.91 On this basis, Blaire and Cotter conclude that panoplied exclusive licensees 
and patentees should, by default, have standing so that they can protect their interests in any 
exclusive rights.92 For patentees in a licence agreement, the interest protected is any reversionary 
interest and any royalty stream that may accrue through continuing royalty payments. For panoplied 
exclusive licensees, this is the exclusivity for which they have bargained.93 
As explored in part 1 of this chapter, current Australian standing law for patentees and panoplied 
exclusive licensees aligns with Blair and Cotter’s rationale by conferring standing on them. Although 
the law does not currently confer standing on partitioned exclusive licensees, whether or not this 
position is consistent with justifications for patent law is more complex than simply applying Blair 
and Cotter’s rationale. There are significant differences between panoplied exclusive licences and 
partitioned exclusive licences, and these differences must be explored to see whether Blaire and 
Cotter’s assumptions hold.  
To begin with, it is helpful to consider whether non-exclusive licensees should have standing. Patent 
rights, by their definition, are negative exclusionary rights, carrying no right to exploit the invention, 
only to exclude others from exploiting it.94 When a non-exclusive licence is granted, the patentee 
agrees not to exercise patent rights against the licensee, and the patentee retains the option to 
licence, or commercialise the invention in any other applicable manner. Thus, if a non-exclusive 
licensee had standing to initiate infringement, this would derogate from the patentee’s ability to 
choose how to exploit their invention, and therefore the rights they have been granted. Moreover, a 
non-exclusive licensee has not been promised any exclusivity to exercise an invention, and to obtain 
88 Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–2000) 74 
Tulane Law Review 1323, 1336. 
89 Thomas F Cotter, ‘Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal 
Trademark Law’ (1999) 3 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 25, 28–34. 
90 Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an Aid to 
Competition?’ (2004) 37 The Australian Economic Review 436, 437–8. 
91 Ibid 437–9.  
92 Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–2000) 74 
Tulane Law Review 1323, 1392–6. 
93 Ibid 1394–7. 
94 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’); JTI International SA v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 250 
CLR 1, 30–2 (French CJ). 
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this they would, usually, have had to pay more. Thus, although a non-exclusive licensee may suffer 
economic harm resulting from infringement of the patent rights that they have paid to practise, the 
law does not confer them standing. 
This reasoning resonates with the viewpoint of Learned Hand J in A L Smith Iron Co v Dickson:95 
The ordinary case of a suit by a licensee against an infringer is in no sense the same [to an 
infringement suit by an exclusive licensee]. It is indeed true that a mere licensee may have an interest 
at stake in such a suit; his license may be worth much more to him than the royalties which he has 
agreed to pay, and its value will ordinarily depend on his ability to suppress the competition of his 
rivals. The reason why he is not permitted to sue is not because he has nothing to protect. But against 
that interest is the interest of the infringer to be immune from a second suit by the owner of the 
patent... Indeed, the owner may have granted a number of licenses, and it would be exceedingly 
oppressive to subject him to the will of all his licensees. These two interests in combination have been 
held to overweigh any interest of the licensee.96 
The definition of an ‘exclusive licence’ for the purposes of patent law, as demonstrated in part 3 
below, differs between jurisdictions. However, exclusive licences also have universal, uncontentious 
aspects. As with non-exclusive licences, an exclusive licensor agrees not to exercise patent rights 
against the licensee, but the pivotal difference between exclusive and non-exclusive licences is that, 
in an exclusive licence, the patentee agrees not to exploit the invention themselves, nor to permit 
another party to exploit it. A corollary of this is that a patentee to a panoplied exclusive licence, has, 
at least for a period of time, chosen how the sum total of their patent rights will be exercised. 
Similarly, for a partitioned exclusive licence, the patentee has chosen how the partitioned elements 
of their rights are to be exercised.  
Bearing these differences in mind, it is useful to analyse partitioned exclusive licences in the context 
of Hand J’s reasoning that patent standing law protects ‘two interests’. The first interest his Honour 
described is an infringer’s immunity from multiple suits regarding the same potentially infringing 
conduct. However, this interest is accounted for under s 120(2) of the Patents Act and r 9.03 of the 
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth): s 120(2) requires that exclusive licensees and patentees are added to 
infringement actions; and r 9.03, in a somewhat overlapping way, specifies that ‘[i]f an applicant 
claims relief to which any other person is entitled jointly with the applicant… every person so entitled 
must be joined as a party to the proceeding’.97 Thus, between s 120(2) and r 9.03, if an alleged 
infringer’s activities encroach upon rights in a patent, then all the relevant licensees must also be 
added, and there is no chance of multiple suits. The second interest described by Hand J is that 
licensee standing should not derogate from a patentee’s ability to licence other parties. Whilst this is 
95 A L Smith Iron Co v Dickson, 141 F 2d 3 (2nd Cir, 1944). 
96 Ibid 6. 
97 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) 9.03(a). 
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clearly a vital issue for patentees, in the context of partitioned exclusive rights in an exclusive licence, 
the ability to licence the partitioned element to other parties is voluntarily foregone by the patentee 
when the licence is struck. Thus, this interest is accounted for too. 
This analysis of interests protected by standing law, by itself, suggests that partitioned exclusive 
licensees should be able to initiate patent infringement actions, but it does not necessarily conclude 
the issue. This is especially so when it is considered that patentees control remaining patent rights, 
have an interest in reversionary rights, have standing, and could enforce patent rights on behalf of 
licensees. However, there are other reasons, legal, economic, and practical, that support partitioned 
exclusive licensee standing. 
The patent system is in part justified by its ability to efficiently allocate prospective resources.98 What 
this means in practise is that the award of patent rights allocates to the patentee the exclusive ability 
to commercialise the invention. In turn, these exclusive rights are designed to help the inventor 
recoup costs expended in its development and commercialisation.99 Connected to these exclusive 
rights is the ability to enforce them, since without enforcement the resource allocated is significantly 
diminished.100 This reasoning flows through to partitioned exclusive licensees in two ways. First, if a 
partitioned exclusive licensee cannot enforce rights it has bargained for, then the value of the right is 
reduced and the licensee will pay less for the right. Second, it is logical that a party who is exclusively 
permitted to practise a partitioned element of a patented invention can choose how and when to 
enforce it, because they are the party actually capitalising on the invention. It is helpful to illustrate 
this reasoning with a practical example.  
Division of labour in exploiting patent rights means that, in some instances, for a patentee to realise 
its greatest advantage from a patent, it will need to create exclusive licences. For example, one party 
may have well-established distribution channels in a geographic area, or a party may have developed 
goodwill in a specific field, and it is more efficient for a party in those positions to practise the 
invention. Indeed, in Australia, geographic exclusive licences are often suited to purpose, as the 
layout of the country includes economically valuable areas separated by geographic boundaries, for 
98 Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an Aid to 
Competition?’ (2004) 37 The Australian Economic Review 436, 437–8; William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The 
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 13, 20, 294–9; Merges, Menell and Lemley, 
Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3; Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 266. 
99 Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an Aid to 
Competition?’ (2004) 37 The Australian Economic Review 436, 437–8; William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The 
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 294–7 cf. 326–32; Merges, Menell and Lemley, 
Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3. 
100 Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an Aid to 
Competition?’ (2004) 37 The Australian Economic Review 436, 437–9; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in 
the New Technological Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3. 
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example, deserts, bodies of water or large distances.101 If infringement occurs within the geographic 
area of a partitioned exclusive licensee, they will be in the best position to judge whether to ignore 
the infringing act, or choose to take other action, including threatening litigation. In contrast to the 
patentee, the licensee will normally have a much better understanding of the market, its players, 
and, quite often, the extent to which the threat of litigation will operate as a bargaining chip in 
negotiation. However, if a geographic exclusive licensee must co-ordinate infringement concerns 
through the patentee, they incur additional transaction costs and risk a situation where they may not 
be able to enforce their rights. 
B. Related Legal Aspects 
Although enabling efficient exploitation of partitioned patent rights is one element of standing, there 
are two further legal aspects. The first concerns applications for relief from unjustified threats of 
infringement proceedings. These applications allow a person who is unjustifiably threatened with 
infringement proceedings to recover any damages caused by them.102 This is relevant because obiter 
statements from the High Court suggest that threats of litigation by a licensee without standing 
would constitute unjustified threats.103 It follows, then, that if the threat of litigation is to operate as 
a bargaining chip in negotiations between partitioned exclusive licensees and infringers, or potential 
infringers, this end will only be achieved if they are legally allowed to make such threats. Otherwise, 
partitioned exclusive licensees will expose themselves to paying for the damage the threat causes.104 
The second legal ramification of current standing law is that it can unfairly curtail damages awards. 
To explain how this reduction occurs, it is necessary to briefly outline how licensees can use 
patentee’s names to litigate patents. In the UK government report leading to the Patents Act 1949 
(UK),105 the ‘Swan Report’,106 the Board of Trade noted that exclusive licences commonly include 
clauses to enable licensees to conduct infringement actions in the name of the patentee (at the time 
the Act only permitted patentees to initiate infringement actions).107 This could result in reduced 
damages because if patent infringement is proved, the successful litigants have a choice between an 
account of profits and damages.108 Moreover, while an account of profits calculation is the same 
regardless of whose name the litigation is conducted under, a damages calculation is based on the 
harm done to the successful litigant.109 This means that, depending on the licence agreement, a 
101 It is interesting to note here that current Australian patent law specifically allows assignments in geographic areas, see 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 14(2). 
102 Ibid s 14(2), ch 11 pt 3. 
103 Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88, 94 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 105 (Dawson J). 
104 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 128(3). 
105 Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 87. 
106 Board of Trade, Patents and Designs Acts: Final Report of the Department Committee, Cmd 7206 (1947). 
107 Ibid 29. 
108 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 122(1). 
109 Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25, 32. 
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damages award might be relatively low, even though the actual damage to the licensee is much 
higher. This could arise, for example, under a scenario of lump sum payments paid to the patentee 
that are not connected to sales of the invention, or when a patentee company creates a partitioned 
exclusive licence with a subsidiary company in exchange for nominal consideration. 
C. Arguments Against Standing for Partitioned Exclusive Licensees 
An argument against standing for partitioned exclusive licensees is that, in theory, it allows more 
than two parties to initiate infringement actions. This could be problematic for a number of reasons, 
including what happens if one or more parties do not want to initiate a suit, or, if the infringement 
action is successful, how relief is distributed. However, while these issues may be more complex 
because more than two parties are involved, they are no different than when a panoplied exclusive 
licence is established. Whether there is only one exclusive licensee and a patentee, or multiple 
exclusive licensees and a patentee, forethought is required on how litigation may be conducted and 
how financial relief should be distributed.  
Related to the negotiation of licences are also various practical business considerations that operate 
against large numbers of partitioned exclusive licensees. From the point of view of a patentee, 
dividing patent rights increases negotiation and other transaction costs and, for licensees, efficient 
and efficacious exploitation will often overlap with the ability to utilise a significant proportion of 
rights conferred in a patent. For example, manufacturers will often be sellers, and will want to 
distribute across the entire patent area and in all fields-of-use. Notably, as explored further below, 
partitioned exclusive licensees can initiate infringement proceedings in the US and UK, and no 
commentary has specifically attributed problems to them doing so.110 
A more general concern with patent law is that patent rights may be used for outcomes which 
undermine its aim as a welfare enhancing tool. The conduct of various patent assertion entities, or to 
use the pejorative term, ‘trolls’, is an ongoing issue.111 Arguably, by limiting enforcement of patents 
to panoplied exclusive licensees, some undesirable conduct may be avoided. However, limiting 
behaviour by confining enforcement to certain types of exclusive licensees is a blunt means to 
achieve such ends, especially when ‘troll’ litigation has not been linked to partitioned exclusive 
licences. 
110 As explored in pt II A below, in the US there is currently a level of confusion associated with standing in patent law. 
However, this is directed to when exclusive licensees can initiate infringement proceedings without the patentee - this is 
something that is not permitted under the Patents Act and not investigated in this paper. Despite this, as a general rule, in 
the US partitioned exclusive licensees can initiate infringement proceedings with patentees named as co-plaintiffs, and no 
problems have been specifically attributed to it. 
111 See, eg, James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, ‘The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes’ (Boston University School of Law 
Working Paper No. 12-34, 28 June 2012) 24–5. 
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The analysis so far has not distinguished between different types of partitioned exclusive licences 
and, generally speaking, most reasoning concerning partitioned exclusive licences applies equally to 
all three. However, a semantic difference between action exclusive licences and the other two 
partitioned exclusive licences is that action exclusive licences wholly allocate separate activities 
under the definition of ‘exploit’, whereas the other two subdivide the activities. What is meant by 
this is that, if a geographic exclusive licence is established in each state of Australia, six parties have 
the ability to sell, import, offer for sale etc, the patented invention. With multiple action exclusive 
licences, only one party may have the ability to either sell, make, or import etc, the invention. It 
follows that there is legal simplicity to prohibiting geographic or field-of-use exclusive licensees from 
having standing because they ‘share’ an activity, or prohibiting action exclusive licensees from having 
standing because they cannot perform all the activities under the definition of ‘exploit’. However, 
there are three arguments that run against both of these propositions. 
First, patent rights have always been able to be split. Like other forms of personal property,112 
patents can be granted to more than one party and they can be assigned in moieties, either as 
tenants-in-common or in joint tenancy.113 Unless there is a reason to distinguish between the rights 
of owners and partitioned exclusive licensees at standing, this distinction is unwarranted. Second, 
from the economic justification described above, the incentive rationale for patents is based on 
exclusivity. In Australia, the activities described in the definition of ‘exploit’ are only ‘examples’ of 
what the word means - they are not rights.114 Thus, focusing on whether a party or parties control an 
activity that is not a right in itself, just an example of what ‘exploit’ means, is artificial and has a 
limited logical connection to the justifications for patent rights.  
Third, in relation to field-of-use exclusive licences, a single patent often consists of different 
applications for the same invention. For example, a single patent to artificial DNA could include 
claims for use of the DNA in human diagnostics, scientific experiments, and human therapeutics. 
Under the current operation of Australian patent law, partitioned exclusive licences to each specific 
field listed would not carry standing. However, as separate claims must each satisfy the requirements 
for grant, when applying for patent protection the applicant could have separated the different 
claims into three separate applications. The benefit to the patentee in these circumstances would be 
that they could create panoplied exclusive licences to each patent. Thus, preventing patentees from 
creating multiple partitioned exclusive licences that carry standing is somewhat artificial, since they 
could in theory be panoplied exclusive licences to three separate patents. Indeed, the single patent 
scenario is preferable, because it reduces work for examiners, saves the patentee money, and does 
112 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(2). 
113 Ibid s 16; Walton v Lavater (1860) 141 ER 1127, 1132–3 (Erle CJ). 
114 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23, 106; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 
228 FCR 1, 33. 
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not require patentees to make significant commercialisation decisions before commencing the 
application process.  
D. Summary on Jurisprudence & Justifications 
A related issue with any type of purported exclusive licence is that it may not actually be exclusive. 
By this, it is meant that the licensee cannot exclude all other parties because they have separate 
permission to practise the invention from the patentee. In circumstances of multiple field-of-use 
exclusive licences that emanate from the same patent, this may be particularly problematic. This can 
be demonstrated using the simplistic example of commercialising an artificial DNA patent described 
above. When purportedly exclusive field-of-use licences are drafted to each area, that is, human 
diagnostics, scientific equipment, and human therapy, it is quite possible that they could be 
interpreted to have overlapping interests. For example, a genetic diagnostic test may also be useful 
to optimise human therapy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to canvas drafting techniques to 
ensure exclusivity or critique contractual interpretation in this area, but the broader issue of 
exclusivity is a problem. To this extent, following the conclusions reached above, the test for 
exclusivity that should be necessary for a party to have standing is whether they have an interest 
amounting to an exclusive sphere within the concept of ‘exploit’.  
The examination of partitioned exclusive licences in this part suggests that there are no aspects of 
them that undermine Blaire and Cotter’s three assumptions. Of particular note, no economic, legal or 
business related rationale undermines the third assumption that patent rights should not have their 
value diminished based on the way they are transferred. The foregoing analysis also suggests that 
where a licensee is permitted to exclusively exercise an invention but is not permitted to enforce it in 
their own name devalues the exclusivity that can be bargained for and therefore the value of the 
patent. Permitting partitioned exclusive licensees to enforce patents gives them the opportunity to 
choose how to exploit resources in a market economy. At its core, this type of explanation supports 
the resource allocation justifications underpinning patent law. Unnecessary restrictions on the ability 
to enforce patent rights creates additional transaction costs and unnecessary hurdles for licensees, 
and may prevent licensees and patentees from capturing the benefits the patent system is designed 
to confer. 
From this economic point of view, what this inquiry also reveals is that focusing on how a given 
statute defines ‘exclusive licensee’ or ‘patent area’ is irrelevant when determining standing, and 
distracts from the real question of what is the correct level of legal interest that should confer 
standing. The real and substantial question is whether a party exclusively exercises a sphere of 
patent rights. By corollary this analysis also suggests that standing to initiate infringement actions in 
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Australian patent law is currently flawed. The next part of this chapter examines whether this flaw is 
common to other jurisdictions or unique to Australia.  
III. Foreign Comparisons 
A. US  
Standing to initiate patent infringement suits in the US is dictated by what is known as ‘prudential 
standing’.115 In a way, it is more dynamic than patent standing law in Australia because it can permit 
exclusive licensees to begin litigation without the patentee being added to the action if they control 
‘all substantial rights’ in a patent and are found to be equivalent to an assignee.116 It also confers 
standing on exclusive licensees when they control less than ‘all substantial rights’, provided 
remaining substantial rights are represented in the suit, which is usually achieved by adding the 
patentee.117 Despite its wide operation, it has recently been described by a number of commentators 
as ‘contradictory’, ‘confusing’, ‘discretionary’, and ‘incoherent’.118 However, these descriptors are 
specifically targeted towards the use of prudential standing in circumstances where a licensee can 
sue by themselves.119 Related to this issue, in Alfred E Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v 
Cochlear Corp,120 the Federal Circuit non-exhaustively listed nine different elements of a licence that 
need to be considered when evaluating whether the licensee has ‘all the substantial rights’.121 It is 
not the point of this chapter to offer a perspective on this issue, although it is noted that 
commentators have suggested reform is needed.122 Rather, on point with the enquiry in this chapter, 
it can be observed from the morass of case law that partitioned exclusive licensees do have standing 
if the patentee is joined in the suit.  
The statutory basis in the US for standing to initiate infringement proceedings is that a ‘patentee 
shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent’.123 Patentee is then defined to 
include ‘not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the 
115 Cf. ‘Constitutional standing’, see, Intellectual Property Developers Inc TCI Cablevision of California Inc, 248 F 3d 1333, 
1348 (Fed Cir, 2001); Totes-Isotoner Corp v United States, 594 F 3d 1346, 1352 (Fed Cir, 2010); Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 US 555, 560–61 (1992). 
116 Prima Tek II LLC v A-Roo Co, 222 F 3d 1372, 1377 (Fed Cir, 2000); Alfred E Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v 
Cochlear Corp, 604 F 3d 1354, 1358–9 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
117 Prima Tek II LLC v A-Roo Co, 222 F 3d 1372, 1377 (Fed Cir, 2000); Alfred E Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v 
Cochlear Corp, 604 F 3d 1354, 1359 (Fed Cir, 2010); Intellectual Property Developers Inc v TCI Cablevision of California Inc, 
248 F 3d 1333, 1346–7 (Fed Cir, 2001). 
118 Timothy Denny Greene, ‘”All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing’ (2012–2013) 22 Federal 
Circuit Bar Journal 1,  1–5; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, ‘Patent Prudential Standing’ (2013–2014) 21 George Mason Law Review 17, 
20–1, 28–9. 
119 Timothy Denny Greene, ‘”All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing’ (2012–2013) 22 Federal 
Circuit Bar Journal 1; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, ‘Patent Prudential Standing’ (2013–2014) 21 George Mason Law Review 17. 
120 Alfred E Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v Cochlear Corp, 604 F 3d 1354 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
121 Ibid 1360–1. 
122 See generally, Timothy Denny Greene, ‘“All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing’ (2012–2013) 
22Federal Circuit Bar Journal 1; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, ‘Patent Prudential Standing’ (2013-2014) 21 George Mason Law Review 
17. 
123 35 USC § 281. 
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patentee’.124 No reference is made to exclusive licensees. With regard to exclusive rights, US patent 
law confers the ability to make, use, sell (or offer to sell), or import the invention in the US.125  
In the 1926 Supreme Court case of Independent Wireless Telegraph Co v Radio Corp of America,126 
the unanimous Court found that an exclusive licensee who controlled less than the panoply of 
exclusive rights had standing to initiate an infringement action.127 How this outcome was achieved 
though, was quite different to reasoning in Australian law. The patent in question was to ‘devices for 
amplifying feeble electric currents and certain new and useful improvements in space telegraphy’.128 
The licensee was granted the exclusive right to use and sell the invention, but not make it.129 
Moreover, the licensee was only granted these rights with regard to ‘radio purposes’,130 when the 
invention itself could be put to a range of other uses, most notably for telephony.131 At the time, it 
was not clear how and when exclusive licensees could initiate infringement actions. Accordingly, 
much of the reasoning in Independent Wireless Telegraph Co v Radio Corp of America concerned how 
and when exclusive licensees could use a patentee’s name to enforce a patent or when they could 
use their own. This last point was of particular importance because the patentee in this case was not 
available.132 Interestingly, the approach adopted by the Supreme Court was in part based on the law 
of trusts.133 Relevantly, their Honours stated that: 
It seems clear then on principle and authority that the owner of a patent who grants to another the 
exclusive right to make, use or vend the invention, which does not constitute a statutory assignment, 
holds the title to the patent in trust for such a licensee, to the extent that he must allow the use of his 
name as plaintiff in any action brought at the instance of the licensee in law or in equity to obtain 
damages for the injury to this exclusive right by an infringer or to enjoin infringement of it.134 
Continuing this reasoning, the Court found that in absence of the patentee, equity allowed the 
exclusive licensee to use their own name and join the patentee without their consent.  
In the intervening time, relatively well articulated rules for exclusive licensee standing have 
developed.135 In Amgen Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd,136 after reviewing case law Young J 
stated, ‘[a] licensee can be deemed exclusive … where the licensee has obtained only the exclusive 
124 35 USC § 100(d). For conditions on assignments, see 35 USC § 261. 
125 35 USC § 154(a)(1). 
126 Independent Wireless Telegraph Co v Radio Corp of America, 269 US 459, 461–464, (1926). 
127 Ibid 475. 
128 Ibid 461. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 US Patent 841,387. 
132 Independent Wireless Telegraph Co v Radio Corp of America, 269 US 459, 472 (1926). 
133 See generally, ibid. 
134 Ibid 469. 
135 Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–2000) 74 
Tulane Law Review 1323, 1347–50. 
136 Amgen Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, 808 F Supp 894 (D Mass, 1992). 
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right to sell the patented invention’ and more generally that, ‘an exclusive license can be created by a 
grant of exclusivity based solely on geographic, time or field-of-use limitations.’137 This reasoning was 
reviewed on appeal in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp v Genetics Institute138 where it was unanimously 
affirmed.139 Nies J, writing for the Court, expanded on the rationale first expounded by Justice Hand 
in A L Smith Iron Co v Dickson (extracted above), stating: 
To have co-plaintiff standing in an infringement suit, a licensee must hold some of the proprietary 
sticks from the bundle of patent rights, albeit a lesser share of rights in the patent than for an 
assignment and standing to sue alone… The proprietary rights granted by any patent are the rights to 
exclude others from making, using or selling the invention in the United States. A patent license may 
have the effect between the parties to the license of transferring some of those proprietary rights 
from the patentee to its licensee. Such license then does more than provide a covenant not to sue, 
i.e., a ‘bare’ license. In addition, the license makes the licensee a beneficial owner of some identifiable 
part of the patentee's bundle of rights to exclude others. Thus, a licensee with proprietary rights in the 
patent is generally called an ‘exclusive’ licensee. But it is the licensee's beneficial ownership of a right 
to prevent others from making, using or selling the patented technology that provides the foundation 
for co-plaintiff standing…140 
From this commentary it is relatively clear that US patent law recognises standing for partitioned 
exclusive licensees.141 It is also interesting to note that the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp v Genetics Institute resonates with the economic justifications for standing 
elucidated above, albeit, as the extracts indicate, more from a property theory and trust law point of 
view.  
B. UK 
In the 1956 UK case, Re Courtaulds Ltd’s Application for Extension of the Term of Letters Patent No 
511,160 (‘Courtaulds Application’),142 Lloyd-Jacob J commented that the definition of ‘exclusive 
licensee’ in the Patents Act 1949 (UK), ‘would permit a plurality of exclusive licensees to be created in 
respect of any one patent monopoly’.143 Since the Patents Act 1949 (UK) specified that exclusive 
licensees could initiate infringement suits,144 this suggests that partitioned exclusive licensees had 
standing to initiate infringement proceedings. However, Courtaulds Application was not decided on 
whether a partitioned exclusive licensee had standing, but whether the applicants were actually in 
137 Ibid 900. 
138 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp v Genetics Institute Inc, 52 F 3d 1026, 1033–4 (Fed Cir, 1995). 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp v Genetics Institute Inc, 52 F 3d 1026, 1031–2 (Fed Cir, 1995); an appeal to the Supreme 
Court was denied, see, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp v Genetics Institute Inc, 516 US 907 (1995). 
141 See also, Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law’ (1999–
2000) 74 Tulane Law Review 1323, 1347. 
142 Re Courtaulds Ltd’s Application for Extension of the Term of the Letters Patent No 511,160 [1956] RPC 208. 
143 Ibid 210. 
144 Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 87, s 63(1). 
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possession of a licence.145 Since Lloyd-Jacob J’s found the applicants were not in possession of a 
licence,146 his Honour’s comments are therefore obiter.  
Nevertheless, there are two additional elements that make Lloyd-Jacob J’s interpretation 
uncontroversial. First, the Board of Trade in the Swan Report specifically stated that the definition of 
exclusive licensee is to include ‘any person who has the sole and exclusive right to work the invention 
in any particular field of its application or in any particular geographical area’.147 Further, the report 
stated that, ‘an exclusive licensee… has been promised immunity from…  [otherwise] legitimate 
competition as would spring from the grant of additional licences. He is plainly entitled, therefore, to 
demand protection against illegitimate competition of infringers.’148 Second, the Patents Act 1949 
(UK) defined exclusive licensee to mean, ‘a licence from a patentee which confers on the licensee, or 
on the licensee and persons authorised by him, to the exclusion of all other persons (including the 
patentee), any right in respect of the patented invention, and "exclusive licensee" shall be construed 
accordingly.’149 In this passage, the phrase ‘any right in respect of the patented invention’ suggests 
multiplicity.  
Under the Patents Act 1977 (UK),150 standing to initiate patent infringement proceedings is now 
specified in ss 61(1) and 67(1). Section 61(1) specifies that ‘civil proceedings may be brought in the 
court by the proprietor of a patent …’151 and s 67(1) specifies that ‘the holder of an exclusive licence 
under a patent shall have the same right as the proprietor of the patent to bring proceedings in 
respect of any infringement of the patent committed after the date of the licence’.152 Relevantly, 
‘exclusive licensee’ is defined to mean: 
a licence from the proprietor of or applicant for a patent conferring on the licensee, or on him and 
persons authorised by him, to the exclusion of all other persons (including the proprietor or applicant), 
any right in respect of the invention to which the patent or application relates, and ‘exclusive licensee’ 
and ‘non-exclusive licence’ shall be construed accordingly.153 
The passage, ‘any right in respect of the invention to which the patent or application relates’, echoes 
the earlier definition.  
In cases under the new Act, none have cited the Swan Report or Courtaulds Application. 
Nevertheless, the law appears to operate in the same way. In Dendron GmbH v University of 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Board of Trade, Patents and Designs Acts: Final Report of the Department Committee, Cmd 7206 (1947) 30. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 87, s 101 (definition of ‘exclusive licensee’) (emphasis added). 
150 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37. 
151 Ibid s 61(1). 
152 Ibid s 67(1). 
153 Ibid s 130. 
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California (No 3),154 the claimant applied to have a party added to an infringement/revocation action 
on the basis that they were an ‘exclusive licensee’.155 The claimant wanted to add the party to the 
action for the purpose of obtaining discovery from them.156 In the course of his Honour’s decision, 
Pumfrey J stated that ‘separate exclusive licences can, to all appearances, be granted in respect of 
distinct rights under a patent. Thus for example it seems clear that separate exclusive licences may 
be granted to manufacture and to import a patented product.’157 However, this case was not decided 
on whether the third party was a type of exclusive licensee and should therefore be added to the 
action. Rather, it was on whether the party actually exclusively controlled any patent rights.158 Since, 
Pumfrey J’s found the party in question did not exercise any exclusive rights,159 his Honour’s 
comments on partitioned licensee standing are obiter too. Nevertheless, from the analysis presented 
here, a consistent line of reasoning indicating that partitioned exclusive licensees do have standing 
under the UK Act does exist.160 
C. Summary on US and UK Standing Law 
The examination of US and UK standing law provided in this part demonstrates that both patent 
regimes confer, or are likely to confer, standing on partitioned exclusive licensees. In of itself, this 
outcome weighs in favour of broadening Australian standing law to include partitioned exclusive 
licensees, however, it also has more specific outcomes for patent harmonisation. A central goal of 
harmonisation is to reduce patent related costs by making consistent laws between countries.161 In 
this context, there are a number of costs associated with partitioned exclusive licensees not having 
standing, all which can be demonstrated in the example of a company that manufactures a patented 
product in one jurisdiction and uses action exclusive licensees to import and sell the product in 
others. In jurisdictions that do not grant standing to partitioned exclusive licensees, licensees may 
encounter additional transaction costs associated with enforcement in the patentee’s name, 
including a reduced amount of damages, or prohibition from enforcing the patent. In addition, costs 
in the global exploitation of patents will be increased by requiring legal advice on an issue that, as 
demonstrated above, has no compelling reason for its existence.  
154 Dendron GmbH v University of California (No 3) [2004] FSR 43. 
155 Ibid [1]. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid [25]. 
158 Ibid [23]–[26]. 
159 Ibid. 
160 See also, Bondax Carpets Ltd v Advance Carpet Tiles [1993] FSR 162; SDL Hair Ltd v Next Row Ltd [2013] EWPCC 31 (14 
June 2013); PCUK v Diamond Shamrock Industrial Chemical Ltd [1981] FSR 427. 
161 B+ Sub-Group, ‘Objectives and Principles, with Commentary on Potential Outcomes’ (Group B+ Sub-Group on Patent 
Harmonisation, 27 May 2015) 2; Jeremy Phillips, Harmonious Global Patent Harmonisation? B+ Subgroup Asks for 
Comments (17 June 2015) IPKat <http://ipkitten.blogspot.com.au/2015/06/harmonious-global-patent-
harmonisation.html>.  
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Conclusion 
The legal and economic reasoning presented in this chapter provides significant support for patent 
law providing standing to partitioned exclusive licensees. In particular, the ability for partitioned 
exclusive licensees to choose how and when infringement is initiated aligns with the patent regime’s 
role in incentivising innovation and complements the role of patents in a market economy. 
Conferring standing on partitioned exclusive licensees would also harmonise Australian law with key 
trading partners. This position, however, is the diametric opposite of Australia’s current patent 
standing laws. It is possible that a future High Court decision could establish that partitioned 
exclusive licensees do have standing under the current wording of the Patents Act. However, this 
seems to be a rather ineffective method to change the law. It is speculative, would take years, and 
would involve litigants risking much. Law reform by legislative means seems much more logical. 
Accordingly, it makes sense for IP Australia to move reform of standing law in the Patents Act up 
their agenda. 
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Introduction 
The first chapter of this thesis considered the threshold issue of standing to initiate patent 
infringement actions. The next four chapters, including this one, consider specific issues that test the 
boundaries of infringement causes of action in Australia. The emergent issue that forms the basis for 
this chapter is the growing use of 3D printers, in particular the creation and distribution of files that 
can instruct 3D printers to print physical objects. This chapter focuses on when creation and 
distribution of these files may give rise to ‘infringement by exploitation’ and ‘secondary 
infringement’.2  
The use of 3D printers is expanding from esoteric areas of research and manufacturing into more 
mainstream applications.3 For example, in the lead up to the 2014 Victorian election, the (then) 
Premier promised 3D printers for every government school if re-elected.4 Despite this, many people 
are not familiar with the technology. 3D printing, also known as ‘additive manufacturing’,5 is a 
process by which electronic data controls the co-ordination of a machine that creates objects by 
‘printing’ successive layers of a material. The electronic data source is usually a type of computer-
aided design (‘CAD’) file, which can be visualised on a computer screen like a blueprint.6 The 
materials that can be printed include plastics, metals and even human cells.7 Printers can now be 
bought that print more than one material,8 and vary in size and complexity, from the simplest forms 
that fit on an office desk, to those that can print houses.9  
There are various advantages and disadvantages to 3D printing technology. A key aspect of the 
technology is decentralisation. 10 Like the change from CDs to digital music files such as MP3s, the 
creation of CAD files that can instruct printers to make physical objects means that items which were 
2 As described in the Introduction to this thesis, these terms will be used throughout this study. See Introduction, pt V. 
3 Phil Reeves and Dinusha Mendis, ‘The Current Status and Impact of 3D Printing Within the Industrial Sector: An Analysis of 
Six Case Studies’ (United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, March 2015) 2; Wohlers Associates Inc, ‘Additive 
Manufacturing: Technology Roadmap for Australia’ (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation of 
Autralia, March 2013) 8–13. The technology itself is not new: the first patent was granted in 1977 and the first commercial 
printer produced in 1988.  
4 Henrietta Cook, ‘Napthine Promises 3D Printers for Every Government School’, The Age (online), 27 October 2014 
<http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/victoria-state-election-2014/napthine-promises-3d-printers-for-every-government-
school-20141026-11c9i2.html>. 
5 The label ‘3D printing’ ‘is a term used to describe a range of digital manufacturing technologies …’, see, Phil Reeves and 
Dinusha Mendis, ‘The Current Status and Impact of 3D Printing Within the Industrial Sector: An Analysis of Six Case Studies’ 
(United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, March 2015) 1. 
6 A CAD file has been described as being the equivalent of the architectural blueprint for a building, or the sewing pattern 
for a dress, see, Stephanie M Santoso, Benjamin D Horne, and Stephen B Wicker, ‘Destroying by Creating: the Creative 
Destruction of 3D Printing Through Intellectual Property’ (Working paper, 2013) 
<https://www.truststc.org/education/reu/13/Papers/HorneB_Paper.pdf>. 
7 For eg, Sean V Murphy and Anothy Atala, ‘3D Bioprinting of Tissues and Organs’ (2014) 32(8) Nature Biotechnology 773. 
8 Objet Connex 3D Printers, Stratasys <http://www.stratasys.com/3d-printers/design-series/objet-connex500>. 
9 ‘3D Printer Builds Houses in China’, The Guardian (online), 29 April 2014 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/video/2014/apr/29/3d-printer-builds-houses-china-video>. 
10 For more detailed discussion see, eg, Dinusha Mendis, ‘”The Clone Wars”: Episode 1 – The Ride of 3D Printing and its 
Implications for Intellectual Property Law – Learning Lessons From the Past?’ (2013) 35(3) European Intellectual Property 
Review 155, 157–159. 
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once only made in factories can now be made in homes, offices or laboratories.11 In conjunction with 
this, the nature of digital CAD files means that the can be instantly shared. This decentralisation of 
manufacturing has broad implications for owners and users of subject matter protected by 
intellectual property (‘IP’) rights.12 The concern that IP owners will lose control over IP-protected 
subject matter is a critical factor, invariably leading to questions about the adequacy of IP laws.13 A 
number of commentators have already suggested that IP laws may not be well fitted to industries 
reliant on a manufacturing base that utilises 3D printing.14  
One key question that warrants detailed doctrinal consideration is whether the unauthorised 
creation of CAD files relating to IP-protected subject matter constitutes infringement, particularly 
when CAD file creators share their files with other users. A future where patented products are 
widely printed by dispersed infringers and the only enforcement option is to pursue infringers 
individually, raises the possibility of unfeasible enforcement,15 and in turn, may erode the economic 
incentive patents are designed to provide.16 There has been some consideration of this issue in the 
context of US law, with specific focus on patent rights in physical subject matter. For example, Daniel 
Brean’s analysis of relevant US patent law led him to conclude that 3D printing leaves patentees 
‘virtually helpless to combat a large class of infringement’.17 This chapter explores whether the 
creation and distribution of CAD files could constitute infringement of patent rights in physical 
11 See generally, Dinusha Mendis, ‘”The Clone Wars”: Episode 1 – The Ride of 3D Printing and its Implications for Intellectual 
Property Law – Learning Lessons From the Past?’ (2013) 35(3) European Intellectual Property Review 155; Deven Desai and 
Gerard Magliocca, ‘Patents, Meet Napster: 3D printing and the Digitisation of Things’ (2014) 102 Georgetown Law Journal 
1691. 
12 For a broader discussion see, John F Hornick, ‘3D Printing and the Future (or Demise) of Intellectual Property’ (2014) 1(1) 
3D Printing and Additive Manufacturing 34, 35–36, 38–40. 
13 Ibid. The term ‘IP disruption’ is essentially used by Hornick to describe fundamental changes to the traditional IP 
protection model. In the same way that manufacturing processes will be disrupted by 3D printing technology, IP will 
arguably become increasingly irrelevant, see, ibid 35. 
14 See eg, Daniel Harris Brean, ‘Asserting Patents To Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771; Deven Desai and Gerard Magliocca, ‘Patents, Meet Napster: 
3D printing and the Digitisation of Things’ (2014) 102 Georgetown Law Journal 1691; Mark Lemley, ‘IP in a World Without 
Scarcity’ (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No 2413974, Stanford Law School, March 2014) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2456741_code32215.pdf?abstractid=2413974&mirid=4; Davis Doherty, 
‘Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D Printing Revolution’ (2012) 26 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology 353;  Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome If They Don’t Screw It Up: 3d Printing, Intellectual Property, and the 
Fight Over the Next Great Disruptive Technology, Public Knowledge (November 2010) <http://publicknowledge.org/it-will-
be-awesome-if-they-dont-screw-it-up>; Dinusha Mendis, ‘”Clone Wars” Episode II – The Next Generation: The Copyright 
Implications Relating to 3D Printing and Computer-Aided Design (CAD) File’ (2014) 6(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 
265. 
15 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 67. 
16 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
12–3; Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 
(Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3. 
17 Daniel Harris Brean, ‘Asserting Patents To Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 804. 
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subject matter in the Australian context,18 and contrasts the conclusions from this analysis with 
Brean’s analysis of US law.  
This chapter considers three dimensions of patent infringement as per the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
(‘the Patents Act’). It first explores whether infringement by exploitation is likely to be made out 
when CAD files that digitise patent-protected subject matter are created and distributed. This type of 
infringement is quite important because, particularly in the context of 3D printing, it affords broad 
protection. Thus, this chapter thoroughly explores the possibility of infringement by exploitation. 
Second, this chapter probes the applicability of the secondary infringement mechanisms: authorised 
infringement19 and supply infringement.20 In the course of this analysis, the chapter also discusses 
whether there is a need for patent law to be amended. Relevant amendments to copyright law have 
been effected in response to the unprecedented growth in unauthorised digital distribution of 
copyright material (such as music and movies). The aim of these amendments was to ensure that 
digital communication of copyright material constitutes direct infringement.21 This chapter examines 
whether equivalent amendments in the patent law context are warranted.  
The unique nature of 3D printing technology should not, however, be overlooked: fundamental 
differences between 3D printing and the distribution of digital copyright material raises questions as 
to whether 3D printing will have a similar disruptive impact.22 Many 3D printing users have limited 
ability to generate CAD files that would produce an infringing version of a patented product, and the 
costs associated with 3D printing present a substantial barrier to infringement. To date there is no 
significant empirical evidence of widespread patent infringement wrought by 3D printing 
technology.23 Nevertheless for those with the means to create CAD files, the technology presents 
significant capacity to infringe. It is this capacity that necessitates appraisal of these issues. 
The implications of the analysis presented in this chapter are both academic and practical, and go 
beyond the specific concerns raised by 3D printing technology. Jurisprudentially, this analysis 
illustrates that there is a need for broader consideration of the nature of exclusive patent rights, 
particularly in the context of the developing information economy. On the practical side, it highlights 
differences in Australian and US infringement law, particularly in respect of secondary infringement. 
18 The issue of copyright infringement is not considered here, but as noted above CAD files may also be subject to copyright 
protection. For analysis of this issue in the US context, see Matt Simon, ‘When Copyright Can Kill: How 3D Printers are 
Breaking the Barriers between “Intellectual” Property and the Physical World’ (2013) 3(1) Pace Intellectual Property, Sports 
and Entertainment Law Forum 59. For analysis in the UK context see, Dinusha Mendis, ‘”Clone Wars” Episode II – The Next 
Generation: The Copyright Implications Relating to 3D Printing and Computer-Aided Design (CAD) File’ (2014) 6(2) Law, 
Innovation and Technology 265. 
19 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1). 
20 Ibid s 117(1). 
21 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth) 2–3. 
22 Dinusha Mendis, Davide Secchi and Phil Reeves, ‘A Legal and Empirical Study into the Intellectual Property Implications of 
3D Printing’ (United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, March 2015) 8. 
23 Ibid. 
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In contrast with the analysis of US indirect patent infringement law presented by Brean, the 
reasoning in this chapter leads to a conclusion that Australian secondary patent infringement law is 
well equipped to provide relief in the context of CAD file distribution. The analysis also suggests that 
Australian secondary patent infringement law addresses many of the uncertainties, both legal and 
jurisprudential, that pose barriers to infringement by exploitation in the circumstances analysed. As 
such, the conclusion is that extending the law relating to infringement by exploitation, either through 
legislative amendment or judicial reasoning, is unwarranted and jurisprudentially unsound, and that 
it could lead to undesirable consequences. 
I. Infringement by Exploitation 
The exclusive rights conferred by a US patent are to: make, use, sell (or offer to sell), or import an 
invention.24 In contrast, as noted in the introduction to this thesis,25 the unanimous Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia recently affirmed that the ‘twin’ exclusive rights conferred by Australian 
patents are to ‘exploit’ an invention and to authorise others to ‘exploit’ an invention.26 Relevantly, 
the Patents Act states that ‘exploit’: 
in relation to an invention, includes: 
(a) where the invention is a product--make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, 
sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those 
things; or 
(b) where the invention is a method or process--use the method or process or do any act mentioned in 
paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use. 27 
Consistent with this interpretation of Australian patent rights, any consideration of what is meant by 
‘make’ or ‘use’, or any of the other activities listed under the definition of ‘exploit’, are indications of 
what is meant by the term ‘exploit’, but they are not exclusive rights in and of themselves.28 In 
scenarios concerning the creation and distribution of CAD files, arguments concerning the activities 
of ‘make’, ‘sell’, ‘use’, and ‘otherwise dispose of’ are relevant. 
A. Make, & Offer to Make 
In the US, the definition of ‘make’ has received judicial consideration by the Supreme Court. In Bauer 
& Cie v O’Donnell, the Court stated that it ‘embraces the construction of the thing invented’.29 On 
24 35 USC § 154(a)(1). 
25 See, Introduction, pt V. 
26 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1, 33 (Besanko, Jagot and Nicolas JJ); affirming Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23, 106 (Yates J). 
27 Patents Act 1990 (1990) sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
28 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1, 33 (Besanko, Jagot and Nicolas JJ); affirming Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23, 106 (Yates J). 
29 Bauer & Cie v O’Donnell, 229 US 1, 10 (1913). 
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this basis, Brean argues that the exclusive right to ‘make’ is not encroached in the creation of a CAD 
file, because it does not involve construction of all of the integers of the invention.30  
The starting point under Australian law for whether an invention is ‘made’ is that all the integers 
must be present in the allegedly infringing product.31 In light of this requirement, a majority of Full 
Court of the Federal Court in Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd 
(‘Pinefair’) held that an invention will be ‘made’ even if it is produced partway through the 
manufacturing process and is not in its ultimate commercial form.32 This raises a question as to how 
far through the 3D printing process a product must be before it could be said to be ‘made’: is it 
necessary that a product is actually printed, or would the creation of a CAD file suffice? In support of 
an argument for infringement here, the High Court has held that the function of a patent right is to 
operate as a negative right that can be used to exclude others from making intangible constructs of 
inventions.33 However, whilst this is undeniably a function of patent rights, the legal interpretation of 
‘make’ is that it is limited to products containing all the integers of an invention.34 If an invention is 
claimed using physical parameters, then those physical parameters must be reproduced. A non-
physical representation does not reproduce physical integers. 
Reflecting further on this requirement, since patent protection is available for software and software 
is non-physical, logic seems to dictate that dimensional consistency is inherent in the definition of 
‘make’. In this sense, patent claims to non-physical property such as software can only be infringed 
when additional non-physical software is created. Likewise, patent claims to physical property can 
only be infringed when physical property is created. Such statements seem elementary, although 
perhaps infrequently appreciated in patent law. Further, when considered in relation to 3D printing 
the implications are enlightening. For example, just as printing software code on paper cannot 
constitute ‘making’ patented software, the creation of a CAD file cannot constitute ‘making’ a 
patented physical product. It is the act of printing the product based on the CAD file that would 
constitute the product being ‘made’. 
30 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 789–90. 
31 Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643, 657–8 (Dixon J); Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty 
Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 464 (Foster J); 469 (Mansfield J); 479–80 (Goldberg J). 
32 Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 463–4 (Foster J); 469 (Mansfield J); 
cf. 479–80 (Goldberg J). In Pinefair the product, garden edging material, was ‘made’ during an intermediate, non-transitory 
manufacturing step, however the product was cut during final manufacturing stages meaning the final product did not 
infringe, see 461 .  
33 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 (Dixon J); Grain Pool (WA) v The 
Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 513–14 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); JT 
International SA v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 250 CLR 1, 31 (French CJ). 
34 Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643, 657–8 (Dixon J); Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty 
Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 464 (Foster J); 469 (Mansfield J); 479–80 (Goldberg J). 
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This reasoning overlaps with similar concepts in copyright law. As a general rule, copyright material 
must be reproduced in the same dimension as the original.35 For example, as stated by Pape J in the 
well-cited case of Cuisenaire v Reed,36 ‘a set of written directions is not “reproduced” by the 
construction of an article made in accordance with those directions. A reproduction must reproduce 
the original’.37 There are exceptions to this rule, for example, three-dimensional artistic works are 
protected from unauthorised two-dimensional reproduction;38 and musical or dramatic works are 
protected from unauthorised reproduction in written form as well as through public performance.39 
Arguably though, these extensions stem from the necessity of achieving the core purpose of 
copyright: to incentivise creative expression. If artistic, musical and dramatic works are not protected 
from routine reproduction in these other dimensions, from a practical point of view there is 
insufficient incentive for creative expression. Whether it is necessary that distribution of CAD files 
constitute infringement by exploitation to ensure patents continue to incentivise innovation is a topic 
turned to later in this chapter. 
The definition of ‘exploit’ also specifies the activity, ‘offer to make’. Consistent with the ‘offer’ 
element of this activity, it follows that to impinge upon this activity nothing need actually be made. 
This in itself demonstrates a type of extra-dimensional protection to ‘make’. Ostensibly, this opens 
the door to an argument that the offer to create a CAD file could be construed as an offer to make a 
patented physical product. However, since the creation of a CAD file is unlikely to constitute ‘making’ 
a patented invention, then an offer to create a CAD file is also unlikely to constitute ‘offering to 
make’ a patented invention. 
B. Sell & ‘Otherwise Dispose of’  
The exclusive right of ‘sell’ has not been interpreted by the US Supreme Court, but it has received 
scrutiny by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In 2005, the Court in NTP Inc v Research in 
Motion Ltd40 concluded that it has two possible meanings: ‘1. The transfer of property or title for a 
price [and;] 2. The agreement by which such a transfer takes place.’41 Based on NTP Inc v Research in 
Motion Ltd and a number of other Federal Circuit cases, Brean reasons that the sale of an 
unauthorised product can only infringe when the invention as described in the claims is to be 
35 See, eg, Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1968) 161 CLR 171, 186–7 (Gibbs CJ), 207 (Brennan J), 213–4 
(Deane J).  
36 Cuisenaire v Reed [1963] VR 719. 
37 Ibid 735; applied in Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1968) 161 CLR 171, 186–7 (Gibbs CJ), 206–7 (Brennan J), 
212–4 (Deane J).  
38 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 21(3). 
39 Ibid s 31(1). 
40 NTP Inc v Research in Motion Ltd, 418 F 3d 1282 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
41 Ibid 1319. 
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transferred.42 Consequently, his reasoning leads to the conclusion that the sale of a CAD file 
depicting the invention cannot constitute infringement in the US.43  
In Australia, the activities of ‘sell’ or ‘otherwise dispose of’ have not received detailed judicial 
interpretation. Nevertheless, case law under the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) does appear to be on point. 
As outlined in the previous chapter,44 under the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent were to ‘make, use, exercise and vend’ the invention.45 In Windsurfing 
International Inc v Petit (‘Windsurfing’),46 Waddell J found that the sale of a sailboard in a kit of parts 
was sufficient for infringement.47 In reaching this conclusion, Waddell J reviewed several cases from 
Australia and the UK, in particular, Walker v Alemite Corp (‘Walker),48 and Townsend v Haworth 
(‘Townsend’).49 
The patent in Walker was for grease-cups that could be used to lubricate bearings that were difficult 
to access.50 The invention consisted of three main components but the grease-cup was a key element 
and unique to the invention.51 In this case, the patentee alleged that the sale of the grease-cup by 
itself constituted infringement because it would ‘inevitably’ be used for the purpose of infringing the 
patent.52 All the members of the High Court found that the activity of selling grease-cups did not 
constitute infringement.53 On this point, Dixon J stated, ‘selling articles to persons to be used for the 
purpose of infringing a patent is not an infringement of the patent’, and that ‘sale with a knowledge 
that the purchaser will use the articles for infringement is not itself an infringement’.54  
In Townsend, the invention was a method for preserving materials and fabrics from mildew by the 
application of commercially available chemicals.55 The defendant supplied chemicals with the 
intention that they be used for such purposes.56 On the issue of infringement Mellish J stated:  
Selling materials for the purpose of infringing a patent to the man who is going to infringe it, even 
although the party who sells it knows that he is going to infringe it and indemnifies him, does not by 
itself make the person who so sells an infringer.57 
42 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 790–3. 
43 Ibid 793. 
44 See, Chapter I pt I B. 
45 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 69. 
46 Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1984] 2 NSWLR 196. 
47 Ibid 207. 
48 Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643. 
49 Townsend v Haworth (1875) 12 ChD 831, fully reported in Sykes v Howarth (1879) 48 LJ(NS) 769, 770. 
50 Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643, 644–5. 
51 Ibid 644–5, 650–1, 657–8. 
52 Ibid 657–8. 
53 Ibid 650 (Rich J), 654 (Starke J), 657–8 (Dixon J), 658 (Evatt J agreeing with Stark J), 659 (McTiernan J agreeing with Dixon 
J). 
54 Ibid 658. 
55 Townsend v Haworth (1875) 12 ChD 831, fully reported in Sykes v Howarth (1879) 48 LJ(NS) 769, 773. 
56 Ibid. 
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A strict application of the reasoning in Walker and Townsend to the facts in Windsurfing tends to 
suggest that because the kit of unassembled parts does not take the integers of an invention, it 
cannot constitute infringement by exploitation; rather, this occurs later when the customer ‘makes’ 
it. Despite this, Waddell J distinguished both of these cases, although his Honour did not explicitly 
mention how.58 It would appear that Walker was distinguished on the basis that the patent in that 
case claimed an apparatus with various integers, and the defendant only supplied one element of the 
apparatus.59 With regard to Townsend, the chemicals that were supplied could be used in various 
ways, many of them non-infringing.60 In contrast, the kit supplied in Windsurfing contained all the 
necessary elements, only had one purpose, and once the kit was constructed in accordance with the 
accompanying instructions, it contained all the integers of the claims.61  
Waddell J also referred to two other cases.62 His Honour approved of an obiter comment from 
Pearson J in United Telephone Co v Dale63 (which had also been perfunctorily approved of by the 
English Court of Appeal64): 
If there was a patent for a knife of a particular construction, and an injunction was granted restraining 
a defendant from selling knives made according to the patent, and he was to sell the component parts 
so that any school-boy could put them together and construct the knife, surely that sale would be a 
breach of the injunction.65 
The other case Waddell J referred to was EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Wilson.66 In this case, 
Swinfen Eady J held that a defendant who sent components of a patented brake via mail that, when 
assembled, formed an infringing product, infringed the patent by sending the components.67  
In finding infringement in Windsurfing, Waddell J emphasised that the kit form of the sailboard was 
the ordinary (and convenient) way for sale to take place and that it was a complete set of parts.68 
With the passage of time, his Honour’s judgment has been approved and applied by the Full Court of 
the Federal Court. In Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd,69 the 
unanimous Full Court approved it.70 In Grove Hill Pty Ltd v Great Western Corp Pty Ltd (‘Grove’),71 
57 Ibid. 
58 Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1984] 2 NSWLR 196, 200. 
59 Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643, 658. 
60 Townsend v Haworth (1875) 12 ChD 831, fully reported in Sykes v Howarth (1879) 48 LJ(NS) 769, 771. 
61 Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1984] 2 NSWLR 196, 214–5. 
62 Ibid 205–6. 
63 United Telephone Co v Dale (1884) 25 Ch D 778. 
64 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyres Ltd v Moseley Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 612, 619. 
65 United Telephone Co v Dale 25 (1884) 25 Ch D 778, 782–3. 
66 EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Wilson (1903) 20 RPC 644. 
67 Ibid 648. 
68 Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1984] 2 NSWLR 196, 207. 
69 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239. 
70 Ibid 254 (Burchett, Sackville and Lehane JJ). 
71 Grove Hill Pty Ltd v Great Western Corp Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 257. 
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Gyles J, with whom French and Dowsett JJ agreed,72 applied it and found that the sale of a row 
cultivator (machinery for farming plants in rows) distributed in a kit, was sufficient for infringement 
by exploitation.73  
Although an analogy between the sale of kits and the distribution of CAD files may at first appear 
tenuous, it does warrant further consideration. Assuming that a CAD file need only be opened in a 
computer program and a print instruction issued to a 3D printer in order to create a physical product 
(similar to downloading and printing an image), this process could be considered analogous to the 
infringing act in Windsurfing. Just as the kits for the sailboards in Windsurfing contained traditional 
paper instructions, the CAD file contains computer-readable instructions. No doubt the quality of the 
instructions differs, but from a human interaction perspective, 3D printing may require less 
intervention. Indeed, it is possible that the 3D printing process incorporates all the integers of an 
invention in a printed article with more certainty because there is no chance of the type of human 
error that is commonly associated with assembling kit products.  
Nevertheless, this analogy is not perfect. In Windsurfing, Waddell J put weight on the fact that 
sailboards were sold in kits as the ordinary course of business. At the moment, it is not the usual 
course of business to send someone (for example a consumer) a CAD file to enable them to print a 
product. But, this may change in the future. The increasing use of 3D printers means that it is quite 
likely that the practice of printing products after paying to download CAD files may become 
commonplace.74 Another more persuasive imperfection in the analogy with kits is that the supply of 
CAD files does not include the supply of the components needed to make the infringing product, 
most notably, the raw materials for printing and the printer itself. In Windsurfing (and Grove) all the 
components were supplied to the consumer, who could then put them together. From this 
perspective, then, supplying a CAD file is more aligned with the supply of the grease-cup in Walker. In 
both instances, although a key component is supplied, without more it does not provide the 
consumer with all of the necessary means to create an infringing product.  
At its core, this emphasis on physical components seems to align more closely the jurisprudential 
underpinning of Windsurfing and Grove. That is, the cases represent an extension of reasoning 
consistent with the activity of ‘make’ and require that all the physical components of a patented 
invention be supplied and that they can be assembled through a straightforward process, or at least 
one that the receiver is capable of. It follows that supplying a CAD file alone is unlikely to constitute 
infringement via the activities of ‘sell’ or ‘otherwise dispose of’. 
72 Ibid 288 (French J), 298–301 (Dowsett J). 
73 Ibid 341. 
74 Dinusha Mendis, ‘”The Clone Wars”: Episode 1 – The Rise of 3D Printing and its Implications for Intellectual Property Law 
– Learning Lessons From the Past?’ (2013) 35(3) European Intellectual Property Review 155, 168–69. 
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C. ‘Use’ 
On whether making a CAD file or distributing it online could constitute ‘use’,75 the US Supreme Court 
has stated that ‘use’ ‘is a comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into 
service any given invention.’76 Reviewing this case law, Brean concludes that making a CAD file or 
distributing it is, ‘far removed from a physical product being put into service in accordance with the 
intended functions…’.77 Thus, he concludes that an infringement action under this right is unlikely to 
succeed.78 
The activity of ‘use’ has not been considered by the High Court of Australia, but it has been 
addressed by the Full Federal Court in Pinefair.79 In that case, the patented product found to be 
infringed related to flexible garden edging material designed to retain soil in fixed areas.80 In a split 
decision, Mansfield J and Foster J81 approved von Doussa J’s finding at first instance that ‘use’ can be 
constituted by ‘taking commercial advantage of the invention to advance them in the market place, 
even though at the point of sale the [respondents’] product has been altered so that it no longer 
possesses all the integers of the claim’.82 The majority found that the respondents produced the 
patented product during manufacturing, but additional alterations meant the market product did not 
include all the integers of the claims.83 Although this meant the respondents did not sell an infringing 
product, since their  production and use of the invention was more than just ‘peripheral or 
transitory’84 and gave them an advance in the market place, the majority found that this was 
sufficient to constitute ‘use’ for the purposes of infringement.85  
By distributing a CAD file that provides instructions for printing a patented product, there is little 
doubt that the commercial value of the patent could be reduced. However, there is a point of 
difference between the infringing use in Pinefair and arguing that the creation and distribution of 
CAD files constitutes ‘use’. Relevantly, in Pinefair the infringing article was ‘made’, and then, through 
additional manufacturing processes, ‘used’ to create a non-infringing article.86 In the 3D printing 
scenario there is no intermediate ‘making’ of the invention, as analysed above, ‘making’ occurs later 
when the file is printed.87 Thus, no direct analogy to Pinefair exists. Despite this finding, it is still 
75 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 800. 
76 Bauer & Cie v O’Donnell, 229 US 1, 10 (1913). 
77 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 803. 
78 Ibid. 
79Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458. 
80 Ibid 459–60; it is helpful to refer to diagrams in the patent, see, Australian Patent No 564,517. 
81 Ibid 463 (Foster J generally agreed with von Doussa’s findings on this point), 469 (Mansfield J). 
82 Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 438, 450. 
83 Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 463–4 (Foster J), 468 (Mansfield J). 
84 Ibid 463 (Foster J), 470 (Mansfield J). 
85 Ibid 463 (Foster J), 470–1 (Mansfield J). 
86 Ibid 463 (Foster J), 470 (Mansfield J). 
87 See above, pt I A. 
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relevant to enquire whether the distribution of a CAD file could constitute ‘use’, because other cases 
indicate the term may encompass other types of conduct. 
Examining what ‘use’ means more broadly, commentators have suggested that it is limited to 
exercising the inventive element of a product.88 However, recent judicial decisions do not appear to 
limit the term in such a way. On this point,  the majority of the Full Federal Court in Azuko Pty Ltd v 
Old Digger Pty Ltd (‘Azuko’)89 made obiter statements about the types of conduct that might be 
included in the definition of ‘use’. In Azuko, Gyles J, with whom Beaumont J agreed on this particular 
issue,90 stated that ‘to sell goods might be seen as commercial use of the goods’.91 Thus, ‘use’ 
appears to have a wider definition than purely exercising the inventive element of a product.  
There is a line of cases on the definition of ‘use’ in the UK, beginning with Saccharin Corp Ltd v Anglo-
Continental Chemical Works Ltd (‘Saccharin),92 which demonstrate that infringement can arise when 
a domestically patented process is performed in a foreign jurisdiction and then the products resulting 
from that process are imported domestically.93 Although Australian patent law now specifies that 
infringement is constituted by importing and selling a product that is the result of using a patented 
process, UK legislation did not include an equivalent provision at that time.94 In this case, the 
patentee controlled rights to a process for making a certain chemical, which could then be converted 
to saccharin (the commonly used artificial sweetener).95 The process of making the intermediate 
chemical was a technical advance in the field and allowed saccharin to be made more efficiently.96 In 
this case, the defendants imported saccharin from companies that made it overseas using the 
patented process.97 One of the reasons described by the Court for arriving at a finding of 
infringement was that without protection in these circumstances, the value of the patent would be 
reduced because third parties would be able to perform the process in a foreign jurisdiction (without 
patent protection), and then import and sell the benefits of it domestically.98 This case is relevant to 
distribution of CAD files because, by recognising infringement when a product is imported that is the 
result of using a domestically patented method in a foreign jurisdiction, this means that an action for 
infringement by ‘use’ will extend to commercial conduct that is not specifically included in the 
88 Stewart et al, Intellectual Property in Australia (2014, 5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths) 485. 
89 Azuko Pty Ltd v Old Digger Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 72. 
90 Ibid 107; see also, Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 469–70 
(Mansfield J). 
91 Ibid 136; in dissent, Heerey J stated that ‘use’ for the sake of ‘prior secret use’ compendiously refers to all the exclusive 
rights in the definition of exploit in s 13(1), (at: 117). 
92 Saccharin Corp Ltd v Anglo-Continental Chemical Works Ltd [1900] RPC 307. 
93 See generally, ibid; see also, Pfizer Corp v Minister of Health [1965] AC 512; Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Ltd 
[1978] RPC 153. 
94 Patents Act 1990 (1990) sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’); Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (2008) 76 IPR 618, 745–6 
(Lindgren J). 
95 Saccharin Corp Ltd v Anglo–Continental Chemical Works Ltd [1900] RPC 307, 308–9. 
96 Ibid 315–8. 
97 Ibid 318–9. 
98 Ibid 319 (Buckley J). 
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boundaries of the claims. Indeed, this can be viewed as a type of extra-dimensional protection in the 
sense that a patented process is infringed when a product is imported. 
The reasoning from Saccharin has been applied in Australia. In Re Application of Eli Lilly and Co (Eli 
Lilly),99 Wootten J had to decide whether a patentee had received adequate remuneration for the 
purposes of patent term extension.100 His Honour held that one way to establish whether the 
patentee had obtained commercial gain from the patent was to assess whether their conduct would 
be equivalent to infringing it.101 The patent in question claimed monensic acid as a product, and 
various processes for its production.102 The patentee imported a variant of the chemical claimed in 
the patent, monensic salt, which his Honour found to be a simple alternative form of monensic acid 
convenient for packaging.103 Applying the reasoning that originated in Saccharin, Wootten J held that 
the importation of monensic salt in Australia constituted ‘use’ because it resulted from the 
performance of the patented process abroad.104 
Since the cases of Eli Lilly and Saccharine represent instances where a type of extra-dimensional 
protection was extended to patented methods, it is constructive to consider whether a similar type 
of extra-dimensional protection could be afforded to patented physical products when a CAD file is 
made of one and distributed. There is little doubt that if such actions were infringing, then a 
patentee would be in a stronger position to protect the economic value of their invention by 
prohibiting people from sharing CAD files that are directed to printing their patented product. 
However, there are various aspects concerning the enforcement of patented physical products which 
means this type of protection is not warranted. Most notably, as outlined above, when a patented 
product is printed from a CAD file, infringement arises via the product being ‘made’. Thus, in the 
absence of the creation and distribution of CAD files constituting infringement, patentees of physical 
products do still have recourse to enforce their rights. Moreover, if infringement via ‘use’ was to be 
found in the creation and distribution of CAD files, then a variety of other activities that are currently 
non-infringing may become infringing. For example, if a company wants to experiment on an 
invention to improve or modify it, they may ask a third party to create a CAD file so they can work 
with the design of it on a computer. Under an extended interpretation of ‘use’, the actions of the 
third party in creating the CAD file and sending it to them could be infringing, even though the party 
who requested the CAD file may be exempt from infringement because their actions would be 
considered acts undertaken for experimental purposes.105 Similarly, under this interpretation of 
99 Re Application of Eli Lily and Co [1982] 1 NSWLR 526.  
100 Ibid [527], [532]. 
101 Ibid [523]. 
102 Ibid [527]–[528], [532]. 
103 Ibid [532].  
104 Ibid [533]. 
105 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 119C. 
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‘use’, creation of a CAD file to send to another jurisdiction could be infringing, even though the 
product is printed outside the patent area.106 
The discussion in this section shows that although the activity of ‘use’ is not exhaustively defined in 
Australian law, current decisions on what it does include do not provide a rational basis to argue that 
the creation and distribution of CAD files constitutes infringement. Similarly, although case law 
concerning patented methods shows that they receive a type of extra-dimensional protection when 
products resulting from their performance outside jurisdiction are imported, the rationale that led to 
this finding cannot be directly transposed to an argument that the distribution of CAD files should 
constitute infringement. As a result, it is unlikely that any theory of infringement under the activity of 
‘use’ warrants a finding of infringement. 
D. Should ‘Exploit’ Include Digitally ‘Communicating’ CAD files? 
The ‘centrepiece’ of the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) introduced the 
exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’.107 This was specifically designed to make 
unauthorised sharing of digital copyright material, such as movies and music, constitute primary 
infringement.108 ‘Communicate’ is defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to mean ‘make available 
online or electronically transmit … work or other subject-matter.’109 A number of commentators have 
discussed the analogy between digitised music/movies and digitised physical products in 3D 
printing.110 Thus, given the overlap in concern about infringement via distribution of files, it is worth 
considering whether enacting an equivalent provision in patent law is necessary to ensure that online 
CAD file distribution constitutes infringement by exploitation.  
One difficulty with this proposition is that the right of communication to the public is not particularly 
well suited to patent law. Copyright law was amended because digital transmission facilitated 
another way to enjoy copyright content without the permission of the copyright owner. Thus, it was 
deemed necessary to add this exclusive right to provide sufficient protection. However, as the 
analysis of creation and distribution of CAD files above reveals, CAD files are not in and of themselves 
another way to enjoy a patented physical product. At its crux, a CAD file is information that instructs 
a 3D printer to make an item. To this end, creating a right to ‘communicate’ patented information 
would result in an extension of patent rights to exclude sharing information about how to make an 
invention. This point overlaps with much of the analysis above. Most notably, infringement by 
exploitation need only be found when practical activities, relative to the invention and essential for 
106 Ibid, s 13(3), sch 1 (definition of ‘patent area’). 
107 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999, 2. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (definition of ‘communicate’). 
110 See generally, Dinusha Mendis, ‘”The Clone Wars”: Episode 1 – The Rise of 3D Printing and its Implications for 
Intellectual Property Law – Learning Lessons From the Past?’ (2013) 35(3) European Intellectual Property Review 155; Deven 
Desai and Gerard Magliocca, ‘Patents, Meet Napster: 3D printing and the Digitisation of Things’ (2014) 102 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1691. 
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its protection, are exercised. Indeed, if a type of communication right was introduced into patent 
law, it could capture typed instructions to make a product when digitally transmitted. This would be 
particularly problematic if the instructions detail how to make an invention and are communicated to 
instruct people on how to avoid infringement. 
E. Conclusion on Infringement by Exploitation Arguments 
Ultimately, although a variety of plausible infringement by exploitation arguments can be raised for 
the creation and distribution of CAD files, none of them present an infringement argument that is 
likely to prevail. The arguments based on Windsurfing and on the UK cases concerning ‘use’ present 
interesting arguments that test the boundaries of the law, but there is no precedent for either and 
their jurisprudential underpinning is weak. Moreover, the analysis here suggests that if infringement 
by exploitation were found when CAD files are created or distributed, it would extend patent 
protection to protecting quite abstract pieces of information in circumstances that do not necessarily 
require it and that this may actually have negative effects. 
II. Secondary Infringement  
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this chapter, the analysis in this part considers whether the 
distribution of CAD files may constitute secondary infringement via authorised infringement, or 
supply infringement. 111  
A. Authorised Infringement 
Section 13(1) of the Patents Act refers to the ‘exclusive rights … to exploit the invention and to 
authorise another person to exploit the invention.’ The current application of authorised 
infringement emerges from this passage,112 and is augmented by analogy to copyright. To be liable 
for authorised infringement, a party must have ‘sanctioned, approved or countenanced’ 
infringement by a third party.113 However, liability will only be found when all the facts of the case 
are considered.114 There are three relevant cases, two copyright and one patent, that are central to 
whether distribution of CAD files could constitute authorised infringement. These are: Roadshow 
111 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 13(1), 117(1). A plausible secondary infringement argument could probably also be made 
under procured infringement (see, Chapter 3 pt II D for a detailed analysis of this cause of action) however, since supply 
infringement and authorisation appear to create quite clear liability, there is no need to consider further causes of action. 
112 Ibid s 13(1). 
113 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 115 (Kenny J); Streetworx Pty Ltd v 
Artcraft Urban Group Pty Ltd (2014) 110 IPR 82, 151–3 (Beach J); Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS Diagnostics 
Pty Ltd (2010) 85 IPR 525, 568–70 (Bennett J); Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 62–3 (French CJ, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 84–86 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). However, it should also be noted that this approach has been 
criticised for ignoring legislating history of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), see generally, Ann L Monotti, ‘Infringement of a 
Patent by Authorisation: Clear or Muddy Waters? (2013) 24 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 5. 
114 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 48 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 89 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (‘iiNet‘),115 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (‘Cooper’)116 and SNF 
(Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (‘SNF‘).117 
In iiNet, an Internet service provider (‘ISP’) was accused of authorising the copyright infringement of 
its clients, namely the download of movies and television shows.118 In two joint judgments, the High 
Court stated that authorisation involves the consideration of three key elements: the nature of the 
relationship between the infringer by exploitation and alleged authoriser, the power to prevent 
infringement, and steps taken to prevent infringement.119 Through considering these elements, both 
judgments in the High Court unanimously found the ISP did not authorise the copyright infringement 
of its customers.120 In reaching this conclusion, the judgments put significant weight on the fact that 
the only power the ISP had to prevent their client’s infringement was by terminating the Internet 
services they provided.121 This, their Honour’s held, was a power that would not prevent 
infringement, just prevent further infringement via that ISP as an intermediary.122 Moreover, in order 
to exercise that power, the ISP would be required to identify infringing articles and identify which 
clients were accessing them, a difficult and time consuming task.123 
By contrast, in Cooper the Full Federal Court unanimously found the applicant authorised 
infringement.124 In this case, the applicant was the registered owner and operator of the website 
‘MP3s4FREE’.125 The website itself did not include music files but provided hyperlinks to other sites 
where Internet users could download them for free.126 In finding infringement, all the members of 
the Court found that although the applicant did not necessarily converse with the ultimate infringers, 
by providing the files on the website, the relationship was sufficient for authorised infringement.127 It 
was also found that the applicant had the power to to prevent infringement by removing the 
115 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42. 
116 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380. 
117 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46. 
118 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 57. 
119 Ibid 67 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 87 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).These elements are specified in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 101(1A), however, they are effectively a codified form of Gibbs J statements in University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, 12–3; which in themselves are distilled from Adelaide Corp v Australian Performing Right 
Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481, 487. See also, Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380, 382 
(French J), 410–13 (Kenny J), 386–391 (Branson J). 
120 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 69–71 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 88–9 (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid 70 (French CJ, Creannan and Kiefel J), 88 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
123 Ibid 68 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 88–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); it is worth noting here that in Dallas Buyers 
Club LLC v IINet [2015] FCA 317 (7 April 2015), Perram J ordered an ISP to reveal the account details of IP addresses which 
the applicant alleged were involved in copyright infringement, see [1]–[2], [92]–[93]. 
124 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380, 391 (Branson J), 413 (Kenny J), 382 (French J agreeing 
with Branson and Kenny JJ). 
125 Ibid 382. 
126 Ibid 382–3. 
127 Ibid 390 (Branson J), 412 (Kenny J), 382 (French J agreeing with Branson and Kenny JJ). 
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hyperlinks or ascertaining the legality of the MP3s.128 Moreover, that the applicant could have taken 
these steps to prevent infringement but didn’t.129  
In the patent case, SNF, Kenny J found authorised infringement occurred when a party supplied a key 
component of a method patent, advised how to conduct infringing actions, and had the power to 
prevent infringement because they could choose not to supply the component.130 Importantly, on 
the question of the required mental state, Kenny J also specified that it is not relevant whether an 
authoriser knows that certain actions will result in infringement, no mental state need be proved.131 
In application to the distribution of CAD files, the argument is that a downloader who prints a CAD 
file commits infringement by exploitation, and authorised infringement operates to make the 
distributor liable. At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between different modes of distribution, 
as they warrant slightly different analyses. Four different modes of transfer will be discussed:  
1. emailing a CAD file;  
2. providing a direct link to download a CAD file on a distributor’s own website;  
3. uploading a CAD file to a BitTorrent site such as The Pirate Bay; and  
4. uploading a CAD file to a 3D printing website. 
The situations of emailing a CAD file to someone or providing it to someone via a distributor’s own 
website are both factually quite similar to SNF and Cooper. That is, the distributor is supplying a key 
component to enable infringement by exploitation via ‘making’ an infringing article, and the 
distributor would have sufficient power to prevent any infringement by choosing not to distribute it. 
Since authorised infringement does not require knowledge that the conduct results in infringement, 
even if they do not know the product itself infringes, it does appear liability could be established, 
particularly if the alleged authoriser takes no steps to avoid infringement. 
A similar analysis also applies to uploading a CAD file to a BitTorrent site such as The Pirate Bay or 3D 
printing websites such as Shapeways,132 or Thingiverse.133 However, before exploring liability further 
in these scenarios, some background information on these distribution channels is needed. 
BitTorrent, as outlined in iiNet, 134 is an online peer-to-peer file sharing protocol that enables users to 
download and make available computer files by communicating directly between users. Websites 
128 Ibid 387–90 (Branson J), 411–2 (Kenny J). Cf. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 69–71 (French CJ, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 88–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
129 Ibid 390–1 (Branson J), 412 (Kenny J). 
130 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 118–9; this case was appealed, but only 
on invalidity, not infringement, SNF (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialist Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2012) 96 IPR 365, 365–
6. 
131 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 119; see also, Streetworx Pty Ltd v 
Artcraft Urban Group Pty Ltd (2014) 110 IPR 82, 153 (Beach J); University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 
1, 21–22 (Jacobs J), 7 (McTiernan ACJ agreeing with Jacobs J), 13 (Gibbs J). 
132 Shapeways, < http://www.shapeways.com/>. 
133 Thingiverse, < http://www.thingiverse.com/>. 
134 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 43. 
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such as The Pirate Bay provide lists of files available for transfer and host torrent files that, once 
downloaded and executed, initiate the peer-to-peer transfer. Distributors can share files via 
BitTorrent by uploading new torrent files to sites like The Pirate Bay. Interestingly, in 2012 The Pirate 
Bay created a new category for sharing of 3D printing files called ‘physibles’.135 3D printing websites 
such as Shapeways or Thingiverse operate by hosting CAD files that are uploaded by distributors. 
Thingiverse operates as a 3D printing community where downloaders can access CAD files for free 
and print corresponding products themselves.136 Shapeways operates as a marketplace where users 
pay for a file and get Shapeways to print it for them. Profits from transactions on Shapeways go to 
the designers of the relevant CAD files.137 
In uploading to a BitTorrent site or a 3D printing site, a distributor is supplying a CAD file through 
means they do not directly control, but in both situations, a distributor is intending for other people 
to download a CAD file that is capable of printing an infringing article. Moreover, the resultant 
infringement could be avoided if the distributor chose not to upload the file. Indeed, uploading to 
these sites implicates distributors more so than in Cooper where the infringer only created links and 
did not supply the infringing content himself. Thus, like in the first two modes of distribution, in the 
absence of any steps taken to avoid infringement, arguments for authorised infringement in these 
scenarios have sound bases. 
The analysis in this section indicates that, overall, none of the four scenarios appear to resemble an 
iiNet type situation where the distributor does not have power to prevent infringement, or is 
conducting a business in which the infringing conduct is not directly linked to the alleged authorised 
actions. This means that, absent any steps taken to avoid infringement by exploitation, authorised 
infringement arguments appear to be applicable to the distribution of CAD files. 
B. Supply Infringement  
The next secondary infringement cause of action considered in this chapter is supply infringement, 
which is specified in s 117 of the Patents Act.138 This provision is referenced throughout this thesis, 
thus it is useful to extract the provision in full. 
(1) If the use of a product by a person would infringe a patent, the supply of that product by one 
person to another is an infringement of the patent by the supplier unless the supplier is the patentee 
or licensee of the patent. 
 (2) A reference in subsection (1) to the use of a product by a person is a reference to: 
135 User:Physibles,  Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Physibles>. 
136 About, Thingiverse <http://www.thingiverse.com/about>. 
137 About, Shapeways <http://www.shapeways.com/about?li=footer>. See also, Kevin Smith, Now Anyone Can Use 3D 
Printing to Make Money (20 December 2012) Business Insider Australia  
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/shapeways-3d-printing-2012-12>. 
138 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 117. 
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(a) if the product is capable of only one reasonable use, having regard to its nature or design—
that use; or 
(b) if the product is not a staple commercial product—any use of the product, if the supplier 
had reason to believe that the person would put it to that use; or 
(c) in any case—the use of the product in accordance with any instructions for the use of the 
product, or any inducement to use the product, given to the person by the supplier or 
contained in an advertisement published by or with the authority of the supplier.  
On first glance, if a CAD file is distributed to a person who uses it to ‘make’ an infringing product, 
then, it appears that, consistent with s 117(1), a supplied product is used by a person to infringe a 
patent. However, before considering the applicability of the scenarios listed in s 117(2) to the four 
modes of distribution described above,139 two aspects of s 117 must first be addressed to highlight 
important distinctions between Australian and US law.  
First, any action under s 117(1) requires that a ‘product’ be supplied. In contrast, the US supply 
infringement action under § 271(c)140 creates liability when a component is sold and the seller knows 
that the component can be used to create a patented product.141 Brean concludes that this cause of 
action is not applicable where CAD files are concerned, as judicial decisions there have established 
that for the purposes of this provision, a component does not include software.142 Australian law 
most likely differs on this point. In the High Court case of Northern Territory v Collins (‘Collins’),143 
Hayne J (with whom Gummow ACJ and Kirby J agreed)144 stated that ‘product’ in s 117 generally has 
its ‘ordinary meaning’.145 Given that software and CAD files can be bought and sold, it seems difficult 
to argue that they do not fit within the ordinary meaning of ‘product’. Moreover, from a practical 
point of view, computer programs and files are created and patented for use with specific machines. 
If s 117 did not apply to the distribution of software or computer files, then distributors of the 
software component of such inventions could not be held liable under s 117. Accordingly, ‘product’ is 
likely include software and, more specifically, CAD files. 
Second, successful s 117(2)(a) and (c) actions have not required that a mental element be proved. 
For example, regarding s 117(2)(a), in Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd (No 2)146 
Bennett J stated, ‘[i]f a product supplied has only one reasonable use and that use is infringing, 
139 See pt II A. 
140 This section is one of two indirect infringement mechanisms under US law. The other mechanism, induced infringement, 
is discussed below. 
141 35 USC § 271(c) (emphasis added). 
142 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 796–800. 
143 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619. 
144 Ibid 623 (Gummow ACJ and Kirby J). 
145 Ibid 628.  
146 Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 848 (1 Au gust 2011). 
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supply of the product will infringe s 117(1) via s 117(2)(a), regardless of any other surrounding 
circumstances.’147 Similarly, on s 117(2)(c), in Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex (No 3),148 Jagot J found that 
instructions alone were sufficient to satisfy the requirements contained in the provision, and it did 
not stipulate any mental element.149 On appeal, Bennett and Yates JJ found no error with Jagot J’s 
reasoning.150 Both of these findings on law are open to appellate review. But since s 117(2)(b) 
specifies a mental state requirement and ss 117(2)(a) and 117(2)(c) do not, it is likely correct that no 
mental element is required to be established in respect of these sub-sections. This contrasts 
markedly with the US position. Both induced infringement (under § 271(b)) and supply infringement 
can only be found when an alleged infringer subjectively knows that their actions will result in a 
certain act, and they know that act is infringing.151 Brean notes that the recent Supreme Court 
decision of Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA152 has specified that this knowledge requirement can 
be made out when a party is wilfully blind to the infringement risks that their behaviour entails.153 
However, he also concludes that, due to the high threshold of knowledge that must be proven, 
distribution of CAD files that are used to print infringing products will only result in a finding of 
indirect infringement in the most egregious situations.154  
Referring again to the four modes of distribution from the analysis above, the modes of distribution 
that involve emailing a CAD file to someone or allowing a user to download it from a distributors 
website are likely to constitute infringement under s 117(2)(a). It is true that CAD files can be edited, 
which means that a CAD file which is created to print an infringing product could be altered to 
produce a non-infringing product. However, if a file is created to print an infringing item and the file 
is very nearly always used to print an infringing product, then due to the nature of the file and its 
designed used, it is likely to be found as a product with only one ‘reasonable use’ that is infringing. As 
a result, infringement liability under s 117(2)(a) does appear to be a real possibility. 
Although much of the argument immediately above also applies to the situation of uploading a CAD 
file to an intermediary website such as The Pirate Bay or Shapeways, the situation is a little more 
complex. In these situations, an argument can be made against infringement, namely that the 
uploader is not supplying to the ultimate infringers, rather it is the intermediary website that is 
carrying out this aspect of supply. On this point, ‘supply’ is defined in the Patents Act, to include ‘(a) 
147 Ibid [77]. 
148 Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex (No 3) (2011) 196 FCR 1. 
149 Ibid 77. 
150 Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 204 FCR 494, 528. 
151 Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2067–71 (2011). This case is actually decided on the 35 USC 271(b), 
not 271(c). However, as the Supreme Court majority states in this case, 271(b) and 271(c) have the same knowledge 
requirements: at 2068; see also, Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement Co, 365 US 336, 488 (1961). 
152 Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060 (2011). 
153 Ibid 2070; Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journa l 771, 794. 
154 Daniel Brean, ‘Asserting Patent to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 771, 793–6. 
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supply by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase; and (b) offer to supply…’.155 In Collins, 
the Court was asked to determine whether a grant that permitted a ‘company to “go upon Crown 
Lands and take … timber” amounted to ‘supply’. Hayne J (with whom Gummow ACJ and Kirby J 
agreed)156 stated ‘that the word is used in the Act with a large operation’,157 and that:  
Whether there was a supply of timber is not to be answered by attempting to classify what was 
granted as an interest in realty or personalty. Nor is it to be answered by asking whether there was a 
sale of a chattel or by asking, as the appellant submitted, whether the conditions of the licence were 
enforceable only by forfeiture. Rather, it is to be observed that the licences permitted the licensee to 
sever and take the timber. That being so there was a supply of the timber. The appellant supplied the 
licensee with the timber by granting the licences it did.158 
In the same case, Crennan J found the definition of ‘supply' was not exhaustive and encompassed 
‘any means by which something is passed from one person to another’.159 
These passages do not definitively state that products supplied through intermediaries engage s 117. 
However, the statements that the term ‘supply’ is to have ‘large operation’ and that it includes ‘any 
means by which something is passed’, do suggest that granting a user the ability to obtain a CAD file 
via an intermediary would be sufficient. More broadly, looking to the UK,160 a jurisdiction that was 
influential in the creation and drafting of s 117,161 it has been held there that supply infringement 
applies irrespective of whether the infringer by exploitation acquires the product from the accused 
supplier or from an intermediary.162 From a practical perspective, this interpretation makes sense 
since it would be odd if a party producing products that inexorably were used for an infringing 
purpose could avoid liability by supplying through a middleperson. Consequently, it does appear that 
distributors of CAD files in all four scenarios that can be used to print an infringing item are likely to 
be liable under s 117(2)(a).  
The second scenario of supply infringement in s 117, s 117(2)(b), requires proof that a product is not 
a ‘staple commercial product', and that ‘the supplier had reason to believe’ that the product would 
be put to the infringing use alleged. The term, ‘staple commercial product’ is not defined in the 
Patents Act, but it has been interpreted by the High Court in Collins. In that case, Gummow ACJ and 
155 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1 (definition of ‘supply’). 
156 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 625. 
157 Ibid 633. 
158 Ibid 633. 
159 Ibid 651. 
160 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, ss 60(2)–(3). 
161 Statement of the Minister for Science, Government Response to the Report of the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee, ‘Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia’ (1986) 56 The Australian Official Journal of Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs 1462, 1477. 
162 Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Scott [2011] FSR 7, [119] (Etherton and Jacob LJJ, with Sir David Keene 
agreeing, at [141]). See also, KCI Licensing Inc v Smith & Nephew Plc [2011] FSR 8 [42]–[56] (Longmore, Jacob and Kitchin 
LJJ). 
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Kirby J in a joint judgment, adopted part of French J’s discussion of ‘staple commercial products’ from 
his Honour’s preceding Full Federal Court decision.163 Specifically Gummow ACJ and Kirby J adopted 
the part of French J’s judgment that concluded unmilled timber was a staple commercial product 
because it had a ‘variety of applications’.164 In the other High Court judgments in this case, Crennan J 
stated that the ‘relevant inquiry is into whether the supply of the product is commercial and whether 
the product has various uses’.165 Hayne J agreed with Crennan J on this point, and Heydon J agreed 
with Crennan J’s entire judgment.166 Accordingly, since Collins, courts have concluded that a ‘staple 
commercial product’ is one that is supplied for a variety of applications.167  
In applying this test in Collins, it was found that unmilled timber was a staple commercial product 
and therefore exempt from s 117(2)(b) liability.168 CAD files that are directed to printing physical 
products are substantially different to unmilled timber. Relevantly, such CAD files can only be used to 
print products (or, with modification, to design and print other very similar products) that they form 
the blueprint for, whereas unmilled timber has a diverse range of applications that extend from 
extracting oils and sculpture, to heating. It is therefore quite unlikely that CAD files would be 
classified as ‘staple commercial products’. This means that the distribution of CAD files would be 
amenable to s 117(2)(b) infringement. 
On the second requirement of whether the ‘supplier had reason to believe’ that the product would 
be put to the infringing use alleged, in Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd,169 all 
three members of the Full Federal Court individually concluded that this requirement could be 
satisfied objectively,170 with the test being whether ‘a reasonable person in the position of [the 
supplier] would have reason to hold such a belief’.171 With regard to each of the four modes of 
distribution discussed above, as a general rule, this requirement is likely to be satisfied. The reason 
for this is that if a CAD file is directed to printing an infringing product and is transferred to other 
people for this purpose, then, by the nature of the file itself, the supplier would have reason to 
believe that it will be used to print the product it is directed to. It follows that since CAD files directed 
163 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 625–7, citing Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 564–70, 
582–3. 
164 Ibid 626, quoting Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 582–3.  
165 Ibid 653–4. 
166 Ibid 630 (Hayne J), 634 (Heydon J). 
167 See, eg, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 763, 778–9 (Yates J); Generic Health Pty 
Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 65 (Bennett J); Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB [No 4] (2013) 100 
IPR 285, 410–11 (Jagot J); AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324, 417–8 (Besanko, Foster, Nicolas and Yates 
JJ); Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) (Yates J). 
168 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 626–7 (Gummow ACJ and Kirby J), 654 (Crennan J). 
169 Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50. 
170 Ibid 59 (Emmett J), 73–4 (Bennett J), 90 (Greenwood J). It should also be noted, that unlike the US indirect infringement 
provisions, no Australian decision has held that under s 117 a supplier must have a reason to believe that a specific patent 
will be infringed, just that a certain act will occur and that it also happens to infringe a patent. 
171 Ibid 59 (Emmett J); see also, ibid, 73–4 (Bennett J). It should also be noted that in AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 
226 FCR 324, 419–20 (Besanko, Foster, Nicolas and Yates JJ), 97 (Jessup J agreeing), the Full Federal Court rejected the 
contention that a patentee must prove a particular person or persons will put the product supplied to an infringement use.  
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to printing infringing products are unlikely to be classified as ‘staple commercial products' and 
suppliers are likely to believe that they will be put to the infringing use, s 117(2)(b) is likely to be 
applicable to all four modes of distribution too. 
The third scenario under s 117, s 117(2)(c), requires proof that the product supplied is used in 
accordance with instructions, or that some form of inducement to use the product exists. In the four 
distribution scenarios discussed, no instructions or inducing conduct were described because in real 
situations, this would be fact dependent. As a result, and in light of ss 117(2)(a)–(b) appearing to 
create liability, s 117(2)(c) will not be discussed further. 
C. Conclusion on Secondary Infringement Causes of Action  
The analysis of authorised infringement and s 117 infringement in this part suggests that both causes 
of action are likely to provide relief for patentees against parties who distribute CAD files that are 
subsequently used to print infringing products. Indeed, on this point, s 117 adds an extra layer of 
protection because, as specified in s 117(1), it will operate to create liability when ‘use of a product 
by a person would infringe a patent’.172 This means the provision can be enforced even if 
infringement is yet to occur, provided that it can be proved that it will. Of course, apprehended 
authorised infringement can also be enforced through a quia timet action.173 However, this feature in 
s 117 simplifies secondary infringement actions when infringement is threatened.  
In the foregoing analysis of infringement by exploitation via ‘use’, a key issue in concluding that no 
liability would arise was that if distribution of a CAD file constituted infringement then it could deter 
subsequent, non-infringing activity. Examples of experimental use, and enabling creation of the 
invention in a foreign jurisdiction were given. But this is very unlikely to be the case under authorised 
infringement or supply infringement, because these secondary modes of infringement can only arise 
when infringement by exploitation on behalf of a person supplied occurs (or will occur). This suggests 
that liability via these means is more fitted to CAD file creation and distribution than infringement by 
exploitation, because experimentation is exempt from infringement,174 and Australian patents do not 
operate overseas.175 Distributors in these situations just have to ensure that their CAD files are not 
distributed more broadly to people who will use them for an infringing purpose. 
172 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 117(1) (emphasis added). 
173 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 74 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); WEA International Inc v Hanimex 
Corporation Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 274, 288 (Gummow J); Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 
280–1 (Bennett J). 
174 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 119C. 
175 Ibid 13(3). 
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Conclusion 
3D printing not only offers great scope to researchers, consumers and manufacturers to develop new 
products, but it is likely also to provide a useful avenue for distribution of inventions. Concomitant 
with this potential, though, is significant latitude for infringement through the creation and 
distribution of CAD files that would violate patent rights over physical products. The question this 
chapter has addressed is whether the infringement provisions in the Patents Act are likely to capture 
conduct of this nature.  
This chapter first explored infringement by exploitation arguments. Some of these arguments appear 
plausible, but finding infringement in such circumstances requires an unnecessary extension of the 
law into protecting information, an incursion which may have undesired consequences. On first 
glance, this conclusion may seem unfair to patentees, especially when the distribution complained of 
may have significant negative effects for inventive endeavour. However, secondary infringement 
causes of action appear to be more fitted to purpose. Analyses of authorisation and supply 
infringement indicate that they provide relatively clear liability pathways. This contrasts with US law 
where Brean asserts that equivalent provisions are generally of no use to patentees. Although 
secondary infringement does create an element of exclusivity in information, it is suggested that this 
exclusivity is more tailored. Of course, in any area where judicial interpretation is lacking there 
remains a level of uncertainty as to its likely application. But importantly, secondary infringement 
only arises when it is possible to establish infringement by exploitation, and it could therefore be 
utilised without unduly extending current law, nor eliciting the same concerns about extended 
infringement to cover what is now, non-infringing conduct.  
Quite whether Australian secondary infringement law in its current state is practically suited to all 
the patent infringement challenges that 3D printing may present requires further research. As 
detailed above, copyright law was specifically amended to ensure digital transmission of copyright 
content is protected. However, as a recent government consultation paper concluded, it has not 
halted online copyright infringement and as a result intermediary liability is currently being 
reviewed.176 Interestingly, the analysis in this chapter suggests a similar right of ‘communication’ is 
not warranted in patent law. The ultimate reason for this is that on a fundamental level, copyright 
and patent law protect different types of creative endeavour. Nevertheless, if authorisation and 
supply infringement under patent law become impractical mechanisms to enforce patent rights to 
the point where the economic incentive provided by patents is eroded, then legislative action may be 
176 Australian Government, ‘Online Copyright Infringement’ (Discussion Paper, July 2014) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/consultations/pages/onlinecopyrightinfringementpublicconsultati on.aspx>.  
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required to balance interests. At this point a watching brief should be maintained so that IP issues 
arising in the context of 3D printing can be quickly and effectively investigated and addressed.177 
 
177 Dinusha Mendis, Davide Secchi and Phil Reeves, ‘A Legal and Empirical Study into the Intellectual Property Implications 
of 3D Printing’ (United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, March 2015) 7. 
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Introduction 
One of the foundational bases for patent law is that the creation of exclusive property rights 
incentivises innovation.1 It follows, then, that if the exclusivity provided by a patent is unenforceable, 
or if there is uncertainty about whether it is enforceable or not, the value of such a patent may be 
eroded. This chapter investigates one such area of uncertainty related to ‘interactive claims’,2 which 
is a term used to describe method claims in which different steps can, in practice, be performed by 
separate parties.3 The scope of what constitutes an interactive claim is broad. For example, if a claim 
includes the steps of collecting data, analysing it, then sending on the results, and one or more of 
these steps can, in a business environment, be performed by a separate party, then it is an 
‘interactive claim’. The specific focus of this chapter is on performance of interactive claims by 
parties that are in arm’s-length relationships and the arrangement does not oblige performance of 
any of the claim’s steps. Performance of a method claim by parties in this situation will be referred to 
as ‘divided performance’.4 
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc 
(‘Akamai’)5 has moved the issue of divided performance into the global spotlight. Akamai, and its 
companion case, McKesson Technology v Epic Systems (‘McKesson’),6 which were actually heard 
together before the en banc US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, both concerned patented 
methods related to Internet mediated communication.7 In the litigation history of these cases, the 
Courts have explored the boundaries of when direct infringement and indirect infringement actions 
will create liability for divided performance. Intriguingly, this history includes the en banc Federal 
1 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
20–1, 294–7 see also, 326–32; Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of 
Monopoly or an Aide to Competition?’ (2004) 37(4) The Australian Economics Review 436, 437–8; Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement 
Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological 
Age (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2012) 11–3. 
2 Also known as ‘multi-user’, ‘divided’, ‘collaborative’ or ‘divided’, claims. See, eg, Lemley et al, ‘Divided Infringement 
Claims’ (2005) 33 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 255, 256. However, it should be noted 
that Lemley et al use these terms to describe claims that can only be performed by separate parties. Whereas in Ann L 
Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European Intellectual 
Property Review 318, 318, 323, the author uses the term in a similar manner to its use in this chapter. 
3 Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 318, 318. In this article, Monotti does not specifically define the term ‘interactive claims’, 
however, this definition is implicit in her commentary. 
4 A similar nomenclature was adopted in, Joshua P Larson, ‘Liability For Divided Performance of Process Claims After BMC 
Resources Inc v Payment tech LP’ (2008–2009) 19 DePaul Journal of Art Technology and Intellectual Property Law 41, 42. 
Some articles have used the term ‘divided infringement’ to refer to performance of a patented method by parties in arms 
length relationship (see eg, Sean Africk, ‘Induced to Infringe: Divided Patent Infringement in Light of the Akamai Ruling’ 
(2014) 14 Nevada Law Journal 620, 620–2). However, because it is not unequivocally established that ‘divided performance’ 
should give rise to infringement liability, this chapter uses the term ‘divided performance’. 
5 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111 (2014). To fully appreciate the contribution the invention 
in Akamai made to telecommunication see, Ben Aiken, ‘Eliminating the Single-Entity Rule in Joint Infringement Cases: 
Liability for the Last Step’ (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review 193, 193–5. 
6 McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 98 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed Cir, 2011).  
7 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1306 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
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Circuit finding that liability for both cases could arise via a legislative type of indirect infringement, 
known as induced infringement.8 However, a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court reversed this 
finding.9 At writing, the Akamai case has, again, been re-heard by the en banc Federal Circuit. The 
decision, in this instance, has found direct infringement. Despite this recent outcome, the 
contentious nature of law, as represented in these cases, raises the possibility that parties can 
arrange their conduct to take advantage of a patented methods without infringing them, as long as 
performance of them is divided between parties at arm’s-length. Part 1 of this chapter dissects the 
litigation history of Akamai and McKesson. This dissection outlines the key aspects of US law and how 
divided performance raises enforcement issues for interactive claims that are linked to certain types 
of modern technologies. 
Building on the concern about liability for divided performance in the US, part 2 of this chapter 
assesses whether the factual scenarios from either case might give rise to infringement liability in 
Australia. Although a similar evaluation has already been undertaken by Professor Ann Monotti, the 
assessment provided here delves more deeply into Australian case law and the facts from the US 
cases.10 The assessment in this chapter addresses infringement by exploitation,11 as well as the 
secondary infringement mechanisms of authorised infringement,12 supply infringement,13 and the 
common law actions of common design14 and procured infringement.15 Through the thorough 
analysis in this part, specific legal and factual impediments to liability under all of Australia’s 
infringement causes of action — except for procured infringement — are identified. This 
investigation finds that procured infringement is the only cause of action that plausibly creates 
liability, with the only hurdle to its application being ambiguous statements about whether it actually 
applies to divided performance.  
Part 3 of this chapter adopts a policy orientated perspective and considers whether the factual 
scenarios from Akamai and McKesson should constitute procured infringement in Australia. This 
analysis is not as simple as it first appears, as various commentators have articulated arguments 
suggesting that it is unnecessary to extend liability to divided performance. Furthermore, judicial 
comments have suggested that if liability is extended to divided performance, it may open the patent 
system up to abuse. This part engages with these arguments, and finds that, despite them, procured 
8 Ibid 1318–9. 
9 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2118 (2014). 
10 See generally, Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) 
European Intellectual Property Review 318. 
11 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid s 117. 
14 SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialty Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 115–6; Bayer Pharma 
Aktiengesellschaft v Genentech Inc (2012) 98 IPR 424, 428–32; Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 510. 
15 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 258–9; Danisco AS v Novozymes 
AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–6; Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72.  
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infringement should be codified in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Patents Act’), specifying that it 
applies to divided performance. 
I. Akamai and McKesson 
Before describing the facts and reasoning in Akamai and McKesson, it is useful to outline some basic 
aspects of infringement law in the US. Under 35 USC § 271(a), direct infringement can occur when a 
party, without authority, inter alia makes or uses a patented invention.16 With regard to ‘using’ 
patented method patents, a requirement of US direct infringement law is that all the steps of a 
method claim must be performed by one party — this requirement is commonly known as the ‘single 
entity rule’.17 This is clearly a problem for proving direct infringement when divided performance 
occurs, but US law allows actions of one party to be attributed to another, if the latter party ‘directs 
or controls’ the conduct of the former18 — this is commonly known as ‘joint infringement’.19 What 
conduct exactly satisfies the ‘direction or control’ test was examined in the litigation history of 
Akamai and McKesson.  
In addition to direct infringement, indirect infringement can arise in the US via 35 USC §§ 271(b) and 
(c).20 As alluded to above, litigation in Akamai and McKesson concerned induced infringement under 
§ 271(b). Interestingly, the induced infringement provision is quite short, it states, ‘[w]hoever actively 
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer’.21 Relevantly, US decisions have held 
that induced infringement will be found when it is proved that an ‘alleged infringer knowingly 
induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another's infringement’.22 As this 
passage indicates, induced infringement in the US is not a strict liability offence,23 it must be proved 
that the alleged infringer knew (or was wilfully blind) to the fact that the induced conduct would be 
infringing.24 Despite this requirement, the analysis of this cause of action in Akamai and McKesson 
did not consider this knowledge element or whether the alleged infringers conduct constituted 
inducement. Rather, it concerned whether direct infringement must be proved as a prerequisite for 
induced infringement. 
16 35 USC § 271(a); Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2115–7 (2014). 
17 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1305–6, 1318 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
18 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc (Fed Cir, 2015 Nos 06-CV-11585, 06-CV- 11109, 13 August 2015) slip op 
4. 
19 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 96, 117–9 (D Mass, 2009); Muniauction Inc v 
Thomson Corp, 532 F 3d 1321, 1328 (Fed Cir, 2008); for a brief history of the ‘control or direction’ test, see, Ken Hobday, 
‘The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement: Multi-Actor Method Claims’ (2009–2010) 38 Capital Law 
Review 137, 165–84. 
20 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2116 (2014). 
21 35 USC § 271(b). 
22 Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co v Chemque Inc, 303 F 3d 1294, 1304–5 (Fed Cir, 2002); affd in, DSU Medical Corp v JMS Co 
Ltd, 471 F 3d 1293, 1306 (Fed Cir, 2006); Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1308 (Fed Cir, 
2012). 
23 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1307–8 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
24 Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2070 (2011). 
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There are a few aspects of Internet technology that it is necessary to briefly outline to assist with 
understanding the patent in Akamai. In one of the basic setups for a website, a content provider 
arranges a computer server to host their website’s content as well as other telecommunication 
technology to distribute it. Typical website content includes text, as well as other ‘page objects’ such 
as movies and photos. A common problem associated with such a setup is that if a website’s viewers 
are geographically distant from the content provider’s server, or a large number of users want to 
access the site concurrently, they may experience slow browsing due to transmission times and 
congestion, particularly when page objects with large files sizes are viewed.25 To help resolve this 
problem, content providers often use third party supplied ‘content delivery services’, which consist 
of globally networked computer servers. Together, these servers are known as a ‘content delivery 
network’ (‘CDN’).26  
The patent in Akamai claimed various methods and systems for organising CDNs. The two 
independent method claims asserted in the case both consisted of four steps,27 and were directed to 
replicating page objects on CDNs and redirecting viewer’s requests for those objects to particular 
CDN servers.28 There is some further technical detail to the invention, but what it effectively 
translates to is a system for distributing page objects on CDN servers around the world so that when 
a user views a webpage and its associated page objects, the objects that have been distributed on 
the CDN will be delivered from a server that is proximate to the user. As generally described in the 
case, through this arrangement, slow browsing issues could be eased because page objects could be 
retrieved from a number of servers close to the viewer.29 The step in both claims that was relevant to 
divided performance was known as ‘tagging’, which referred to modifying links to page objects that 
were to be located on the CDN.30  
In Akamai, the patentee operated a CDN and the defendant directly competed with its own CDN.31 
Although the Supreme Court appeal in this case concerned induced infringement, at first instance 
only direct infringement was argued.32 Throughout the litigation, an undisputed fact was that the 
defendant did not perform every step of the claims.33 In particular, it did not perform any tagging. 
25 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 96 (D Mass, 2009). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 97. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid 96–7. 
30 Ibid 97–8. One of the claims in issue, claim 19, also included the step of ‘serving’ a website’s content from a content 
providers domain. According to the claim this is performed by the defendant’s clients, thus this step is also performed in a 
divided fashion. However, for simplicity, this step will not be discussed in this chapter because it unnecessarily adds 
complexity. 
31 Ibid 96. 
32 See generally, ibid.  
33 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 116–7; Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight 
Networks Inc, 629 F 3d 1311, 1305–07  (Fed Cir, 2011); Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 
2115 (2014). 
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Instead, the defendant provided information to its clients instructing them to do it.34 This was pivotal 
because, as outlined above, direct infringement can only be found if a single entity performs all the 
steps of a method claim. Thus, although the defendant did not itself perform the step of tagging, the 
patentee argued that performance of the step could be attributed to the defendant because it 
‘directed or controlled’ the tagging of its clients.35 At first instance, a jury was asked to consider 
whether the defendant ‘directed or controlled’ the tagging by its clients.36 The jury instructions 
specified that the test would be satisfied if the clients were ‘acting’ for the defendant.37 On these 
instructions, the jury found infringement and awarded the patentee US$45.5 million in damages.38 
Shortly after the jury decision, the Federal Circuit case of Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp39 was 
decided. This case shed further light on the types of conduct that satisfy the ‘direction or control’ 
test. The patent in this case related to a method of auctioning bonds online,40 and included the step 
of inputting data associated with a bid on a bidder’s computer.41 The defendant operated an Internet 
mediated process that performed many of the steps in the patent,42 but the defendant did not 
perform the step of inputting data on the bidders’ computer — this was performed by the bidder.43 
Similar to Akamai, a key issue before the Court was whether the actions of the bidder could be 
attributed to the defendant, so it could be said that the defendant performed all the steps in the 
claim.44 On this point, the Federal Circuit cited an earlier case, BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP,45 
in which it was held that the ‘control or direction’ test is only satisfied when conduct is performed on 
‘behalf’ of the defendant.46 The Court in Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp continued this line of 
reasoning from BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP and stated that, ‘mere “arms-length 
cooperation”’ would not satisfy the ‘control or direction’ test.47 Accordingly, the Court held that 
controlling access to the bidding system and instructing bidders on how to use its system was not 
sufficient for infringement, because the bidder ultimately chose whether to insert the information 
and to make a bid.48 
34 Ibid 116–7. 
35 Lemley et al, ‘Divided Infringement Claims’ (2005) 33 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 
255, 256; Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2115 (2014). 
36 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 118–9 (D Mass, 2009).  
37 Ibid 118. 
38 Ibid 95. 
39 Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, 532 F 3d 1318 (Fed Cir, 2008). 
40 Ibid 1321. 
41 Ibid 1322.  
42 Ibid 1328–9. 
43 Ibid 1328. 
44 Ibid 1329. 
45 BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP, 498 F 3d 1373 (Fed Cir, 2007). 
46 Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, 532 F 3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed Cir, 2008); affirming, BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP, 
498 F 3d 1373, 1379–81 (Fed Cir, 2007). 
47 Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, 532 F 3d 1318, 1329(Fed Cir, 2008), affirming BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP, 498 
F 3d 1373, 1371 (Fed Cir, 2007). 
48 Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, 532 F 3d 1318, 1330 (Fed Cir, 2008). 
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On the basis of Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, the defendant in Akamai applied to have the trial 
decision reconsidered.49 To succeed in this application the defendant had to prove that the jury did 
not have a sufficient evidentiary basis to reach the decision it made.50 This meant that the defendant 
had to prove that there was no substantial evidence that it ‘directed or controlled’ the tagging of its 
clients.51 On reconsideration, Zobel J found that the contract between the defendant and its clients 
was a result of standard arm’s-length negotiation and did not compel the clients to perform the 
tagging on the defendant’s behalf.52 Thus, her Honour found that the defendant’s clients’ tagging 
could not be attributed to the defendant,53 and therefore the defendant did not infringe the 
patent.54 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Zobel J’s decision was unanimously affirmed.55 Writing on 
behalf of the Court, Linn J emphasised the obligation facet of the ‘control or direction’ test, finding 
that although the defendant’s clients were given instructions and tools to complete tagging, since it 
was performed at the clients’ discretion, performance was not on the defendant’s behalf.56 
The initial appeal to the Federal Circuit in Akamai was heard before a three-member bench. The next 
appeal was heard before an ‘en banc’, nine-member bench of the Federal Circuit, which is not 
regularly convened. The US Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that an en banc court is 
convened to maintain uniformity in the Court’s decisions, or when the proceeding involves a 
question of ‘exceptional importance.’57 At the en banc appeal, the cases of Akamai and McKesson 
were heard together. Thus, before analysing this decision, it is necessary to outline the initial Federal 
Circuit appeal in McKesson.  
The patent in McKesson was directed towards methods of online communication between 
healthcare providers and patients.58 The invention included automatically establishing a webpage for 
patients that contained details such as the patients’ medical records and treatment details, but its 
primary advantage was that the website also allowed for communication between patients and 
healthcare providers to facilitate appointments, prescription refills, and callbacks.59 The facts in 
McKesson included a type of divided performance. However, a difference between the divided 
performance in McKesson compared to Akamai was that the defendant in McKesson did not itself 
perform any of the steps in the patented method. Rather, the defendant in McKesson supplied 
49 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 119 (D Mass, 2009). 
50 Ibid  
51 Ibid 119. 
52 Ibid 122. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 123. 
55 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 629 F 3d 1311, 1322 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
56 Ibid 1320–22. 
57 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (1967) rr 35(a)(1)–(2). 
58 McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 98 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1281 [2] (Fed Cir, 2011). 
59 Ibid. 
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software to healthcare providers who performed many of the steps, but relied on patients to 
perform the first step of initiating communication with healthcare providers.60  
In McKesson, induced infringement was the primary infringement cause of action argued.61 The 
argument presented by the patentee was that healthcare providers were induced to infringe the 
patent by the defendant. However, to account for the fact that the healthcare providers’ patients 
performed a step in the method claim, the patentee argued that performance of this step could be 
attributed to the the healthcare providers because they ‘directed or controlled’ the act.62 In deciding, 
Linn J, who wrote the opinion for the Court (and with whom Bryson J agreed),63 held that direct 
infringement was a prerequisite for induced infringement.64 Thus, before deciding whether 
healthcare providers were induced by the defendant, her Honour had to decide whether direct 
infringement actually took place.65 On the basis of BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP and 
Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp, her Honour found that the relationships between healthcare 
providers and patients, either via contract or via the doctor-patient relationship, were not sufficient 
to oblige patients to perform the step of initiating communication on behalf of the healthcare 
providers; they did it on their own volition.66  
Before the en banc Federal Circuit, argument was presented concerning both direct and induced 
infringement.67 Despite this, the majority decision only addressed induced infringement.68 In contrast 
to Linn J’s initial Federal Circuit decision in McKesson, the majority held that direct infringement by 
one entity is not a prerequisite for induced infringement.69 Following this, the majority also held that 
induced performance of a method claim can be found even when the steps are performed by 
separate parties, as long the performance of the steps was by either the defendant, or parties 
operating under the defendant’s inducement.70 This finding meant that when proving induced 
infringement, the issue of whether a party ‘directed or controlled’ the actions of others was 
irrelevant.71  
In reaching this conclusion, the majority reviewed applicable case law and legislation, but found 
neither binding.72 On the other hand, the majority found patent policy instructive. On this point, their 
Honours stated that, ‘there is no reason to immunize the inducer from liability for indirect 
60 Ibid [5]. 
61 Ibid [7]. 
62 Ibid [5]. 
63 Ibid [15]. 
64 Ibid [7]. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid [10]–[11]. 
67 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1306 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
68 Ibid 1306–7; 35 USC § 271(a). 
69 Ibid 1307. 
70 Ibid 1307–9. 
71 Ibid 1316–7. 
72 Ibid 1307–1318. 
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infringement simply because the parties have structured their conduct so that no single defendant 
has committed all the acts necessary … for direct infringement’.73 Their Honours also stated:  
It would be a bizarre result to hold someone liable for inducing another to perform all of the steps of a 
method claim but to hold harmless one who goes further by actually performing some of the steps himself. 
The party who actually participates in performing the infringing method is, if anything, more culpable than 
one who does not perform all the steps.74 
Ultimately, the majority reasoned that in the context of induced infringement, the single entity 
requirement ‘invites evasion of the principles of patent infringement and serves no policy-based 
purpose’.75 Lamentably, the majority did not evaluate whether the defendants’ clients were acting 
under its inducement. Rather, their Honours remanded both cases for further hearings on this 
understanding of the law.76  
The cases were not in fact re-heard because the en banc decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Although the appeal from the McKesson en banc decision to the Supreme Court was denied, 
the Supreme Court accepted the case of Akamai.77 Alito J authored the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
judgment.78 In a short six-page judgment, his Honour overruled the previous decision, finding that 
single-entity direct infringement is a prerequisite for induced infringement.79 His Honour’s primary 
reason for reaching this conclusion was that the structure of the legislation and prior Supreme Court 
authority clearly mandated it.80 Indeed, Alito J chided the majority’s reasoning in the en banc 
decision stating that their Honours’ ‘analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to 
infringe a method patent.’81 Alito J did express concern with the ‘anomaly’ that a party may avoid 
infringement through divided performance, but found that any such anomaly did not ‘justify 
fundamentally altering the rules of inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act 
clearly require’.82 The case was therefore remanded for consideration on the correct understanding 
of US infringement law.83  
At writing, the en banc Federal Circuit has recently reconsidered whether the defendant in Akamai 
‘directed or controlled’ its clients’ actions.84 In a unanimous decision with few references, the Court 
held that the ‘direction or control’ test can be satisfied ‘when an alleged infringer conditions 
73 Ibid 1309. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 1315. 
76 Ibid 1319. 
77 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111 (2014); McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 
133 S Ct 1521 (2013); Epic Systems Corp v McKesson Technologies Inc 133 S Ct 1520 (2013). 
78 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2115 (2014). 
79 Ibid 2117. 
80 Ibid 2117–8. 
81 Ibid 2117. 
82 Ibid 2120. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc (Fed Cir, 2015 Nos 06-CV-11585, 06-CV- 11109, 13 August 2015). 
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participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented 
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.’85 In applying the facts of the 
case to these aspects of the law, the Court found that the defendant conditioned its clients’ use of 
the CDN on their performance of tagging.86 The Court also found that the defendant established the 
manner of its clients performing this step by supplying them with the specific information on how to 
achieve it and providing assistance if it was needed.87 Thus, the Court found that the defendant 
‘controlled or directed’ its clients’ actions and was therefore liable for direct infringement. Whether 
this outcome will be reviewed by the Supreme Court remains to be seen. 
Although, as demonstrated in these cases, the law concerning divided performance has been 
developing at a relatively rapid pace, a number of US-based scholarly articles have been published on 
Akamai and McKesson and, more broadly, on the issue of divided performance itself.88 A common 
theme in these articles is questioning whether the law sufficiently protects patented inventions.89 Or, 
more specifically, whether divided performance effectively means that parties can organise their 
commercial activities to take advantage of a patent without infringing it.90 Related to this concern is 
that, as Akamai, McKesson and Muniauction Inc v Thomson Corp demonstrate, divided performance 
is an important part of Internet-based technology. Further to this reasoning, Professor Mark Lemley 
et al have noted that:  
as communications technologies support ever increasing bandwidth, virtually any innovation that 
employs computation or decision making is susceptible to placement of a particular component 
or step with an independent vendor … in a way that may avoid traditional infringement 
remedies.91  
In light of this effect on Internet-based technologies, perhaps not surprisingly a number of 
commentators (prior to the most recent en banc case) have referred to the ongoing issue of divided 
85 Ibid slip op 5. 
86 Ibid slip op 7–8. 
87 Ibid slip op 8–9. 
88 See eg, Nicole D Galli and Edward Gecovich, ‘Cloud Computing and the Doctrine of Joint Infringement: “Current Impact” 
and Future Possibilities (2012) 11 The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 673; Erik P Harmon, ‘Promoting the 
Progress of Personalized Medicine: Redefining Infringement Liability for Divided Performance of Method Patents 967 (2014) 
42 Hofstra Law Review 967; W Keith Robinson, ‘No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement’ 
(2012) 62 American University Law Review 59, 103–4; Joshua P Larson, ‘Liability For Divided Performance of Process Claims 
After BMC Resources Inc v Payment tech LP’ (2008–2009) 19 DePaul Journal of Art Technology and Intellectual Property Law 
41. 
89 See, eg, Reza Dokhanchy, ‘Cooperative Infringement: I Get By (Infringement Laws) With a Little Help From My Friends’ 
(2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 135; Damon Gupta, ‘Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection 
Under the Single Entity Rule’ (2012) 94 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 61. 
90 Ibid 135–6, 159; Damon Gupta, ‘Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under the Single Entity Rule’ 
(2012) 94 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 61, 66–8. 
91 Lemley et al, ‘Divided Infringement Claims’ (2005) 33 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 
255, 262–3. 
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performance in the US as a loophole that must be closed.92 The most recent en banc decision, which 
finds liability on the facts in Akamai, affects many of the arguments in these articles, but with the 
possibility of another Supreme Court review, the law is not yet settled. Moreover, regardless of the 
outcome in the US, the broader issue of divided performance and the potential loophole in US law 
represents an issue that should be explored in Australia. In line with this concern, the next part of 
this chapter considers whether the factual scenarios in Akamai and McKesson might give rise to 
infringement liability under Australian patent law. 
II. Might the facts from Akamai and McKesson result in infringement in Australia? 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, and again in chapter 2,93 patent infringement in 
Australia can be found under three statutory causes of action. Section 13(1) of the Patents Act 
specifies that a patentee has the exclusive right to ‘exploit’ their invention.94 The definition of 
‘exploit’ is extracted in chapter 2 part I.95 Consistent with this right, infringement by exploitation 
occurs when a party, without authorisation, encroaches upon a patentees right to exploit an 
invention. Section 13(1) also specifies that a patentee has the right to ‘authorise’ others to ‘exploit’ 
an invention, and thus infringement can occur if a party other than a patentee ‘authorises’ another 
party to exploit an invention.96 In addition, s 117 specifies that, in certain circumstances, suppliers 
can be liable for infringing uses of the products they supply.97 Beyond these statutory-based 
infringement mechanisms, there are two further common law mechanisms: a party can be liable for 
procuring another party to exploit an invention,98 or for engaging in a common design with an 
infringer that exploits an invention.99 Each cause of action will be addressed in turn. 
92 See generally, Kristin E Gerdelman, ‘Subsequent Performance of Process Steps by Different Entities: Time to Close 
Another Loophole in US Patent Law’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 1987; Long Truong, ‘After BMC Resources Inc v 
Paymentech LP: Conspiratorial Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable’ (2009) 103 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1897, 1899; W Keith Robinson, ‘No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint 
Infringement’ (2012) 62 American University Law Review 59, 103–4; see also, Joshua P Larson, ‘Liability For Divided 
Performance of Process Claims After BMC Resources Inc v Payment tech LP’ (2008–2009) 19 DePaul Journal of Art 
Technology and Intellectual Property Law 41; Damon Gupta, ‘Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection 
Under the Single Entity Rule’ (2012) 94 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 61; Ben Morgan, ‘Joint 
Infringement and the Impact of BMC Resources, Inc v Paymentech, L.P’ (2008–2009) 12 Southern Methodist University 
Science & Technology Law Review 173, 200; Stacie L Greskowiak, ‘Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of Process 
Patents (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 351; Reza Dokhanchy, ‘Cooperative Infringement: I Get By 
(Infringement Laws) With a Little Help From My Friends’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 135, 153–4. 
93 See generally, Chapter 2, pts I and II. 
94 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit). 
95 See page 59. 
96 See, Chapter 2 pt II A. 
97 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 117(2)(b); see Chapter 2 pt II B.  
98 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 258–9; Danisco AS v Novozymes 
AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–6; Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72. 
99 SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialty Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 115–6; Bayer Pharma 
Aktiengesellschaft v Genentech Inc (2012) 98 IPR 424, 428–32; Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 510. 
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A. Infringement by Exploitation, Agency, and Vicarious Liability 
The primary way a method claim is infringed is by encroaching on a patentee’s right to ‘use’ it.100 It is 
well established in Australian patent law that a method claim is only infringed when it is proved that 
an alleged infringer’s process takes every step of a patentee’s method.101 As described above, the 
defendants in Akamai and McKesson did not perform all the steps of the inventions as claimed. 
Consequently, to create infringement liability for divided performance in Australia, a legal 
mechanism must be used to attribute the performance of the divided steps to the defendants. 
Australian legal mechanisms that can attribute exploitation of an invention by one party to another 
include agency and vicarious liability.102 Unlike US patent law, Australian patent law does not contain 
a mechanism analogous to the ‘control or direction’ test.103 Relevantly, an ‘agent’ is a person who, by 
virtue of authority conferred upon them, is able to create or affect legal rights and duties as between 
another person and third parties.104 In Akamai and McKesson, no conferral of legal authority 
occurred, thus agency type arguments are irrelevant.  
The doctrine of vicarious liability attributes the actions of one person to another when there is a 
sufficient relationship between the two parties, and the actions to be attributed to the ‘responsible 
party’ are sufficiently connected to that relationship.105 Typically, vicarious liability arises between an 
employer and an employee, but only when an employer has a right to control an employee’s 
actions.106 Although vicarious liability somewhat resembles the US ‘control or direction’ test, it has 
some significant differences. For example, vicarious liability typically applies between employers and 
employees, but not to the relationships that traditionally arise between sub-contractors and their 
hirers.107 Illustrating the high threshold that must be satisfied, Sappideen et al note that vicarious 
liability will only be found in the employee-employer context when ‘the employer can tell the person 
not only what to do but how to do it.’108 This includes controlling working hours, the obligation to 
100 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit). Infringement of a method patent can also occur when a 
producting resulting from ‘use’ of the patented method is ‘used’ or ‘sold’, however, since the analysis here shows the 
method is not ‘used’ it is redundant to also consider this argument. 
101 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 120(1); Olin Corp v Super Cartridge Co (1976) 180 CLR 236, 246 (Gibbs J); Populin v HB Nominees 
Pty Ltd (1982) 59 FLR 37, 41; Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 237–8, cf. 244–6 (Bennett J). 
102 Sappideen et al, Torts: Commentary and Materials (Law, 11th ed, 2012) 623–4; Sykes v Hawarth (1879) 48 LJ(NS) 770, 
773; Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Miles (1961) 3 FLR 146, 148–9. 
103 It could be argued that the ‘direction and control’ test should be incorporated into Australian patent law, but since, as 
explored in pt II D (below), procured infringement plausibly creates liability, it is not necessary to significantly alter Australia 
law and consider this argument. 
104 Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91, 94; See generally, Gino E Dal Pont, Law of Agency (Butterworths, 2001) 5–6; Sykes 
v Howarth (1879) 12 Ch D 826. 
105 Sappideen et al, Torts: Commentary and Materials (Law, 11th ed, 2012) 624. 
106 Ibid 624–5; Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389, 404–5. 
107 Hollis v Vabu (2001) 207 CLR 21, 36, cf 38–46. 
108 Sappideen et al, Torts: Commentary and Materials (Law, 11th ed, 2012) 624. 
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perform tasks, organisation of future tasks, and the ability to control the variety of tasks that will be 
performed.109  
In Akamai and McKesson, the relationships between the defendants and parties performing the steps 
of the invention as claimed were those of suppliers and clients.110 Relevantly, the clients chose to 
perform a limited range of tasks and chose when to perform them at their own discretion. There 
were no specific time frames for performance and the clients suffered no repercussions beyond not 
receiving a benefit for which they originally contracted with the defendant to get. In this sense, they 
are analogous to sub-contractors who choose what work they want to perform and when.111 
Consequently, infringement arguments via vicarious liability would be unlikely to succeed. 
B. Infringement by Authorisation 
Compared to infringement by exploitation, authorised infringement under s 13(1) of the Patents Act 
appears more applicable to the facts from Akamai and McKesson. However, there are well 
established elements of the cause of action that are likely to prevent any finding of liability here too. 
The current operation of authorised infringement was described in chapter 2 part II A. The decisions 
in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (‘iiNet’),112 and SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water 
Treatments Ltd (‘SNF‘)113 were also described in that chapter, and the analysis here builds on those 
descriptions. As a brief recap, in iiNet both joint judgments in the High Court stated that 
authorisation involves the consideration of three key elements: the nature of the relationship 
between the infringer by exploitation and alleged authoriser; the power to prevent infringement; 
and steps taken to prevent infringement.114 On the facts in iiNet, both judgments found that an 
Internet service provider (‘ISP’) did not authorise the copyright infringement of its clients.115 In 
reaching this conclusion both judgments put significant weight on the fact that the only power the 
ISP had to prevent their clients’ infringement was by terminating the Internet services they 
provided.116 In SNF, Kenny J found authorised infringement when a party supplied a key component 
of a method patent that pertained to treating mining waste.117 However, in addition to supplying the 
109 Ibid 625. 
110 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 122 (D Mass, 2009). 
111 Hollis v Vabu (2001) 207 CLR 21, 36–8. 
112 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42. 
113 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46. 
114 Ibid 67 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 87 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).These elements are specified in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 101(1A), however, they are effectively a codified form of Gibbs J statements in University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, 12–3; which in themselves are distilled from Adelaide Corp v Australian Performing Right 
Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481, 487. See also, Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380, 382 
(French J), 410–13 (Kenny J), 386–391 (Branson J). 
115 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 69–71 (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 88–9 (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
116 Ibid. 
117 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 52. 
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component, the respondent also advised how to conduct infringing actions, provided support, and, 
had the power to prevent infringement because they could choose not to supply the component.118  
In many ways, the facts from Akamai and McKesson are similar to SNF. Notably, in both Akamai and 
McKesson the defendants created scenarios for all the steps in the method patent claims to be 
performed. In Akamai, this was achieved by setting up the CDN and instructing clients on how to tag 
page objects, and in McKesson, this was achieved by creating and supplying software that, with the 
interaction of the healthcare provider and patients, would result in each of the steps being 
performed. Moreover, in both cases, no evidence was adduced demonstrating the defendants took 
steps to avoid infringement. It follows, then, that if these were the only criteria for authorised 
infringement, there would probably be a strong basis for arguing that liability may arise in Australia 
for factual scenarios akin to Akamai and McKesson. However, both judgments in iiNet make it clear 
that infringement by exploitation must be established as a prerequisite to a finding on authorisation. 
On this point, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ stated, ‘a primary infringement of a copyright in a 
cinematograph film occurs when a person, who is neither the owner nor the licensee, makes the film 
available online without the copyright owner's consent; a secondary infringement occurs when a 
person, who is neither the owner nor the licensee, authorises the making available online of the film 
without the copyright owner's consent.’119 In the same case, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated, ‘a 
secondary infringement is completed only when the primary infringement has taken place’.120 This 
second passage was specifically affirmed by Bennett J in the patent case of Apotex Pty Ltd v Les 
Laboratoires Servier.121 Thus there is no reason to expect that this element of the law applies in 
different ways between patent law and copyright law. Indeed, the text in s 13(1) specifically states 
that patentees have the right to ‘authorise another person to exploit the invention.’122 It follows, 
then, that since no infringement by exploitation or ‘primary’ infringement has occurred (as outlined 
above due to divided performance), authorised infringement cannot be found.  
In Monotti’s article on infringement of interactive claims by separate parties in Australia, she 
analyses authorisation from a more abstract perspective, and raises divided performance as a 
possible ‘hurdle’ to liability.123 However, since the judicial statements and legislation on this point 
appear to be quite clear, it appears that, more than a hurdle, this requirement is a barrier to a finding 
of authorised infringement. 
118 Ibid 118–9; this case was appealed, but only on validity, not infringement, SNF (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialist Chemicals 
Water Treatments Ltd (2012) 96 IPR 365, 365–6. 
119 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42, 49. 
120 Ibid 74. 
121 Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 278. 
122 Patents Act 1990 s 13(1) (emphasis added). 
123 Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 318, 324–6. 
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C. Supply Infringement 
The fact that there was supply of products and services to clients in Akamai and McKesson suggests 
that supply infringement under s 117 of the Patents Act is a relevant consideration. The text and 
basic operation of s 117 was outlined in chapter 2 part II B, and the analysis here builds on that.124 
However, before analysing whether the facts from Akamai or McKesson satisfy any of the scenarios 
in s 117(2), there are two threshold issues to liability in s 117(1) that need to be considered. These 
concern the definition of ‘infringement’ and the definition of ‘product’.125  
The threshold issue concerning the definition of ‘infringement’ emerges from the passage in s 117(1), 
‘[i]f use of a product by a person would infringe a patent …’.126 The argument under this wording is 
that because there is no infringement by one person, or one entity, then s 117 is not applicable. In 
effect, this is (again) the same single entity issue as enunciated in the US cases. In addition to the 
literal wording of s 117, there are several passages from the judgments in the High Court case, 
‘Northern Territory v Collins’ (‘Collins’),127 that support this argument. Relevantly, Crennan J stated 
that, ‘[s]ection 117 covers infringement by supplying another person with a product, the other 
person being the direct infringer.’128 Hayne J in the same case stated, ‘[i]t is that use which must be 
identified as the use which would infringe the patent because the hinge about which s 117 turns is its 
introductory words: “[i]f the use of a product by a person would infringe a patent.”’129 Emphasising 
the point, Hayne J continued that s 117 liability, ‘turn[s] upon whether the use in question 
contravenes the patentee’s exclusive rights under s 13 of the Act’.130 These explanations of the law 
mean that there is clear High Court authority stating that supply infringement can only arise when an 
exploitation within the meaning of s 13 occurs.131 The significance of this is that, as analysed above, it 
is unlikely that a right within s 13 is infringed — primarily because of divided performance. As a 
result, on the basis of these arguments, s 117 is unlikely to be applicable to the factual scenarios 
from Akamai or McKesson.  
124 See commentary beginning at page 72. 
125 It is arguable that method claims that do not have a ‘product resulting’ from their ‘use’ are not amenable to s 117 (see, 
Rescare v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205, 242–3 (Gummow J), affirmed in obiter, Anaesthetic Supplies Pty 
Ltd v Rescare (1994) 50 FCR 1, 45 (Lockhart J), 24 (Wilcox J agreeing with Lockhart J)). However, since this line of reasoning 
is contrary to the legislature’s intent (see, Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent: Does it Exist after 
Rescare? (1995) 6 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 223–4) and has been expressly disagreed with (see, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Company v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 524, 558 (Black CJ and Lehane J), 573 (Finkelstein J agreeing 
with Black CJ and Lehane J); Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 650 (Crennan J), 634 (Heydon J agreeing with 
Crennan J)) this chapter will not consider it further. 
126 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 117(1) (emphasis added). 
127 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619. 
128 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 642. 
129 Ibid 629. 
130 Ibid. 
131 See also, Rescare v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205, 242–3 (Gummow J); this reasoning was also labelled 
as ‘uncontentious’ by Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent: Does it Exist after Rescare? (1995) 6 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 223. 
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The ‘product’ issue only applies to the factual circumstances in Akamai.132 In that case, although the 
defendant operated a CDN and supplied associated support for its operation,133 no specific item 
relating to using the patented method was supplied. Thus it is arguable that a service, as opposed to 
a ‘product’ was supplied.134 Although courts have not dismissed a s 117 case because what was 
supplied was only a service, previous cases on s 117 have been limited to commodities such as 
timber,135 pharmaceuticals,136 and chemicals.137 Thus, what was provided in Akamai is significantly 
different in character from what has previously been argued before the courts. Further support for 
this argument can be found in extrinsic materials to the Act. The 1984 Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee report (which was instrumental in the inclusion of the supply infringement provision in 
the Patents Act),138 specifically referred to supply infringement provisions applying to goods, 
materials, and parts.139 Given this report laid the basis for s 117, it would be expected that this 
extrinsic material to the Act would be quite influential in guiding judicial interpretation of the 
provision. It follows, then, that there are quite sound arguments that the definition of ‘product’ 
prevents s 117 from applying in circumstances akin to those in Akamai. 
Although the scenarios in Akamai and McKesson may not satisfy the requirements in s 117(1), if it is 
assumed that they did, it would be necessary to identify at least one of the subsections in s 117(2) 
that apply to the facts from each case. The basic operation of ss 117(2)(a)–(c) were outlined in 
chapter II part B and this analysis builds on that background information.140 Section 117(2)(a) refers 
to an infringing use that is the only reasonable use of the product supplied. In Akamai, the ‘product’ 
supplied (if it can be called that) was a CDN. As outlined in the US case, when the defendant’s CDN 
was in operation, with all the parties performing their expected steps, all the steps of the method 
patent were collectively performed.141 The fact the defendant’s CDN was designed to achieve this 
outcome,142 suggests that this use would be classified as its only reasonable use. On this basis, then, 
the factual circumstances in Akamai would likely satisfy the requirements in s 117(2)(a). A similar 
132 An argument could be raised that the software supplied in McKesson does not constitute a ‘product’ for the purposes of 
s 117(1), however, this argument was broadly raised in chapter 2 pt II B and dismissed. Thus, it does not need to be raised 
here again. 
133 Limelight Networks Inc v Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2115 (2014). 
134 It should be noted that in Akamai instructions on how to use the defendants CDN were supplied, but these could not be 
‘used’ to infringe a patented method for distributing page objects on a CDN. 
135 See generally, Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619. 
136 See generally, Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50; Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca 
AB (No 4) (2013) 100 IPR 285; Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50. 
137 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46. 
138 Statement of the Minister for Science, Government Response to the Report of the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee, ‘Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia’ (1986) 56 The Australian Official Journal of Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs 47, 1462, 1477; Explanatory Memorandum, Patents Bill 1990 (Cth) 28. 
139 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia, (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 67. 
140 See commentary starting on page 72. 
141 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 116–7 (D Mass, 2009); Akamai Technologies Inc v 
Limelight Networks Inc, 629 F 3d 1311, 1305–07 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
142 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 629 F 3d 1311, 1317–8 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
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argument can also be constructed for the software supplied in McKesson. The trial Court indicated 
that the purpose of the patent in McKesson was to facilitate Internet mediated communication with 
patients, and that this was something that could only be achieved if all the steps of the method 
claims were performed.143 Consequently, there are sound arguments that the facts from both cases 
would satisfy s 117(2)(a).  
A successful s 117(2)(b) action requires proof that the product supplied is not a ‘staple commercial 
product', and that ‘the supplier had reason to believe’ that the product would be put to the infringing 
use alleged. Summarising the analysis from the previous chapter, ‘staple commercial product’ is not 
defined in the Patents Act, but it has been interpreted by the High Court in Collins to be one that is 
supplied for a variety of applications.144 In reference to the software in McKesson and the CDN in 
Akamai, both are unlikely to be classified as staple commercial products because their purposes are 
quite narrow, namely, patient communication and management in McKesson, and website content 
distribution in Akamai. Thus, this requirement is likely to be met. 
On the second requirement in s 117(2)(b) — whether ‘the supplier had reason to believe’ that a 
person would put the product to the infringing use alleged — in Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka 
Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, all the members of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concluded 
that this can be satisfied objectively,145 with the test being whether ‘a reasonable person in the 
position of [the supplier] would have reason to hold such a belief.’146 As outlined above, the uses of 
the CDN in Akamai and software in McKesson were directed towards the infringing purposes alleged, 
thus the suppliers in both circumstances would have reason to believe that the use would occur 
because that was what they were designed to do. Consequently, it is likely that both requirements in 
s 117(2)(b) would be satisfied. 
A successful s 117(2)(c) action requires proof that the product supplied is used in accordance with 
instructions or some form of inducement. As detailed above, in Akamai, instructions were provided 
to the defendant’s clients instructing them how to tag objects.147 By contrast, in McKesson no facts 
were provided in the written decisions pertaining to instructions or technical support. However, as 
explained above, the case never progressed to considering facts relating to infringement, thus the 
absence of such facts is not necessary conclusive of whether instructions were provided to clients. 
Indeed, the defendant’s current website details live classroom training, video lessons, and phone and 
143 McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 98 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1281 [2]–[4] (Fed Cir, 2011). 
144 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 626 (Gmmow ACJ and Kirby J), 653–4 (Crennan J); see also, Generic 
Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 65 (Bennett J); Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (No 4) 
(2013) 100 IPR 285, 411 (Jagot J); Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 763, 778–9 (Yates 
J). 
145 Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 59 (Emmett J), 73–4 (Bennett J), 90 
(Greenwood J). 
146 Ibid 59 (Emmett J). 
147 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 629 F 3d 1311, 1321–2 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
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web support.148 Given the technical nature of the defendant’s software and its use, it is relatively 
safe to assume that these types of instructions and support would have always been provided. 
Moreover, assuming this is true, if the case did progress to assessing whether the defendant did 
‘induce’ the infringing actions, then this type of evidence would be led. Consequently, given the 
instructions in both cases are related to performing the infringing actions, it appears that robust 
infringement arguments can be mounted under s 117(2)(c) as well.  
Summarising the results from this analysis of s 117: the infringing uses in s 117(2)(a)–(c) all plausibly 
apply to the factual circumstances of Akamai and McKesson, but the threshold issues with the 
definition of ‘product’ and ‘infringement’ in s 117(1) mean that, overall, factual circumstances akin to 
Akamai and McKesson are unlikely to create supply infringement liability. 
In Monotti’s article on interactive claims, she did not raise the limitations that the definition of 
‘product’ may have in creating liability for the facts from Akamai, nor did she raise the applicability of 
ss 117(2)(b) or (c). She did comment that the factual scenarios would fit into s 117(2)(a) and raised 
the issue of whether the definition of ‘infringement’ within the meaning of s 13 would operate to 
limit its operation.149 On this last point though, Monotti was more equivocal on whether supply 
infringement was applicable to divided performance, arguing that the use of ‘would’ in s 117(1) 
meant that infringement could be found if the parties were acting as joint tortfeasors150 — through 
the term ‘joint tortfeasors’, Monotti was referring to the common law actions of common design and 
procured infringement.151 However, there are two problems with this argument. First, it ignores a 
literal interpretation of s 117 and the comments from Crennan and Hayne JJ in Collins stating that 
exploitation within s 13 is a prerequisite for supply infringement. Second, if joint tortfeasance can be 
proved against the defendants’ actions in scenarios like those in Akamai or McKesson (as explored 
below), there is no reason to prove supply infringement as well.  
D. Procured Infringement 
As outlined above, two common law causes of action relevant to the facts in Akamai and McKesson 
have been outlined in Australian case law, namely, common design and procured infringement.152 
Procured infringement is discussed first in this chapter because analysis of it sheds light on the 
operation of common design as well. Procured infringement has a much longer history than common 
148 Epic, Client Services < https://www.epic.com/services-index.php>; Epic, Contact <  https://www.epic.com/contact.php>.  
149 Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 318, 324. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid 320. 
152 Other monikers could be used to describe these actions, see, Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583, 609 (Lord 
Mustill); Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 4) [1992] 1 WLR 1112, 1118–9; Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (1999) 48 
IPR 1, 9 (Carr, Sundberg and Kenny JJ). In Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583, Mustill LJ queried whether these 
causes of action are different but thought they were separate, see, 608; see also Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 
549, 560 (French J). 
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design, with UK cases in the 19th century applying153 and approving it.154 However, a judicial 
comment early in the 20th century also criticised it for being of dubious authority.155 In Ramset 
Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (‘Ramset’),156 the unanimous Full Court 
of the Federal Court of Australia became the first Australian court to find procured infringement.157 
Interestingly, this finding was preceded by a number of Australian cases where it was considered, but 
not applied.158 Highlighting the controversy of whether the cause of action was a part of Australian 
patent law, Young J in Ryan v Lum159 stated:  
tempting as it is to be the first to have the glory of deciding the point, or alternatively the infamy of 
having decided it wrongly, it seems to me that I should not go further than to record the arguments 
which have been put to me and to acknowledge the diligent research which must have gone into them 
and to leave the point open until it becomes absolutely necessary to decide it.160  
The judgment in Ramset validated the existence of the cause of action and outlined its boundaries. 
Relevantly, the Court stated: 
Liability for infringement may be established, in some circumstances, against a defendant who has not 
supplied a whole combination (in the case of a combination patent) or performed the relevant 
operation (in the case of a method patent). The necessary circumstances have been variously 
described: the defendant may ‘have made himself a party to the act of infringement’; or participated 
in it; or procured it; or persuaded another to infringe; or joined in a common design to do acts which 
in truth infringe. All these go beyond mere facilitation. They involve the taking of some step designed 
to produce the infringement, although further action by another or others is also required. Where a 
vendor sets out to make a profit by the supply of that which is patented, but omitting some link the 
customer can easily furnish, particularly if the customer is actually told how to furnish it and how to 
use the product in accordance with the patent, the court may find the vendor has ‘made himself a 
party to the [ultimate] act of infringement’. He has indeed procured it. So to hold is not in any way to 
trespass against the established line of authority which, as Dixon J made clear in Walker v Alemite, is 
based upon the need to confine a monopoly to the precise area in which it operates. That protects the 
mere vendor of an old product, though selling with knowledge of the purchaser’s intention to infringe 
153 Innes v Short (1898) 15 RPC 449, 451–2 (Bigham J). 
154 See, Gibson v Brand (1842) 1 WPC 627, 631 (Tindal CJ); Townsend v Haworth (1879) 48 LJ Ch 770, 770–1 (Jessel MR); see 
also, Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 560 (French J). 
155 Adhesive Dry Mounting Co Ltd v Trapp & Co (1910) 27 RPC 341, 353 (Parker J). 
156 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239. 
157 Ibid 263. 
158 Ryan v Lum (1989) 14 IPR 513, 521–2; BEST Australia Ltd v Aquagas Market Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 217, 220; Ccom Pty Ltd 
v Jiejing Pty Ltd 1994) 27 IPR 577, 626–7; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 467, 489 (Heerey J). 
See also, Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (1980) 145 CLR 520, 527–528; Re Application of Eli Lilly and 
Co [1982] 1 NSWLR 526, 535. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid 522 (note, this argument is not recorded in the Ryan v Lum (1989) 16 NSWLR 518). 
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a combination patent; but it affords no excuse to the person who sets out to induce customers to do 
what falls fairly within the area of the monopoly.161 
Procured infringement has been thought of as being superseded by s 117 supply infringement.162 
However, as described below, it may still have a role in modern litigation, and perhaps a greater role 
in creating liability for divided performance. An important feature of the action, especially in relation 
to the factual circumstances in Akamai and McKesson, is that in Ramset their Honours held that 
when a party procures another to infringe a patent, there is no need to find that the parties had a 
‘common design’ to to perform any activities.163 This feature also distinguishes the action from 
‘common design’ (discussed below). 
With the passage of time, this extract from Ramset has been cited with approval in a number of 
judgements, including, by a differently constituted Full Federal Court bench to that in Ramset.164 It 
has also been applied by Bennett J in Danisco AS v Novozymes (‘Danisco’),165 and Middleton J in 
Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (‘Damorgold’).166 Although it follows that there is a strong 
basis for the existence of procured infringement actions in Australia, there is, nevertheless, some 
lingering doubt from cases that pre-date Ramset. In the 1975 High Court decision, Firth Industries Ltd 
v Polyglass Engineering Pty Ltd (‘Firth’),167 Stephen J, sitting as a single judge on an interlocutory 
injunction matter, stated that procuring others to infringe a method patent by providing instructions 
on how to achieve the infringing acts is ‘a matter open to some doubt’.168 A similar sentiment was 
also expressed by Cooper J in Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (‘Ccom’),169 and by the High Court in 1980 
case, Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (‘Wellcome’).170 In Wellcome, the 
unanimous High Court in obiter held that there were no authorities for establishing liability when a 
product is supplied with instructions to use it in a way that would infringe a method claim.171 This last 
161 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 258–9 (Burchett, Sackville and 
Lehane JJ) (citations omitted). 
162 Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 318, 322; Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 562 (French J). 
163 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 258–9, 263; contra, Wake 
Forest University Health Sciences v Smith & Nephew Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 92 IPR 496, 563 (Dodds-Streeton J). 
164 Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 562 (French J), 588–9 (Branson and Sundberg JJ); Unilever Australia Ltd v 
PB Foods Ltd [2000] FCA 798 (16 June 2000) [9] (Moore J); Grove Hill Pty Ltd v Great Western Corp Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 257, 
341 (Gyles J); Leonardis v Theta Developments Pty Ltd (2000) 78 SASR 376, 402–2 (Williams J); SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special 
Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 115–6 (Kenny J); this case was appealed, but only on validity, not 
infringement, see, SNF (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialist Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2012) 96 IPR 365, 365–6; Wake 
Forest University Health Sciences v Smith & Nephew Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 92 IPR 496, 563 (Dodds-Streeton J). See also,  
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 375, 559 (Black CJ and Lehane J); McCallum & Co Pty Ltd v 
Allen Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 550, 556–7 (Gyles J); Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577, 627 
(Cooper J). 
165 Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–45.  
166 Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72. 
167 Firth Industries Ltd v Polyglass Engineering Pty Ltd (1975) 123 CLR 489. 
168 Ibid 497. 
169 Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577, 627 (Cooper J). 
170 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (1980) 145 CLR 520. 
171 Ibid 527–8; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding (1998) 41 IPR 467, 489 (Heerey J). 
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holding is particularly problematic, since the supply of instructions are key facts in Akamai and 
McKesson. Also problematic is that the Courts in Ramset, Dansico and Damorgold did not address 
Firth or Wellcome. This means that although there is a clear signal from the Federal Court that the 
cause of action exists, the High Court is yet to definitively approve of its modern development.  
Assuming procured infringement does exist, then according to the extract from Ramset, two 
elements must be proved in a successful procured infringement action: (1) that there is a physical act 
of infringement; and (2) that the conduct of the procuring party is sufficient to attribute infringing 
conduct to them. As established above, in both Akamai and McKesson, performance of the all the 
steps in the method claims was not in dispute, rather the question was whether steps performed by 
the clients could be attributed to the defendants. On this point, the extract from Ramset is apposite, 
particularly the passage, ‘[t]hey involve the taking of some step designed to produce the 
infringement, although further action by another or others is also required’. This tends to imply that 
if part of a patented method is completed by an alleged infringer, and a client completes the rest, 
this could give rise to liability. However, this interpretation is open to debate. It could also be read to 
only apply to two specific situations: first, where a product patent is partly assembled by one party 
and then completed by another; and second, where a party supplies a product to another who uses it 
to perform all the steps in an infringing method. Support for this alternative interpretation can be 
found in dicta from Ramset. Relevantly, their Honours specifically approved a passage from the UK 
case, CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc.172 In that case, Lord Templeman, with whom 
all the members of the House of Lords agreed, stated, ‘[g]enerally speaking, inducement, incitement 
or persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and must identifiably 
procure a particular infringement in order to make the defendant liable as a joint infringer.’173 CBS 
Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc is a copyright case, but as their Honours stated in 
Ramset, ‘it is necessary to bear in mind that his Lordship treated the patent cases as involving the 
same principle.’174  
Additional support for the argument that procured infringement does not create liability for divided 
performance can also be found in the three cases that have found procured infringement in 
Australia: Ramset concerned the supply of ‘face-lift anchors’ and ‘ring clutches’ to customers who 
used them to make patented construction apparatuses;175 Danisco concerned the supply of an 
enzyme to customers who used it to perform all the steps in an infringing baking process;176 and 
Damorgold concerned the supply of ‘springs assists’ to customers who used them to make patented 
172 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] 2 ALL ER 484.  
173 Ibid 496–7. 
174 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 256. 
175 Ibid 243, 252, 258–65. 
176 Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 237–45. 
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window blind control apparatuses.177 Thus, in each case, the person who was supplied with the item 
exploited the claimed invention by making the patented apparatus or performing all the steps in the 
patented method — liability was not found in circumstances of divided performance. As such, there 
is no Australian precedent for finding procured infringement in circumstances of divided 
performance. But, by the same token though, nor is there precedent denying it. 
If it is assumed that procured infringement exists and it is applicable to divided performance, the 
second issue is whether conduct equivalent to that of the defendants in Akamai and McKesson 
would be sufficient to be classified as ‘procuring’ infringement. In Ramset, the infringer supplied 
construction components together with instructions in brochures, bulletins and personal seminars 
demonstrating how to make the infringing apparatuses.178 In Danisco, supply of the enzyme was 
supported by advice, presentations on the benefits of the enzyme and personal contact with 
customers.179 In Damorgold, the supply of window blind components was supported by various 
‘directions, recommendations and instructions’, all in a situation where the components only had 
one use.180  
Lamentably, facts surrounding the provision of CDN services in Akamai and provision of the software 
in McKesson are scant because the cases focused on the single entity issue rather than the broader 
circumstances of inducement. Nevertheless, the written reasons for the decisions concerning the 
facts in Akamai do make it clear that, in addition to the defendant supplying the CDN service, they 
provided specific instructions on how to tag web objects and associated technical support.181 
Moreover, in the circumstances of clients using the defendant’s CDN service, there was no possibility 
for them to obtain the benefits of that service without tagging.182 As outlined above, in McKesson, no 
facts were provided in the written decision pertaining to instructions or technical support. Despite 
this, the defendant’s current website details a wide variety of support for using the software,183 and 
it is logical to assume that if the case progressed to considering ‘inducing’ conduct, evidence of this 
type would be led. The facts from the case do indicate that the software had a non-infringing use, 
namely, it allowed hospitals to link patient records to a patient’s website.184 However, it is also clear 
that the primary purpose of the software was to allow patients to access the website and to 
177 Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 61–2, 65–70, 72–3. 
178 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 261–3. The Court also 
appeared to attribute increased weight to the instructions since the components were used in dangerous work, see ibid 
261–2. 
179 Danisco AS v Novozymes AS (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 245–6. 
180 Damorgold Pty Ltd v Jai Products Pty Ltd (2014) 105 IPR 60, 72. 
181 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 122 (D Mass, 2009); Limelight Networks Inc v 
Akamai Technologies Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2115 (2014); Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc (Fed Cir, 2015 Nos 
06-CV-11585, 06-CV- 11109, 13 August 2015) slip op 9. 
182 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 122 (D Mass, 2009); Akamai Technologies Inc v 
Limelight Networks Inc (Fed Cir, 2015 Nos 06-CV-11585, 06-CV- 11109, 13 August 2015) slip op 8–9. 
183 Epic, Client Services < https://www.epic.com/services-index.php>; Epic, Contact <  https://www.epic.com/contact.php>.  
184 McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp (ND Ga, Civ No 06-CV-2965, 8 September 2009) slip op 2. 
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communicate with healthcare providers.185 Thus, in both cases the defendants deliberately created 
scenarios which meant that when their product (or services) were used for their designed purpose, it 
would result in all the steps of the method patents being performed. Moreover, in both 
circumstances, instructions were provided to relevant parties detailing how to perform their part. In 
these respects, then, both cases are quite similar to Damorgold, in the sense that a high level of 
support was supplied for the infringing use, and what was being supplied only had one reasonable 
use, and that use was infringing. As a result, for factual circumstances mirroring those in Akamai and 
McKesson, there appears a strong basis for a finding of procured infringement in Australia. 
E. Common Design Infringement 
The second common law cause of action canvassed in this chapter, common design, has been 
described as originating in the UK case, Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd (‘Morton-
Norwich).186 In that case, Graham J outlined the cause of action,187 and his Honour’s judgment is 
generally considered instructive on its dimensions.188 Relevantly, his Honour stated, ‘two persons 
who agree on common action in the course of and to further which one of them commits a tort in 
this country are joint tortfeasors.’189 In the later Court of Appeal case, Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) 
Ltd,190 Lord Mustill, with whom the rest of the Court agreed,191 expanded on this point stating, there 
is no ’no need for a common design to infringe. It is enough if the parties combine to secure the 
doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements.’192 Consistent with this passage, Lord 
Mustill emphasised that a key element of the suit was the nature of the relationship between alleged 
joint tortfeasors.193 Furthermore, his Honour explained that a common design to commit actions is 
not found based on the classification of a relationship, but on an analysis of various features of it.194  
In Australian patent law, common design has been argued in three general fact scenarios. These are: 
(1) whether a parent company can be liable for a subsidiary’s infringement by exploitation;195 (2) 
whether a supplier can be liable for a distributor’s infringement by exploitation;196 and (3) whether a 
185 Ibid slip op 2; McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 98 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1281 [2]–[4] (Fed Cir, 2011). 
186 Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501; Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 4) [1992] 1 WLR 
1112, 1118; Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 1, 10 (Carr, Sundberg and Kenny JJ); Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for 
Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European Intellectual Property Review 318, 321. 
187 Ibid 512–7. 
188 See, Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 277; Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v 
Genentech Inc (2012) 98 IPR 424, 429.  
189 Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 512, see also, 515. 
190 Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583. 
191 Ibid 611. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid 608–9. 
194 Ibid; see also, Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 1, 13 (Carr, Sundberg and Kenny JJ); Apotex Pty Ltd v Les 
Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 277–8; Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v Genentech Inc (2012) 98 IPR 424, 
428–32. 
195 See, eg, Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corp (1994) 55 FCR 194, 205; Best Australia Ltd v Aquagas 
Marketing Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 217.  
196 See eg, Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 510–11; see Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier 
(No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 273; Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft v Genentech Inc (2012) 98 IPR 424, 428; Caterpillar Inc v 
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supplier can be made liable for a client’s exploitation of the invention.197 However, in all instances, it 
is well accepted that merely facilitating infringement is not enough. For example, supplying an 
element of an invention and knowing that a person supplied will infringe, will not established 
liability, rather, (in a similar manner to procured infringement) something more than facilitation must 
occur, relevantly, a party must have ‘itself a party to the act of infringement…’.198 In Morton-Norwich, 
this was found when a UK importer and Dutch distributor met regularly and formed a close working 
relationship to import a product into the UK that infringed a UK patent.199 
The infringement arguments in Akamai and McKesson were both aimed at making the defendant 
responsible for its client’s actions. In this context, then, two requirements emerge that must be 
proven for a finding of infringement: (1) whether the features of the relationships are sufficient to be 
classified as a common design; and (2) whether common design infringement can create liability for 
divided performance. On the first question, whether the relationships in the factual scenarios are 
sufficient to be classified as a common design, there are two relevant Australian cases that have 
been argued in the context of making suppliers responsible for their client’s infringement. Both of 
which have already been mentioned in this chapter: Ccom,200 and SNF.201 In Ccom, the applicant 
controlled petty patent rights for a Chinese text display computer program.202 In this case, although 
Cooper J found the petty patent in question was invalid on a number of grounds, including subject 
matter and fair basing,203 his Honour continued to consider infringement. Assuming the clients who 
used the respondent’s program were infringers by exploitation, his Honour considered whether 
supply of the program coupled with an instruction manual could constitute infringement.204 On this 
point, Cooper J stated that, without more, sale of the software with instructions was not sufficient to 
support a finding of a ‘common design’ between the parties.205 
John Deere Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 1, 10 (Carr, Sundberg and Kenny JJ). In other intellectual property regimes it has also been 
used to make a director of a company personally liable for his or hers company’s infringement, see, eg,  Sporte Leisure Pty 
Ltd v Paul’s International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 275 ALR 258, 277, or in copyright, Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd 
(2006) 237 ALR 714, 749. 
197 See eg, Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577, 626; SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments 
Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 119. 
198 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 116 (Kenny J); Walker v Alemite Corp 
(1933) 49 CLR 643, 658 (Dixon J, McTiernan J agreeing: at 659); quoted with approval in regards to common design in, 
Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 560 (French J); Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building 
Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 258–9 (Burchett, Sackville and Lehane JJ). 
199 Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 514. 
200 Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577 (the infringement arguments are not recorded in Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing 
Pty Ltd (1993) 48 FCR 41). 
201 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46; see also, Danisco AS v Novozymes AS 
(No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209, 244–45; C.f. Rotocrop International Ltd v Genbourne Ltd [1982] FSR 241. 
202 Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577; this case was appealed, however, common design was not pursued, see, 
Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260, 272–75 (Spender, Gummow and Heerey JJ). 
203 Ibid 577–9. 
204 Ibid 626. 
205 Ibid. 
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In SNF, the relevant patent concerned the use of polymers in treating mining waste.206 The case was 
initiated by an applicant seeking to revoke the patent,207 and the respondent cross claimed for 
various types of infringement including common design.208 In all, Kenny J found that the patent was 
valid and infringed.209 As in Ccom, common design was argued on the basis that the alleged infringer 
supplied the polymers in question and provided instructions on how to use them to contravene the 
patent.210 However, in addition to these facts, her Honour found that the suppliers engaged in a 
‘joint endeavour’ with the mine operator.211 This included, developing a management strategy for 
treating the waste,212 as well as ongoing testing, optimisation, and advice.213  
In Akamai, the alleged infringer supplied instructions and technical support on how to use its CDN 
and tag web objects, but there is no evidence of a relationship like the ‘joint endeavour’ in SNF, thus 
the facts appear more akin to Ccom. Indeed, in the trial decision, the trial judge specifically described 
the relationship as one at arm’s-length.214 As a result, it seems unlikely that a ‘common design’ would 
be found on the basis of the facts in Akamai. The analyses of the relationships between software 
provider, healthcare providers and patients in McKesson is similar. There was no evidence of 
anything more than arm’s-length relationships.215 Accordingly, it seems unlikely that a common 
design would be found on the facts from McKesson too. 
On the second issue of whether common design is applicable to divided performance, in Graham J’s 
articulation of common design in Morton-Norwich, his Honour stated that common design 
infringement could arise when a common design is reached between two parties ‘and to further one 
of them commits a tort …’. 216 A literal reading of this passage suggests that common design is only 
applicable to scenarios where one party commits infringement by exploitation. Relevantly, in the 
Australian context, this passage was specifically approved of by Bennett J in Apotex v Les 
Laboratoires Servier (No 2).217 However, despite these comments, there are good counter-arguments 
suggesting they may not exhaustively represent the law in Australia. First, in Morton-Norwich, a 
Dutch corporation supplied a UK company an animal medicament that was patented in the UK.218 
The UK company then directly infringed the UK patent by importing and selling the medicament in 
206 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 46; this case was appealed, but only on 
validity, not infringement, see, SNF (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ciba Specialist Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2012) 96 IPR 365, 365–
6. The case actually concerned five patents however the litigants agreed that the differences between them were 
‘immaterial’ and conducted the case using one as an ‘exemplar’: see, 56. 
207 SNF (Australia) v Ciba Special Chemicals Water Treatments Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 46, 46. 
208 Ibid 47. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid 118. 
212 Ibid 118–9. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 614 F supp 2d 90, 122 (D Mass, 2009). 
McKesson Technologies Inc v Epic Systems Corp, 98 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1281 [7]–[12] (Fed Cir, 2011). 
216 Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 512, see also, 515. 
217 Apotex v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272, 277. 
218 Morton-Norwich Products v Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, 510–1. 
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that jurisdiction.219 Thus, Graham J’s statement of the law was suited to the facts, and it was not 
necessary to consider the irrelevant, and perhaps difficult to perceive scenario, of divided 
performance. Second, as the extract (above) from the unanimous Full Court in Ramset indicates, 
their Honours reviewed common law patent infringement as a whole in their decision, and 
referenced common design in the same paragraph when they stated that infringement can occur 
when ‘further action by another or others is also required’. Accordingly, the arguments detailed 
above on whether procured infringement applies to divided performance, are also relevant to 
common design. It follows, then, that like the conclusion drawn above for procured infringement, it 
is not clear whether common design can create liability in circumstances of divided performance. 
In Monotti’s article on infringement of method claims by separate parties, she does not analyse 
whether the factual circumstances regarding the relationships between the defendants and clients in 
Akamai or McKesson are sufficient to be classified as a common design.220 Similarly, she does not 
consider whether common design is applicable to divided performance. Rather, she appears to 
assume that if a common design relationship can be proved then the divided performance can be 
attributed to two parties.221 The arguments here present a more nuanced assessment of common 
design law. They also indicate that, in reference to establishing infringement liability for the facts 
from Akamai and McKesson, the relationships in the cases are unlikely to constitute a ‘common 
design’ and therefore unlikely to create liability. 
F. Conclusion on Australian Causes of Action 
The examination of Australian infringement actions in this part highlights weaknesses in the 
applicability of each of them to the factual circumstances in Akamai and McKesson. Notably, none of 
them clearly apply to divided performance. Despite this finding, the arguments surrounding the 
applicability of common design and procured infringement suggest that they are more likely to be 
amenable to creating liability for divided performance than the statutory infringement causes of 
action. Nevertheless, common design is unlikely to create liability because the relationships in each 
of the two cases are at arm’s-length and do not compel any infringing actions. On the other hand, the 
fact matrices in both cases are akin to previous procured infringement cases and therefore strong 
arguments can be raised supporting a finding of liability. There is a remaining issue of whether 
procured infringement would be recognised by the High Court, but given its broad application by 
members of the Federal Court, this appears to be more of a formality. 
219 Ibid 511. 
220 Ann L Monotti, ‘Liability for Joint Infringement of a Method Patent Under Australian Law’ (2013) 35(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 318, 320–3. 
221 Ibid. 
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III. Should the Factual Scenarios from Akamai and McKesson Constitute 
Infringement in Australia? 
Theoretically, if the Australian courts or legislature decide that it would be appropriate to find 
infringement liability in circumstances akin to those in Akamai and McKesson, it could be achieved by 
various means. These means include creating a new head of liability, or altering the operation of a 
current causes of action. However, the analysis in part 2 of this chapter illustrates that no specific 
barriers have been raised to the applicability of procured infringement, only uncertainties in its 
application. Arguably, then, significant changes to the current law are not warranted until it is 
established that procured infringement does not create liability.222 On the other hand, an alternative 
approach to the current situation is to codify procured infringement in the Patents Act, specifying 
that it does apply to divided performance. Indeed, this approach makes sense, as altering the current 
operation of the law in any marked way is undesirable as it alters current expectations, but codifying 
the law will not result in a significant change, and it will serve to more clearly demarcate rights. 
Before this is done though, two policy aspects of the law would need to be demonstrated to show 
that it is preferable, namely: (1) that liability for divided performance is desirable; and (2) that 
codification of procured infringement, as opposed to relying on the common law to find its own way, 
is warranted. In this context, then, this part considers the policy arguments for the first aspect under 
the conventional headings of ‘for’ and ‘against’. Then, finding the arguments that support liability 
more compelling, this part proceeds to consider the second aspect. 
A. Arguments For 
One of the primary rationales for instituting patent regimes is that the creation of legally enforceable 
rights in inventions incentivises innovation and commercialisation.223 A corollary of this, as Giles Rich, 
a key draftsman of the US patent infringement provisions and Federal Circuit judge from 1982 to 
1999 stated,224 ‘[w]eaken or destroy the monopoly and you weaken or destroy the system’.225 It 
222 A preference for the applicability of procured infringement to the facts from Akamai and McKesson has also been 
supported by: Brett M Jackson, ‘Bridging the (Liability) Gap: The Shift Toward Sec 271(b) Inducement in Akamai Represents 
a Partial Solution to Dividend Infringement’ (2012) 54 Boston College Law Review 2127; Reza Dokhanchy, ‘Cooperative 
Infringement: I Get By (Infringement Laws) With a Little Help From My Friends’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
135, 163–69. 
223 See generally, Introduction, pt II; Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in 
Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement Final Report (IP 
Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property 
(Harvard University Press, 2003) 12–3; Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (6th 
ed, 2012) 11–3; Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 
265, 266–71; Joshua S Gans, Philip L Williams, and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an 
Aide to Competition?’ (2004) 37(4) The Australian Economics Review 436, 437–8. 
224 Giles S Rich, ‘Congressional Intent-Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?’, in Patent Procurement and Exploitation: 
Protecting Intellectual Rights ((Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1963) 61–78. See generally, Giles S Rich, ‘Infringement 
Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952’ (1953) 35 Journal of the Patent Office Society 476. 
225 Giles S Rich, ‘Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952’ (1953) 35 Journal of the Patent Office Society 
476, 479. 
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follows that if classes of patents are unenforceable, or if there is ambiguity about whether they are 
enforceable, then the incentive that the patent system is designed to create may diminish for certain 
technologies.226 As discussed at the end of part 1 of this chapter, the lack of protection for divided 
infringement potentially creates a ‘loophole’ for parties who are not authorised by the patentee to 
take advantage of particular types of modern technological inventions. These economic arguments 
are quite strong – especially given that they are the same arguments that underpin the patent 
system itself227 - thus they form a sound reason to find liability in circumstances akin to Akamai and 
McKesson. However, this rationale for liability does not necessarily conclude the issue. There are 
other factors that must be considered. 
B. Arguments Against 
A number of arguments against finding procured infringement liability in circumstances akin to those 
in Akamai and McKesson have been raised in US case law.228 Of these, two are relevant in the 
Australian context: (1) the use of ‘unitary claims’ makes it unnecessary; and (2) it is open to abuse. 
Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.  
In an article by Lemley et al addressing divided performance, the authors argue that the lack of 
enforceability can be remedied by drafting ‘unitary claims’.229 As explained in the article, ‘unitary 
claims’ are ones that are drafted from the point of view of one actor.230 For example, in a claim that 
includes a client and a supplier, it can be re-drafted to focus only on the supplier. That is, if a claim 
originally included a step similar to, ‘a client transmits a request’, it can be changed to ‘a supplier 
receives a request’.231 Relevantly, a preference for unitary claims was articulated by Linn J in his 
Honour’s dissenting opinion in the first en banc decision concerning the facts from Akamai and 
226 For a similar argument see, Stacie L Greskowiak, ‘Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of Process Patents (2010) 41 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 351, 397–405; Erik P Harmon, ‘Promoting the Progress of Personalized Medicine: 
Redefining Infringement Liability for Divided Performance of Method Patents 967 (2014) 42 Hofstra Law Review 967, 977–
81. 
227 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–4; Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual 
Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement Final Report (IP Australia, Phillip, 2000) 22–4; William M 
Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 12–3; 
Merges, Menell and Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (6th ed, 2012) 11–3; Edmund W Kitch, ‘The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 266–71; Joshua S Gans, Philip L 
Williams, and David Briggs ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or an Aide to Competition?’ (2004) 37(4) The 
Australian Economics Review 436, 437–8. 
228 See, BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech, 498 F 3d 1373, 1381 (Fed Cir, 2007); Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight 
Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1326–33, 1338–50 (Fed Cir, 2012) (citations omitted). The arguments concerning statutory 
construction, legislative history, tort and criminal law are not considered in this chapter because they are unique to the US. 
229 Lemley et al, ‘Divided Infringement Claims’ (2005) 33 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 
255, 272–5. 
230 Ibid. 
231 For a more thorough examples, see ibid 272–3; see also, Dolly Wu, ‘Joint infringement and Internet Software Patents: An 
Uncertain Future?’ (2009) 91 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 439, 449, 446–7; see also, Ken Hobday, 
‘The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement: Multi-Actor Method Claims’ (2009–2010) 38 Capital Law 
Review 137, 141–45. 
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McKesson (in which 3 other judges joined).232 On this point Linn J stated, it ‘is unwise to overrule 
decades of precedent in an attempt to enforce poorly-drafted patents.’233 The primary feature of 
unitary claims is that, because they are able to be infringed by one party, issues related to divided 
performance are irrelevant. Accordingly, in some patents that involve interactive claims, it may be 
prudent for patentees to include unitary claims. However, for various reasons explored below they 
are unlikely to be a panacea to divided performance and may actually be detrimental.234   
In BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech,235 Rader CJ writing for the unanimous Federal Circuit 
commented that unitary claims could capture many instances of divided performance, but his 
Honour acknowledged that, for inventions that involve more than three separate parties, it would be 
difficult to prove infringement when such an invention was in the form of a unitary claim.236 In 
commentary to this case, Long Truong, a patent attorney, illustrates this issue with a US patent on 
networked data processes, and, in this scenarios goes on to suggest that it is not possible to describe 
the invention from the perspective of one party.237 Related to this issue is a point originally made by 
Melissa Wasserman, who argues that if an invention is novel or inventive because of the way it 
divides performance of a method between different parties, then if claimed in unitary form it may 
not be patentable because the claim will not recite its inventive features.238 Following this, 
Wasserman goes on to argue that, if unitary claims are of dubious validity, patent applicants will 
likely include them alongside interactive claims, and that the outcome of including both types of 
claims is that it will increase the number of claims patent offices need to examine.239 A further aspect 
of this issue, not mentioned by Wasserman, is that some patent offices charge significant additional 
fees for claims over a certain number. For example, in the European Patent Office each claim 
numbered 16 to 50 costs an additional €235 on top of normal examination fees, and for claims 
232 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1337, 1349–50 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
233 Ibid 1349–50. 
234 See eg, Dolly Wu, ‘Joint infringement and Internet Software Patents: An Uncertain Future?’ (2009) 91 Journal of the 
Patent and Trademark Office Society 439, 466–7; Long Truong, ‘After BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP: Conspiratorial 
Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable’ (2009) 103 Northwestern University Law Review 1897, 1920; 
Sriranga Veeraraghavan, ‘Joint Infringement of Patent Claims: Advice for Patentees’ (2006) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High 
Tech Law Journal 211, 232 n 181; For a similar argument see, Stacie L Greskowiak, ‘Joint Infringement after BMC: The 
Demise of Process Patents (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 351, 404–6; Stephen W Moore, ‘A Last Step Rule 
for Direct Infringement of Process Claims: Clarifying Indirect Infringement and Narrowing Joint Infringement’ (2013) 61 
Cleveland State Law Review 827, 848. 
235 BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech, 498 F 3d 1373 (Fed Cir, 2007). 
236 Ibid 1381.  
237 Long Truong, ‘After BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP: Conspiratorial Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint 
Infringers Liable’ (2009) 103 Northwestern University Law Review 1897, 1919–20. 
238 Melissa Feeney Wasserman, ‘Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law’ (2007) 82 New 
York University Law Review 281, 300–1; see also, Long Truong, ‘After BMC Resources Inc v Paymentech LP: Conspiratorial 
Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable’ (2009) 103 Northwestern University Law Review 1897, 1919–20; 
Sriranga Veeraraghavan, ‘Joint Infringement of Patent Claims: Advice for Patentees’ (2006) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High 
Tech Law Journal 211, 232 n 181; Nari Lee, ‘Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the Global Economy’ 
(2008) 48 IDEA 345, 349; W Keith Robinson, ‘No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement’ (2012) 
62 American University Law Review 59, 105–6. 
239 Melissa Feeney Wasserman, ‘Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law’ (2007) 82 New 
York University Law Review 281, 301. 
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numbered 51 and over, each claim costs an additional €580.240 Thus, in additional to the usual 
examination costs, patents with 16 claims or more become quite expensive. 
If divided performance does not constitute liability in Australia, then, in addition to applicants adding 
unitary claims to their applications, current patentees may want to amend their specifications to 
include them. In Australia, this can only occur if an amended claim ‘fall[s] within the scope of the 
claims of the specification before amendment’.241 In effect, this requires that the new claims would 
constitute infringement of the old claims.242 This legal test is problematic for unitary-claim  
amendments because if interactive claims cannot be infringed by a single entity, logic seems to 
dictate that unitary claims, which focus on one entity, will not fall within the scope of interactive 
claims. Or, demonstrating this problem on a claim integer level, if claims prior to an amendment 
include a step of a ‘client sending a request’ and a new claim does not specify a client doing this, it is 
difficult to say that the old step is performed and the claim infringed. As a result, if a current patent 
only consists of interactive claims, then it may be difficult for a patentee to be able to amend it to 
include unitary claims, and therefore the invention may be disclosed but unenforceable against 
parties who utilise it. 
More generally, it seems inappropriate to create an invention, describe it as thoroughly as possible in 
a patent specification, claim the way it works in the clearest and broadest claim language possible, 
then have to morph it into something else to fit a legal rule that serves limited utility. Indeed, this 
commentary resonates with dicta from Newman J in her Honour’s dissenting judgment in the first en 
banc decision concerning induced infringement:  
I do not discourage ingenuity, but the presence or absence of infringement should not depend on 
cleverness or luck to satisfy a malleable single-entity rule. The Court in Dawson Chemical Co v Rohm & 
Haas Co, 448 US 176 (1980), discussing the law of contributory infringement, cautioned lest ‘the 
technicalities of patent law’ enable persons ‘to profit from another's invention’ by performing ‘acts 
designed to facilitate infringement by others.’243 
It follows that unitary claims will likely be useful in many circumstances, but should not be relied 
upon as a solution to create liability for divided performance. 
The second argument against procured infringement creating liability for factual scenarios akin to 
those in Akamai and McKesson, is that liability for divided performance via procurement is open to 
‘abuse’. This argument was outlined by Newman J in the first en banc decision too. Her Honour’s 
240 European Patent Office, Schedule of Fees, EPO Online, 
<http://www.epoline.org/portal/portal/default/epoline.Scheduleoffees>.  
241 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 102(2)(a); see also Dolly Wu, ‘Joint infringement and Internet Software Patents: An Uncertain 
Future?’ (2009) 91 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 439, 462–3. 
242 Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH [2000] FCA 1918 (22 December 2000) [18]–[19] (Heerey J). 
243 Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1325 (Fed Cir, 2012) (citations omitted).  
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primary argument, was that the conduct that may constitute procured infringement is too broad.244  
In particular her Honour commented that the ‘potential for abuse looms large, for the majority does 
not require proof of direct infringement, but holds that the entity that advises or enables or 
recommends the divided [performance] is fully responsible for the consequences of the direct 
infringement.’245 However, whilst this concern may be applicable in the US, in Australia, the 
threshold that needs to be proved to attribute infringing conduct to another, via procured 
infringement, is quite high. Re-iterating a point already made, the Court in Ramset said mere 
facilitation is not enough for procured infringement, an infringer must effectively make themselves 
part of the infringing conduct.246 Demonstrating this high threshold, the case of Ccom indicates that 
merely supplying a product and providing instructions on how to use the product in an infringing way 
is not enough; something more must occur.247  
C. Conclusion on Policy Arguments 
Overall, the analysis of policy issues in this part suggests that there are valid arguments to be made 
concerning unitary claims and abuse, but, when considered in context, they do not overcome the 
economic rationale. As a result, from the point of view of the policy arguments presented here, 
procured infringement should create liability when factual circumstances akin to those in Akamai and 
McKesson arise in Australia. In light of this conclusion, and with reference to the uncertainties 
outlined in part 2 of this chapter, the next logical question is whether procured infringement should 
be codified to clarify its operation, or whether the common law should be left to find its own path? 
D. Codify Procured Infringement? 
One of the general arguments for codification is that the common law evolves slowly, in a piecemeal 
approach, does not necessarily use comprehensive policy to guide it, and relies heavily on legal 
precedent. As Professor Dratler, the author of two US treatises on intellectual property,248 has 
observed: 
common law decision making is inevitably ad hoc. It relies on general principles of justice and common 
sense. Its tools are analogy and distinction based on facts. By using these tools, courts mimic—on a 
much smaller scale and for a much smaller subset of factual contingencies—the comprehensive 
factual inquiries that legislatures are supposed to undertake before prescribing more comprehensive 
and general rules in statutes.249 
244 Ibid 1333. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239, 253, 258. 
247 Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 577, 626. 
248 See, Law Journal Press, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative and Industrial Property; Law Journal Press, 
Licensing Intellectual Property. 
249 Jay R Dratler, ‘Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster Was a Unanimous 
Decision’ (2005) 22(3) Santa Clara High Technology Journal 413, 420. 
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Related to Dratler’s arguments, Chief Justice French, writing extra-curially, has stated that the 
primary purpose of a court is to interpret and apply the law, and that courts are often reluctant to 
engage with policy.250 Pursuant to French CJ’s and Dratler’s comments, then, codification presents 
the opportunity to clarify liability in circumstances like those raised in Akamai and McKesson, as well 
as providing the opportunity to craft procured infringement laws consistent with patent policy. This 
second point is important because, beyond the arguments in this chapter, there are various aspects 
of procured infringement law that are not necessarily clear and which warrant review from a policy 
perspective. For example, the US equivalent of procured infringement, induced infringement, 
requires a mental element,251 should it in Australia?252 Similarly, should liability or remedies be 
altered if parties hold a bona fide belief a patent was invalid?253 Related to these issues, it might also 
be useful to have clarification on how joint and several liability and remedies operate when procured 
infringement is found with multiple parties.254  
Another advantage of legislation is that it can clarify rights immediately. This means that the time 
and effort that may go into arguing legal or factual aspects of cases analogous to Akamai and 
McKesson before various courts could be avoided, as would any uncertainty that may permeate legal 
advice. Consistent with this advantage, the Australian Law Reform Commission has previously stated 
that, ‘[t]he first way to reduce the cost [of litigation] is to eliminate the opportunity for disputes to 
arise. Uncertainty or obscurity of the law may contribute to the existence of a dispute.’255 Despite 
this, an issue that complicates this advantage is, if procured infringement was to be codified, 
feedback from stakeholders would be needed on whether it should only have prospective effect, or 
whether it should have retrospective effect as well. Although it would be desirable only to have one 
law relating to procured infringement, if, beyond the divided performance issue, patentees believed 
that the codified cause of action changed what they thought their rights were, it may be a good idea 
to limit the provision to a prospective effect. 
250 See generally, Robert S French, ‘Dolores Umbridge and Policy as Legal Magic’ (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 322. 
251 See generally, Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060 (2011). 
252 This topic has received a lot of commentary in the US, see, Mark Lemley, ‘Inducing Patent Infringement’ (2005) 39 
University of California Davis Law Review 225;  Tal Kedem, ‘Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: 
Which Intentions Pave the Road?’ (2007) 48 William and Mary Law Review 1465; Michael N Rader, ‘Toward a Coherent Law 
of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under s 271(b) 
(2000–2001) 10 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 299, 320–6; Timothy R Holbrook, ‘The Intent Element of Induced Infringement’ 
(2006) 22 Santa Clara Computer & Higher Technology Law Journal 399, 404–7; Jason A Rantanen, ‘An Objective View of 
Fault in Patent Infringement’ (2011) 60 American University Law Review 1575; Jacob S Sherkow, ‘Patent Infringement as 
Criminal Conduct’ (2012) 19 Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review 1; Charles W Adams, ‘Indirect 
Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective’ (2008) 42 University of Richmond Law Review 635; Lynda J Oswald, ‘The Intent 
Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Patent Law: Reflections on Grokster’ (2006) 13 Michigan Telecommunications & 
Technology Law Review 225. 
253 See generally, Commil USA LLC v Cisco Systems Inc (S Ct, No 13-896, 26 May 2015). 
254 See generally, The Koursk [1924] P 140; Akamai Technologies Inc v Limelight Networks Inc, 692 F 3d 1301, 1330–1 
(Newman J) (Fed Cir, 2012); Dmitry Karshtedt, ‘Formalism and Pragmatism in the Analysis of Damages for Indirect Patent 
Infringement’ (2013) 91 Washington University Law Review 911. 
255 The Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 1900 (1990) 70 [7] (appendix 2, submission to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs: Reducing The Cost of Justice). 
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More broadly, the idea of clarifying rights in patents overlaps with James Bessen and Michael 
Meurer’s argument that if patents are to operate efficiently as property rights, then the boundaries 
of what constitutes infringement should be demarcated as clearly as possible.256 Further to this 
argument, the authors contend that, if patent rights are not clearly demarcated, then this 
uncertainty can lead to costly litigation and other transaction costs, that undermine the value of a 
patent, and more broadly, impair the operation of the patent system.257 Indeed, it is very likely that 
for parties that are commercialising IT and Internet orientated communications technologies, clarity 
on this point of law would be much appreciated.  
Related to the notion of reducing uncertainty, in a recent article by Professors Mark Janis and 
Timothy Holbrook, the authors argue that since many people (for example scientists and business 
development managers) interact with patent law but are not experts in it, where possible, patent law 
should be simplified so that they can understand it.258 In this context, accessibility of the law relating 
to procured infringement has much to be improved upon. Not only is procured infringement not 
recorded in the Patents Act, but, at the moment some Australian intellectual property textbooks do 
not refer to it.259 The codification of procured infringement will make it easier to identify, and 
remove the need to refer to several cases to understand the basic elements of the action. In short, 
codification of a form of infringement law that exists, but seldom used or acknowledged, is a 
paradigm example of simplifying law to enhance its operation. 
It should also be acknowledged that this is not the first scholarly work to advocate for codification of 
procured infringement. In 1979, the then Minister for Productivity asked the Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee, at the time the independent government body appointed by the Australian 
government, to review the patent system.260 Prior to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee 
writing their report, they sought expert advice on a variety of areas and commissioned Monash 
University to report on a number of issues.261 This report comprehensively addressed 
secondary/indirect infringement across many jurisdictions.262 With regards to procured infringement, 
the report recognised the action as emerging from the common law and concluded that it should be 
codified.263  
256 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) 47–52; see also, Introduction, pt II. 
257 Ibid ch 2. 
258 Mark D Janis and Timothy R Holbrook, ‘Patent Law’s Audience’ (2012) 97 Minnesota Law Review 72, 76–89. 
259 For example see, Bowrey et al, Australian Intellectual Property: Commentary Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2010); Ricketson et al, Intellectual Property: Cases Material and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2009) 815–
35; cf. McKeough et al, Intellectual Property in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2004) 395; Davison et al, 
Australian Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 569–70. 
260 Ann Dufty, Report to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (Monash University Law School, 1983) vol 1, iii. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid 209–79. 
263 Ibid 216, 277–8; See also, Ann L Monotti, ‘Infringement of a Patent by Authorisation: Clear or Muddy Waters?’ (2013) 24 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 5, 11–3. 
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A classic argument against codification is that the common law is more fluid and can evolve to meet 
changing values and practices over time.264 However, the problem with this argument, in the context 
of procured infringement, is that such actions are infrequent in Australia and require the expense of 
litigation. Moreover, as outlined above, the basis for procured infringement has been part of the 
English common law since the 19th century,265 and no significant changes to the law are being 
advocated for here, rather what is being sought is clarification, consistent with patent policy. Indeed, 
the only significant change to procured infringement since Australia’s first patent legislation was 
enacted in 1903,266 is the recognition of procured infringement by the Federal Court.  
Conclusion 
The primary rationale for patent systems is that they are designed to incentivise innovation by 
creating exclusive property rights in inventions. If a patented invention can be effectively 
implemented via divided performance without authorisation from the patentee, yet not be liable for 
infringement, then the incentive element of patent law is undermined. The analysis in this chapters 
suggests that there is no defined liability pathway for divided performance in Australia, but procured 
infringement appears to be applicable. Pursuant to this finding, this chapter argues that the best way 
to resolve this lack of clear exclusivity for inventions like those in Akamai and McKesson is to codify 
procured infringement, clarifying exactly how the cause of action is to operate, and in particular, 
specifying that it is applicable to divided performance. Codification would inevitably involve detailed 
discussion of aspects of the law beyond those addressed in this chapter. However, in the interests of 
providing clear legal rights for those that use patent law, this is a desirable goal.  
What is proposed here is not radical, or even freethinking. The principles emerged from case law in 
the 1800s, and due to the evolution of technology and business structures, have even greater 
relevance today.  
264 See eg, Attorney-General’s Department, Should Contract Law Be Codified? < 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/ReviewofAustraliancontractlaw/Shouldcontractlawbecodified.pdf>.  
265 Innes v Short (1898) 15 RPC 449, 451–2; Townsend v Haworth (1879) 48 LJ Ch 770, 770–1; Gibson v Brand (1842) 1 WPC 
627, 631 (Tindal CJ). 
266 Patents Act 1903 (Cth). 
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Chapter 5 
Introduction 
The three preceding chapters of this thesis have all focused on various infringement causes of action 
in Australia. Like those chapters, this chapter continues to focus on an infringement cause of action, 
however, this chapter changes tack. Rather than evaluating whether an emergent issue is dealt with 
by the patent system in a way that accurately reflects the justifications for patent law, this chapter 
builds directly on the problems that were outlined in chapter 4. In short, this chapter aims to solve 
the problems that the analysis in chapter 4 presented by considering the applicability of various 
legislative amendments. Relevantly, chapter 4 outlined a number of emerging problems with the 
operation of supply infringement under s 117(2)(b) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Patents Act’),1 
which is currently affecting markets for generic drugs, at a significant cost to the Australian 
government and public.  
The first problem described in chapter 4 is that, in certain circumstances, patentees could enforce 
their method claims under s 117(2)(b) to foreclose supply of products that are not patented 
themselves but have infringing uses, even though the same products also have substantial non-
infringing uses. This is particularly important in the context of generic branded drugs, which much of 
the s 117(2)(b) litigation concerns (and this chapter focuses on), because this means that second 
medical use patents can be enforced as if they are a patent for the drug itself. The second problem 
described in chapter 4 is that, in the prescription and dispensation of drugs that are ultimately used 
to infringe second medical use patents, in some scenarios doctors and pharmacists may play roles 
that are sufficient for secondary infringement liability (and in which they bear a high level of 
responsibility for the infringing conduct of patients), but generic drug companies are the only parties 
being held to account. Thus, in both situations, s 117(2)(b) appears to be extending liability too far. 
The benchmarks by which any possible amendments will be evaluated in this chapter are the three 
original rationales of the legislature in enacting supply infringement under s 117. That is, it was 
designed to: (1) create a ‘more effective, realistic and just’ enforcement system; (2) assist with 
international patent harmonisation efforts; and (3) improve certainty for holders and users of 
patented technology.2 One solution to the problems detailed in chapter 4, is simply to repeal the 
provision. However, this is undesirable as it was originally enacted to offer patentees additional 
protection on inventions, in particular, new uses of known products,3 which includes second medical 
1 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 117(2)(b). 
2 See Chapter 4 pt I; Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia, (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 66–7; Statement of the Minister for Science, Government Response to the 
Report of the Industrial Property Advisory Committee, ‘Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia’ (1986) 56 The 
Australian Official Journal of Patents, Trade Marks and Designs 47, 1477. 
3 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 66–7; see also, Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent under the 
Patents Act 1990: Does it Exist After Rescare?’ (1995) 6 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 219–21. 
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uses of known drugs. The logic here is that, in the absence of a provision permitting method of use 
patents to be enforced against suppliers, patentees would only be able to pursue widely dispersed 
patients who use the drugs for infringing purposes – something that is likely to be difficult, 
ineffective and expensive.4 Thus, the aim of this chapter can be effectively distilled down to 
balancing the ability of generic pharmaceutical companies to fairly supply drugs for non-infringing 
uses, with the ability of patentees to exclusively supply the same drugs for patented uses.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. Part 1 provides a summary of the key findings from chapter 4 
to provide context for the analysis that follows. Part 2 then explores potential ‘balancing’ 
amendments by outlining how the legal mechanisms in provisions analogous to s 117(2)(b) operate 
in the UK and US. This methodology is adopted because, by aiming to import foreign legal 
mechanisms into the operation of s 117(2)(b), the legislative rationale of harmonisation will be 
furthered. However, beyond the harmonisation rationale, there are additional reasons why these 
jurisdictions are chosen, namely: they have well litigated supply infringement legislation; are 
important trading partners with Australia; are common law nations; have accessible case law in 
English; were influential in the development of s 117;5 and, present slightly different supply 
infringement legislation.  
Part 3 evaluates whether any of the mechanisms from the US and UK provisions could provide an 
appropriate solution to the problems posed by s 117(2)(b) by examining the extent to which they 
might have altered the outcomes on liability in the problematic cases identified in chapter 4. Overall, 
the analyses in parts 2 and 3 are quite wide ranging. They include legal mechanisms specific to supply 
infringement, such as the definition of ‘staple commercial products’, as well as other traditional legal 
mechanisms such as the mental element that must be proved. Part 4 then extends the analysis in 
part 3 and assesses whether any of the mechanisms should be inserted into s 117(2)(b). This final 
assessment is made against the remaining rationales provided by the legislature for enacting s 117.  
Admittedly, other jurisdictions could offer alternative solutions to the problems posed by s 117(2)(b), 
or perhaps bespoke solutions could be developed de novo. However, the foreign comparisons 
conducted here offer ample alternatives and it is suggested that by adopting a certain international 
approach into s 117(2)(b), a more balanced, certain, and harmonised law can be established. 
4 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 66–7; Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent under the Patents 
Act 1990: Does it Exist After Rescare?’ (1995) 6 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 219–21. 
5 Ann Dufty, Report to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee, (Monash University Law School, 1983) vol 1, 209–78; 
Statement of the Minister for Science, Government Response to the Report of the Industrial Property Advisory Committee, 
‘Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia’ (1986) 56 The Australian Official Journal of Patents, Trade Marks and 
Designs 47, 1462, 1477. 
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I. Section 117(2)(b) of the Patents Act 
This chapter analyses the wording of s 117(2)(b) in detail, it is therefore useful to reference the 
provision in full. It can be found in chapter 2 part II B.6 As described in chapter 4, three key cases 
demonstrate the problems with s 117: Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) 
(‘Otsuka’);7 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (‘AstraZeneca’);8 and; Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex 
Pty Ltd (‘Lambert’).9 In these cases, the requirements in s 117(1), of whether a use of the supplied 
product was infringing, and whether the supplier was not a licensee of the relevant patent, were not 
contentious.10 Thus, in these cases, supply infringement liability depended on proving the two 
remaining requirements in s 117(2)(b). That is, the product supplied was not a ‘staple commercial 
product’ and, that ‘the supplier had reason to believe’ that a person would put it to the infringing use 
alleged.11 As also explained in chapter 4, as a general rule, drugs that treat a narrow range of 
diseases do not qualify as ‘staple commercial products’.12 This means that supply of prescription 
drugs is, as a general rule, amenable to s 117 infringement. 
In the context of these cases, the most contentious requirement with regard to supply infringement 
liability was whether the supplier had a ‘reason to believe’. In Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka 
Pharmaceutical Co Ltd,13 all the members of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia 
concluded that this requirement could be satisfied objectively,14 with the test being whether ‘a 
reasonable person in the position of [the supplier] would have reason to hold such a belief’.15 
Although these cases were analysed in detail in chapter 4,16 it is necessary to outline key aspects of 
these cases that are relevant to the analyses that follow in later parts of this chapter.  
6 See page 72. 
7 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015). 
8 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324. 
9 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632. The case of Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Aust Pty Ltd 
(2013) 304 ALR 1, is not a topic of analysis in this chapter because in that case infringement was not found.  
10 See generally, Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632; Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic 
Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015). Whether infringement by exploitation occured, was raised in Apotex 
Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2013) 100 IPR 285, but was dismissed (at: 409–10) and was not pursued on appeal in AstraZeneca 
AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324. 
11 Patents Act (Cth) s 117(2)(b). 
12 See, Chapter 4 pt II A; rosuvastatin was found not be a staple commercial product in AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd 
(2014) 226 FCR 324, 417–9 (Besanko, Foster, Nicholas and Yates JJ). Leflunomide was found not to be a staple commercial 
product in Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd [No 3] (2011) 196 FCR 1, 79, this was not pursued on appeal in 
Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] (2012) 204 FCR 494, 528. Aripiprazole was found not to be a staple 
commercial product in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [182]–
[191]. For the purposes of an interlocutory injunction pregabalin was accepted to not be a staple commercial product in 
Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 637 (Allsop CJ, Jagot and Nicholas JJ). 
13 Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50. 
14 Ibid 59 (Emmett J), 73–4 (Bennett J), 90 (Greenwood J). 
15 Ibid 59 (Emmett J); see also, ibid, 73–4 (Bennett J). 
16 See, Chapter 4 pt II A. 
 
 
145 
                                                          
Chapter 5 
In Lambert, the patentees controlled rights to the use of pregabalin to treat pain.17 At the time there 
were two medically approved listings for pregabalin, one for pain and another for seizures, with the 
latter being non-infringing.18 Since the seizures indication was non-infringing, a generic 
pharmaceutical company obtained approval of pregabalin for this purpose and went on to launch the 
product.19 Despite the fact the approval was limited to the non-infringing use, the patentees alleged 
infringement under s 117(2)(b) on the grounds that generic pregabalin would be used ‘off-label’20 for 
the patented use of treating pain.21 In an interlocutory injunction appeal before the Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia, the unanimous Court found a prima facie case was made out because 
evidence from a pharmacist suggested suppliers would have a ‘reason to believe’ that doctors would 
prescribe pregabalin for pain and pharmacists would substitute a generic version of the drug.22 
In AstraZeneca, the drug rosuvastatin could be used for various non-infringing purposes related to 
cardiovascular disease,23 but the primary s 117(2)(b) argument was that that doctors would 
prescribe, or pharmacists would dispense, dosages of generic-labelled rosuvastatin for the infringing 
use of lowering cholesterol. An important part of this argument was that to use the generic version 
for the off-label infringing purpose, the pills had to be split.24 On this point, evidence was led of pill 
splitting using a cheap, handheld ‘pill-splitter’ that was commonly available in pharmacies.25 
Although the Full Federal Court found the relevant patents were invalid,26 the Court reasoned that, if 
they were valid, supply infringement would be found because there was sufficient evidence of 
doctors prescribing generic-labelled rosuvastatin in circumstances where it would be split for a 
supplier to be aware that it would be used for an infringing purpose.27 
In Otsuka, the drug aripiprazole could be used for treating schizophrenia at all stages of the disease,28 
and a generic company supplied it for this purpose, but the patentee claimed use of the drug to treat 
a certain sub-type of schizophrenia under certain conditions. These conditions related to patients’ 
symptoms and responses to other drugs.29 The patentee’s s 117(2)(b) argument was that a generic 
17 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 633. 
18 Ibid 634. 
19 Ibid 635. 
20 For a discussion of the term ‘off-label’, see Chapter 4 pt II A. 
21 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 637. 
22 Ibid 651–2. 
23 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324, 418 (Besanko, Foster, Nicholas and Yates JJ), 421 (Jessup J agreed 
with the majority on this point). 
24 Ibid 417–20. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid 378, 402, 403–4. 
27 Ibid 417–20. 
28 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 763, 768–9. 
29 Ibid 774. 
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version of aripiprazole would be dispensed in situations in which it was infringing.30 Ultimately, the 
patents in this case were found to be invalid. However, based on instances of medical practitioners 
prescribing aripiprazole in circumstances that would be infringing if a generic version of the drug was 
dispensed, Yates J found that a ‘reason to believe’ was established.31 
The descriptions of these cases outline how the ‘reason to believe’ aspect of s 117(2)(b) can be 
satisfied. They also illustrate the ‘foreclosure’ issue associated with s 117(2)(b) because, if the second 
medical use patents in all these cases were valid, infringement would have been found. Accordingly, 
orders would likely have be made prohibiting supply of the generic drugs for any purpose32 — as was 
ordered in Lambert.33 In the circumstances of AstraZeneca and Otsuka, this is particularly 
problematic because evidence suggested that the non-infringing uses of the drugs were more 
common than the infringing ones.34 
II. Legal Mechanisms in Equivalent UK and US Provisions  
The UK equivalent to s 117(2)(b) is ss 60(2)-(3) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK), and the US equivalent is 
35 USC § 271(c). For ease of reference, both of these provisions are extracted in Table 3 (below). This 
part outlines how the legal mechanisms in these provisions operate, thereby setting the groundwork 
for parts 3 and 4 to evaluate whether any the mechanisms should be incorporated in s 117(2)(b). 
Table 3 Equivalent statutory supply Infringement provisions in the UK and US. 
30 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [180]. An element of this 
case distinguishing it from the other two is that the infringing use of the generic drug was not actually off-label because it 
was approved for use in all stages of treating schizophrenia. 
31 Ibid [244]–[245]. 
32 See comments regarding courts’ discretion to narrow injunctions in Chapter 4 pt II B. 
33 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 654–5. 
34 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [200]–[249]; Apotex Pty Ltd v 
AstraZeneca AB (2013) 100 IPR 285, 408–9. 
Country Equivalent Supply Infringement Legislation 
UK (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person (other than the proprietor 
of the patent) also infringes a patent for an invention if, while the patent is in force and 
without the consent of the proprietor, he supplies or offers to supply in the United 
Kingdom a person other than a licensee or other person entitled to work the invention with 
any of the means, relating to an essential element of the invention, for putting the 
invention into effect when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the 
circumstances, that those means are suitable for putting, and are intended to put, the 
invention into effect in the United Kingdom. 
(3) Subsection (2) above shall not apply to the supply or offer of a staple commercial 
product unless the supply or the offer is made for the purpose of inducing the person 
supplied or, as the case may be, the person to whom the offer is made to do an act which 
constitutes an infringement of the patent by virtue of subsection (1) above. 
US (c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States 
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A. UK 
Under ss 60(2)–(3) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK)35, there are five elements that must be satisfied to 
prove supply infringement. These have been summarised as: the knowledge requirement; ‘staple 
commercial product’; ‘essential element’; ‘means suitable for putting the invention into effect’; and a 
person other than a licensee.36 The knowledge requirement, ‘essential element,’ and ‘means suitable 
for putting the invention into effect’ have been considered by appellate courts. However, the 
remaining two elements were effectively considered for the first time in Arnold J’s first instance 
judgment in Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd (‘Nestec’).37  
Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik BmbH v Scott (‘Grimme’)38 is the leading case on the UK knowledge 
requirement. The knowledge requirement in s 60(2) is stipulated in the passage, ‘he knows, or it is 
obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that those means are suitable for putting, and 
are intended to put, the invention into effect...’. In Grimme, the joint judgement of Etherton and 
Jacob LJJ was agreed to in whole by Sir David Keene.39 Etherton and Jacob LJJ held that the 
knowledge requirement has two components. First, that the supplier must know, or it must be 
obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the supplier, that the product supplied is probably 
suitable for the infringing use alleged. Second, that the supplier must know, or it must be obvious to 
a reasonable person in the position of the supplier, that some ultimate users of the product will 
probably intend to put it to the infringing use.40 The patent in Grimme concerned a machine for 
separating potatoes from soil and haulm when they were extracted from the ground.41 The supplier 
in Grimme advised how to use a machine it sold for the infringing purpose and also sold attachments 
to help achieve this purpose.42 Accordingly, the Court found that the mental element was satisfied 
because the supplier had subjective knowledge that the machine was suitable for the infringing use, 
and that persons supplied would intend to put it to this use because they were advised of it.43 
35 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, ss 60(2)–(3). 
36 See, Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [153]–[205]. 
37 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat). 
38 Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Scott [2011] FSR 7. 
39 Ibid [141]. 
40 Ibid [112], [116]–[117]. 
41 Ibid [H5]. 
42 Ibid [69]–[70]. 
43 Ibid [127]–[132]. 
a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a 
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part 
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in 
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
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In Nestec, Arnold J summarised the relevant patent as relating to a coffee ‘extraction system’ which 
was embodied in the claimant’s coffee machine.44 The claimant had sold variations of its coffee 
machine since 1986 and all versions of the machine operated by extracting coffee from capsules, 
which the claimant also supplied.45 The capsules had been patent protected but the relevant patent 
expired in May 2011.46 The defendant in Nestec initially only produced coffee capsules that were 
designed to be used in the claimant’s machine,47 but later produced adaptors for capsules to enable 
them to be used in other capsule-based coffee machines.48 The claimant alleged that the use of the 
defendant’s coffee capsules in the machine it sold infringed its rights in the patented extraction 
system, and therefore argued that the defendant was liable for supplying the capsules under s 
60(2).49 Ultimately, Arnold J found the patent to be invalid for a number of reasons, including lack of 
novelty,50 but considered infringement, had the patent been valid.51 
Through the operation of s 60(3), supply infringement in UK patent law limits the types of products 
amendable to the suit to ‘non-staple commercial products’.52 In Nestec, Arnold J had to consider 
whether the coffee capsules satisfied this criterion.53 Prior to Nestec, the requirement had not been 
authoritatively considered in the UK.54 Thus, Arnold J looked internationally for assistance on the 
meaning of the phrase. Ultimately, his Honour adopted Crennan J’s interpretation in the Australian 
High Court case, Northern Territory v Collins.55 As outlined in chapter 2,56 Crennan J in this case 
stated, the ‘relevant inquiry is into whether the supply of the product is commercial and whether the 
product has various uses’.57 Applying this interpretation to the coffee capsules in Nestec, Arnold J 
found that although the adaptors for the capsules allowed them to be used in other capsule-based 
machines,58 they had ‘no other use other than with a limited range of coffee machines’.59 
Accordingly, his Honour found that the capsules were non-staple commercial products, and 
therefore supply of them was amenable to supply infringement.60  
44 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [69]. 
45 Ibid [17]–[24]. 
46 Ibid [162]. 
47 Ibid [182]. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid [153]. 
50 Ibid[120]; for s summary, see, [206]. 
51 Ibid [206]. 
52 As per s 60(2) this element is not required if a supplier ‘induces’ infringement. However, as discussed in part 1, this 
chapter is not concerned with supply infringement that occurs via inducement. Accordingly, the ‘staple commercial 
products’ component of this action will be treated as if it is strictly required. 
53 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [177]–[82]. 
54 Ibid; see also, Pavel v Sony (UK) Ltd (Unreported, Patents County Court, Ford J, 13 January 1993) [6.3]–[6.6]. 
55 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [182]; Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 630.  
56 See, Chapter 2 pt II B. 
57 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 630. 
58 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [182]. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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With regard to the requirement of ‘essential element’, this arises from the passage in s 60(2) that 
mandates that a successful supply infringement action depends on whether the supplied product 
relates to an ‘essential element of the invention’. Prior to Nestec, no English authority had 
comprehensively interpreted the passage,61 and thus, Arnold J again referred to international 
interpretations.62 The German interpretation, which his Honour adopted,63 was that any means 
which contributed to ‘implementing the technical teaching of the invention’ constituted an ‘essential 
element’,64 even if the means were known in the prior art.65 Arnold J further clarified this 
requirement, stating that a means would only be considered a non-essential element if it was 
‘completely subordinate’ to the technical teaching of the invention.66 In applying this requirement, 
Arnold J said that in the coffee extraction system, the ‘invention takes the capsule as a given, and 
claim 1 only requires the capsule to have a guide edge in the form of a flange’.67 However, his 
Honour also found that, ‘the flange of the capsule plays a significant role in the way in which the 
claimed invention works.’68 By this his Honour was referring to the way the system used the flange to 
move the capsule into place. His Honour therefore concluded that the capsule contributed to the 
implementation of the technical teaching in the patent and was not of completely subordinate 
importance.69 In Grimme, although the Court did not comprehensively interpret the ‘essential 
element’ requirement, it did find that the required ‘essential element’ could be satisfied when a 
supplied product had to be adapted by a receiver before it could be put to an infringing use.70 
In the UK Supreme Court case, Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd (‘Schütz’),71 the Court addressed the 
requirement, ‘means suitable for putting the invention into effect’, which is actually shorthand for 
the passage from s 60(2), ‘he supplies…any of the means… suitable for putting … the invention into 
effect’. Writing for the unanimous Court, Lord Neuberger held that this passaged required that use of 
the supplied product resulted in direct infringement.72 The claimant in Schütz was the exclusive 
licensee of the patent titled, ‘[p]allet container for the transporting and storing of liquids’, the 
containers themselves being more commonly known as ‘intermediate bulk containers’.73 Broadly 
speaking, the invention was for a metal cage that plastic bottles fitted within, and which rests on a 
61 Ibid [168]; see also, Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Scott [2011] FSR 7 [99]–[104]; Actavis UK Ltd v Eli Lilly 
& Co [2015] EWCA Civ 555 [81]–[92]. 
62 Ibid [168]–[75]. 
63 Ibid [175]. 
64 Ibid [170].  
65 Ibid [172]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid [176]. 
68 Ibid [176]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Scott [2011] FSR 7 [99]–[104]; see also, Actavis UK Ltd v Eli Lilly & Co 
[2015] EWCA Civ 555, [81]–[92]. 
71 Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177. 
72 Ibid 181, 184; see also, Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [183]. 
73 Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177, 177. 
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transport pallet.74 The issue in this case was that the appellant supplied replacement bottles for the 
intermediate bulk container frames when the bottles wore out, and it was argued that replacing the 
bottles in the frame constituted infringement, and therefore the appellant was liable for supplying 
them.75 Since direct infringement was required, the Court had to determine whether putting new 
bottles in the intermediate bulk container frames actually constituted ‘making’ the invention.76  
In determining whether the invention was ‘made’, Lord Neuberger outlined ten considerations.77 It is 
not necessary to touch upon all the considerations as different elements may influence different 
cases.78 However, Lord Neuberger did state that it is ‘legitimate and helpful’ to question whether the 
bottle was a ‘subsidiary part’ of the invention.79 In applying this question, his Honour acknowledged 
that the bottle was an essential and large part of the patented product, but in the context of the 
whole invention, found it to be a subsidiary part.80 Neuberger J arrived at this conclusion by focusing 
on two elements. First, the metal cage would exceed the life of the bottle and a purchaser would 
expect to be able to replace the bottles.81 And second, the ‘bottle did not include any aspect of the 
inventive concept of the patent’.82 
In Nestec, Arnold J applied Lord Neuberger’s reasoning when a question was raised about whether 
use of the capsules in the coffee extraction system constituted ‘making’ it.83 His Honour found that 
the capsules were a subsidiary part of the system for a number of reasons. Primarily, the capsules: 
had a much shorter life than the machine; are regularly used and discarded; have independent 
economic existence from the machine; do not embody the inventive concept; were required for use 
of the machine; and, there was no notice that the user must use any specific capsules.84 Accordingly, 
Arnold J held use of the capsules in the machine did not result in the coffee extraction system being 
‘made’ and therefore no direct infringement occurred.85 
The fifth element of supply infringement under s 60(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK), that the 
purchaser is ‘a person other than a licensee’, operates to limit supply infringement to circumstances 
in which a person supplied does not have a licence. In Nestec, Arnold J held that this passage also 
included implied licences.86 In outlining how implied licences operate in patent infringement law, 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 181–4.  
76 Ibid 177–8.  
77 Ibid 186–7.  
78 Ibid 188 (citations omitted). 
79 Ibid 193. 
80 Ibid 194. 
81 Ibid 193–4. 
82 Ibid 194. 
83 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [183]. 
84 Ibid [199]–[205]. 
85 Ibid [205]. 
86 Ibid [158]. 
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Arnold J extracted a quote of Lord Hoffman’s in the House of Lords case, United Wire Ltd v Screen 
Repair Services (Scotland Ltd),87 where his Honour stated: 
The concept of an implied licence to do various acts in relation to a patented product is well 
established in the authorities. Its proper function is to explain why, notwithstanding the apparent 
breadth of the patentee’s rights, a person who has acquired the product with the consent of the 
patentee may use or dispose of it in any way he pleases.88 
Arnold J applied this reasoning to the facts in Nestec and stated: 
In order to use the machine for its intended purpose, the purchaser must insert capsules into the 
machine. It follows that the purchaser must be impliedly licensed to obtain and use capsules with the 
machine. Otherwise, it would be useless. In the absence of any restriction upon the purchaser 
preventing him from obtaining capsules from third parties, the purchaser is entitled to do so.89 
Put in a slightly different way, Arnold J held that if an invention is ‘made’ when it is used in its 
intended way, and requires consumables to do this, then without a restriction on what consumables 
can be used, there must be an implied licence for purchasers to use any consumables they please.90 
B. US 
Under 35 USC § 271(c), it is generally considered that there are three elements that must be satisfied 
to succeed in a supply infringement action.91 Using a shorthand notation, these three elements are: 
the knowledge requirement; ‘staple articles’; and ‘material part’. However, before elaborating on 
these mechanisms, it is necessary to briefly address a related, preliminary aspect of § 271(c). The 
provision refers to articles that are ‘sold’, not supplied. Ostensibly, this wording limits the methods 
by which liability may arise under the provision. However, this limitation will not be addressed 
further because all the cases addressed in this chapter involve products that are sold. 
In addition to the three mechanisms already outlined, there is a fourth consideration — a ‘carve out’ 
— that must be discussed. Although it is not part of supply infringement under § 271(c), it is central 
to this chapter because a recent Australian government sponsored review of pharmaceutical patents 
recommended implementing a US-style carve out into s 117.92 This fourth mechanism will be 
addressed at the end of this section.93 
87 United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353. 
88 Ibid 357. 
89 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [164]. 
90 Ibid [165]–[166]. 
91 Donald S Chisum, LexisNexis, Chisum on Patents, vol 5 (at Release 130–11/2011) § 17.03.  
92 Australian Government, Pharmaceutical Patents Review (Canberra, May 2013) 138–40. 
93 In the analysis of UK law above, implied licences and a detailed examination of ‘make’ (which was addressed under the 
requirement ‘means suitable for putting the invention into effect’) were canvassed. In light of these, it is acknowledged that 
US law has similar mechanisms, however, despite the broad relevance of these US mechanisms to this chapter, they will not 
be evaluated further. The reason for this is that, as explored below, Australian law is likely to operate in a similar way to the 
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With regard to the knowledge element, the US Supreme Court has addressed it a number of times.94 
Relevantly, the Court has held that the legislative passage, ‘knowing the same to be especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent’, requires that a supplier must know, 
or be wilfully blind, to the infringing use that a product can be put and that the product will actually 
be put to that use.95 The operation of this mechanism raises the possibility that supply of certain 
articles may not incur liability under § 271(c) for two reasons: either a supplier is unaware that a 
product will be put to a certain use; or, that they are unaware that a particular use is infringing. 
However, either reason cannot exclude liability permanently because once infringing actions are 
brought to the supplier’s attention, such as when an alleged infringer is served legal documents in a 
civil action, a supplier is made subjectively aware of the infringing uses.96 
The ‘staple articles’ requirement is drawn from the passage in § 271(c), ‘not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’ This mechanism limits supply 
infringement in the US in much the same way as ‘staple commercial products’ does in the UK and 
Australia, although it has a different field of operation.97 One of the draftspersons of § 271, Giles 
Rich, described staple articles and commodities suitable for substantial non-infringing use as ‘first 
cousins’.98 Indeed, modern US authorities treat staple articles as those with substantial non-
infringing uses,99 a type of circular definition. Nonetheless, clarifying this requirement, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Vita-Mix Corp v Basic Holding Inc,100 stated ‘that 
non-infringing uses are substantial when they are not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, 
occasional, aberrant, or experimental.’101 In this case, the patentee controlled rights to an invention 
that prevented the formation of air pockets around the blades of household food blenders.102 The 
UK mechanisms, and, s 117(2)(b) liability in the problematic cases is quite unlikely to be affected by such consideration. In 
this way, then, this chapter uses the UK mechanisms to show that similar law is likely to exist in Australia, but since little 
turns on it, there is little to be gained by also analysing the US equivalents. For relevant US law on implied licences see, eg, 
Donald S Chisum, LexisNexis, Chisum on Patents, vol 5 (at Release 141-12/2013) § 16.03[2]. For US law on the repair-
reconstruction dichotomy see, eg, Donald S Chisum, LexisNexis, Chisum on Patents (at Release 141-12/2013) § 16.03[3]. See 
also, Christina M Sperry, ‘Building A Mystery: Repair, Reconstruction, Implied Licenses, and Hewlett-Packard Co v Repeat-O-
Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp’ (1999) 5 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 9. 
94 See, eg, Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060 (2011); Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement 
Co, 365 US 336 (1961); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd, 545 US 913, 933–4 (2005) (this is a copyright case, 
but as stated in the decision, the principle is the same). 
95 Global–Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2067–71 (2011). This case is actually decided on the 35 USC 271(b), 
not 271(c). However, as the Supreme Court majority states in the opinion, 271(b) and 271(c) have the same mental element 
requirement in this respect: at 2068; see also, Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement Co, 365 US 336, 488 
(1961). 
96 Fujitsu Ltd v Netgear Inc, 620 F 3d 1321, 1330 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
97 The definition of ‘staple articles’ was briefly addressed in Chapter 4 pt II B but the description here adds more detail to its 
operation.  
98 Giles S Rich, ‘Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952’ (1953) 35 Journal of the Patent Office Society 
476, 495. 
99 R Carl Moy, Thomson Reuters, Moy’s Walker on Patents § 15.23, 15–141; Rohm and Hass Co v Dawson Chemical Co, 599 F 
2d 685, 687; Sony Corporation of America v University City Studios Inc, 464 US 417, 442 (1984). 
100 Vita-Mix Corp v Basic Holding Inc, 581 F 3d 1317, 1327 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
101 Ibid 1327. 
102 Ibid 1321. 
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Court found that the defendant’s supplied devices were capable of non-infringing uses,103 but said 
that whether a product was a ‘staple article’ or not turned on the substantiality of those uses.104 The 
Court looked at the defining features of the defendant’s blender and its designed use, and, since it 
found these to be directed towards non-infringing uses, reasoned that they were substantial.105 
In reference to the requirement, a ‘material part of the invention’, the Supreme Court has only said 
that it does not require that the product supplied be an ‘essential element’, or refer to the ‘gist’ or 
‘heart’ of the invention.106 However, the Federal Circuit has held that it does require that the product 
supplied is described in the patent claims. In Fujitsu Ltd v Netgear Inc,107 the patentee controlled 
rights to a wireless communication method of breaking electronic messages down into fragments 
and transmitting them.108 The broader patent specification did mention a ‘data receiver’ that would 
defragment messages — that is, put the messages back together so they could be read — but the 
claims did not.109 The defendant supplied a software product that, as part of its operation, 
defragmented data, but did not fragment it.110 Pursuant to § 271(c), the patentee alleged that supply 
of the software would result in infringement of their patent.111 The Federal Circuit did find that use of 
the defendant’s defragmenter would mean the patentee’s fragmenting invention was used, but 
because the claims were only directed to fragmenting data and the supplied software did not do this, 
the Court found a material part of the invention was not supplied by the defendant.112  
Moving on to the fourth mechanism, the carve out, further background knowledge on infringement 
provisions in the US is required to understand how it operates. In addition to patent infringement in 
the US being found under §§ 271(a)–(c), it can also arise under § 271(e)(2). This provision deems that 
an application for government mediated medical approval of a drug, when the drug, or a specific use 
of the drug, is protected by a patent, constitutes infringement.113 The US case of AstraZeneca 
Pharmaceuticals LP v Apotex Corp114 is homologous to the Australian case of AstraZeneca, with 
supply of rosuvastatin as the central issue. In the US case, a generic pharmaceutical company applied 
to register rosuvastatin for non-infringing uses, and their labelling for the drug reflected this.115 
Despite this, a patentee who controlled rights to uses of the drug in a second medical use patent 
103 Ibid 1327. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid 1328. 
106 Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement Co, 365 US 336, 344–5 (1961).  
107 Fujitsu Ltd v Netgear Inc, 620 F 3d 1321 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
108 Ibid 1326. 
109 Ibid 1331. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 35 USC 271(e)(2); a similar carve out also exists in Europe, see, Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Actavis Group Ptc EHF 
[2015] EWHC 72 (Pat) (21 January 2015) [17] (Arnold J). 
114 AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v Apotex Corp, 669 F 3d 1370 (Fed Cir, 2012). 
115 Ibid 1374. 
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alleged that the generic pharmaceutical company would infringe § 271(e)(2) ‘because even if a 
generic drug is formally approved only for unpatented uses, pharmacists and doctors will 
nonetheless substitute the generic for all indications once it becomes available’.116 The unanimous 
Federal Circuit found the argument ‘unpersuasive’ for two reasons. First, statements required for 
government approval under 21 USC § 355(j) and labelling requirements, which the defendant 
complied with,117 are designed to ‘carve out patented indications’ that are non-infringing.118 Second, 
if the patent holder’s argument were to succeed it: 
would allow a pioneer drug manufacturer to maintain de facto indefinite exclusivity over a 
pharmaceutical compound by obtaining serial patents for approved methods of using the compound 
and then wielding § 271(e)(2) as a sword against any competitor's … seeking approval to market an 
off-patent drug for an approved use not covered by the patent. Generic manufacturers would 
effectively be barred altogether from entering the market.’119 
The outcome of AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v Apotex Corp demonstrates that if approval of a 
generic-labelled drug is sought for only non-infringing uses, and its associated application and 
labelling reflects this, then 21 USC 355(j) operates to exempt generic pharmaceutical companies from 
liability under § 271(e)(2). 
This part has now examined a variety of mechanisms from the US and UK equivalents to s 117(2)(b). 
For convenience these mechanisms are recorded in Table 4. 
Table 4 Legislative mechanisms from the UK and US equivalents to s 117(2)(b) 
US Legal Mechanism  UK Legal Mechanism 
Subjective mental element  Objective and subjective mental element 
Staple article Staple commercial product 
Essential element  Implied licences  
Carve out  Means suitable for putting the invention into effect  
 Material part 
 
The next part of this chapter considers whether any of the legal mechanisms examined in this part, if 
present in s 117(2)(b) when AstraZeneca, Otsuka, or Lambert were decided, might have altered the 
findings of supply infringement liability in those cases. 
116 Ibid 1380.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid (citation excluded). 
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III. Analysis of Whether Any of the Foreign Legal Mechanisms Alter Liability 
For convenience, various mechanisms identified in part 2 are analysed together in this part due to 
the similarity in content. For example, the UK mental element and US mental element are analysed 
under the same heading because they have similar themes. At the end of this part, Table 5 
summarises the outcomes of this assessment. 
A. Mental Element  
As discussed above, the UK mental element has two components. First, the supplier must know, or it 
must be obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the supplier, that the product supplied is 
probably suitable for the infringing use alleged. Second, that the supplier must know, or it must be 
obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the supplier, that some ultimate users of the 
product will probably intend to put it to the infringing use alleged. Although, these elements can be 
satisfied both subjectively and objectively, since there was little evidence in the Australian cases of 
any subjective knowledge, and, as argued below, the objective arm of this requirement is likely to be 
satisfied, the analysis here will only consider the objective approach. 
In AstraZeneca the evidence of the infringing use included widespread use of pill-splitters and 
doctors writing prescriptions for patients to split generic-labelled rosuvastatin pills.120 In Otsuka the 
evidence of the infringing use included doctors prescribing the drug for such purposes.121 Likewise, in 
Lambert a pharmacist gave evidence indicating that generic-labelled pregabalin would be dispensed 
for the infringing purpose of treating pain.122 Since these facts were sufficient for the Australian 
Courts to find that the suppliers ‘had reason to believe’ that the drugs would be put to the infringing 
uses alleged, it makes sense that these same facts would be sufficient to make it ‘obvious’ to 
suppliers that they are probably suitable for the infringing uses.123 On the second component of this 
requirement, based on the same facts, it would also be ‘obvious’ that a patient would probably 
intend to put the drug to the infringing use because that is why they would have obtained them. This 
means that, although the UK mental element differs from the Australian mental element is s 
117(2)(b), it is difficult to see how the UK test, if it existed in s 117(2)(b), would alter the findings on 
supply infringement liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka, and Lambert.  
With regard to the US mental element. As outlined above, it requires evidence of subjective 
knowledge and has two components as well: a supply infringer must know (or be wilfully blind) to 
the specific actions that are to be performed; and they must know (or be wilfully blind) to the fact 
that those actions are infringing. The mental elements of supply infringement law in various 
120 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324, 419–20. 
121 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [246]. 
122 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 640–2 
123 See also, KCI Licensing Inc v Smith & Nephew Plc [2011] FSR 8 [53]–[55]. 
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countries have been subject to comparative commentary by David Nilsson and Timo Minssen,124 
where the authors compare the mental elements in the US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway.125 As Nilsson and Minssen point out, the fact the US requirement can only be satisfied 
subjectively (including being wilfully blind) is unique to that jurisdiction.126 Thus, the first point that 
can be drawn from this analysis is that if Australia were to adopt a US style mental element, broad 
harmonisation with other countries is unlikely to occur. 
Focussing on the question of whether a US mental element would alter liability in AstraZeneca, 
Otsuka, or Lambert, ostensibly, if a supplier is not aware of a specific use of one of their products, or 
that a specific use is infringing, then they cannot be held liable under this test. However, a key aspect 
of US law is that once allegations of infringement are served on a supplier, they are subjectively 
made aware of both elements.127 This means that, assuming the other aspects of the suit are 
satisfied, although infringement might not be found before service, it will be found after it 
(supposing the infringing conduct is continued once service is effected). In AstraZeneca, Otsuka, and 
Lambert, the conduct complained of was either occurring at the time of the hearing, or the generic 
companies were planning to do it.128 This means that if the US mental requirement existed in s 
117(2)(b), it would not have altered whether infringement was ultimately found, because service 
would mean that the US mental element would be satisfied.  
Despite the finding that a US subjective mental element would not alter an ultimate finding of 
infringement in the Australian cases, there is an argument that it could still reduce financial 
remedies. The argument here is that, since infringement cannot be found when the knowledge 
element is not satisfied, then, in the absence of any other specific information relating to the 
product, liability can only be found after service is effected. In such circumstances, this would mean a 
supplier would not be liable for infringement prior to service. However, in the circumstances of 
supplying generic branded drugs, due to the wilful blindness aspect of the mechanism, it is quite 
probable that the subjective mental requirement would always be satisfied prior to service.  
The majority decision in the Supreme Court case of Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA129 is 
instructive on the dimensions of wilful blindness in US indirect infringement law. In this case, it was 
held that wilful blindness can be found when: (1) the defendant subjectively believes that there is a 
124 David Nilsson and Timo Minssen, ‘What Intent, Whose Intent, and to What Extent? The Knowledge Requirement in 
Indirect Patent Infringement’ (2012) 7(6) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 437. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid 447. 
127 Fujitsu Ltd v Netgear Inc, 620 F 3d 1321, 1330 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
128 See, Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632,635; AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 
324, 417–20; Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [180], [244]–
[245]. 
129 Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060 (2011). This case was actually decided under 35 USC 271(b), not 
271(c). However, as the Supreme Court majority states in their judgment, 271(b) and 271(c) have the same knowledge 
requirements: at 2068. 
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high probability that a certain fact exists; and (2) the defendant took deliberate actions to avoid 
learning of the fact.130 When the majority in Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA applied this 
reasoning to the facts in the case, they found that the defendant was wilfully blind to inducing other 
parties to infringe a patent for a deep fryer.131 There were three aspects of the case that led to this 
conclusion. First, the patentee’s fryer was an innovation in the US market and the defendant 
undertook significant research surrounding it.132 Second, the defendant deliberately copied the 
patentee’s product, but the copying process was undertaken on an overseas version of the fryer 
which, unlike the US version, did not bear the US patent markings.133 Third, when the defendant 
instructed a patent attorney to check that their new fryer was not infringing any patents, they did 
not inform the patent attorney that it was copied from the patentees market product.134  
To understand how the majority’s reasoning from Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA applies to a 
generalised situation of supplying generic branded drugs, additional background pharmaceutical 
industry related facts need to be outlined. It is quite well established that the pharmaceutical 
industry is patent intensive. On this point, research has shown that numerous patents apply to top-
selling drugs.135 Furthermore, in general, the high cost of getting a drug to market, coupled with (in 
many instances) low imitation costs, means that originator pharmaceutical companies need patent 
protection on new drugs (or new uses of old drugs) to ensure they can obtain a return on their 
investment in developing them.136 Similarly, as discussed below in greater detail, it is very common 
for doctors to make off-label prescriptions,137 and, as discussed in chapter 4, pill-splitters are widely 
used and it is normal practice for pharmacists to dispense generic versions of drugs (if one is 
available) if a patient is consulted.138 
In this context, then, it is quite likely that a court would find a generic pharmaceutical company that 
did not canvass whether a drug they intended to supply could be used to infringe a patent would 
satisfy the two requirements outlined in Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA. That is, first, due to the 
expectation of patent protection and off-label use of drugs, a court would likely find that a generic 
130 Ibid 2070. 
131 Ibid 2070–2. 
132 Ibid 2071. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 See for eg, Christie et al, ‘Patents Associated with High-Cost Drugs in Australia’ (2013) 8(4) PLoS One < 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0060812>. 
136 Levin et al, ‘Appropriating the Return from Industrial Research and Development’ (1987) 3 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 783, 797, 811; see also, Mansfield et al, ‘Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study (1981) 91 The 
Economic Journal 907, 913–4; Arora et al, ‘R&D and the Patent Premium’ (2003) NBER (Working Paper 9431, The National 
Bureau of Economic Research, November 2004) 35–6; cf Yi Qian, ‘Do Additional National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic 
Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment’ (2007) 89(3) Review of Economics and Statistics 436, 450; Nicol et al, The 
Innovation Pool in Biotechnology: the Role of Patents in Facilitating Innovation, Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional 
Paper No. 8 (2014) 81–2 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503314>. 
137 See part IV. 
138 See Chapter 4 pt II A. 
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pharmaceutical company would subjectively believe that there is a high chance that a patent exists 
for any government-approved use of a given drug. Second, by not searching for patents on a drug 
they intended to supply, and not considering how it could be used in an infringing action, a court 
would likely find that they took deliberate actions to avoid learning of it. Thus, due to the wilful 
blindness element of US law, there is a good argument that generic pharmaceutical companies are 
always ‘aware’ of infringing uses of drugs. It follows, that since the US subjective mental requirement 
is likely to be satisfied when drugs are supplied that have infringing uses, if the US knowledge 
requirement existed in Australian law when AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert were decided, it is 
unlikely the mechanism would have altered the Courts’ findings regarding s 117(2)(b) infringement. 
In summary, the analysis in this part on the mental elements in the US and UK suggests that neither 
approach would have altered the findings on s 117(2)(b) liability in the Australian cases. 
B. ‘Staple Articles’ and ‘Staple Commercial Products’ 
The definition of ‘staple commercial products’ in s 117(2)(b) is a key factor in limiting supply 
infringement for products with more than one use. This occurs because, if a product can be classified 
as a ‘staple commercial product’, then supply of that product is exempt from infringement under the 
provision. However, as outlined above, prescription drugs are, as a general rule, classified as non-
staple commercial products and therefore supply of them raises the prospect of s 117(2)(b) 
infringement.139 Would a foreign approach to the ‘staple commercial products’ test alter liability in 
the Australian cases?  
As elucidated above, the UK definition of ‘staple commercial products’ specifically adopted the 
Australian interpretation, thus application of the UK test would effect the same result. By contrast, 
the US ‘staple articles’ test is quite different. In the US case of Vita-Mix Corp v Basic Holding Inc,140 
the Federal Circuit said that ‘staple articles’ are those with substantial non-infringing uses and ‘non-
infringing uses are substantial when they are not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, 
occasional, aberrant, or experimental.’141 The interpretation of this requirement is quite different to 
the Australian test of ‘staple commercial products’. Thus it is necessary to consider how it might have 
altered liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka, and Lambert if it existed in s 117(2)(b). 
The facts provided in the Otsuka decision disclosed that the drug in question, aripiprazole, had 
medically approved non-infringing uses to treat schizophrenia at various stages of the disease.142 
Evidence was also provided which suggested the non-infringing uses were more common than the 
139 See, Chapter 4 pt II. 
140 Vita-Mix Corp v Basic Holding Inc, 581 F 3d 1317 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
141 Ibid 1327. 
142 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 763, 768–9. 
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infringing ones.143 Similarly, in AstraZeneca, the evidence suggested that there were as many non-
infringing uses for the drug, rosuvastatin, as there were infringing ones.144 Since millions of dollars 
are spent on each drug annually in Australia,145 the evidence of these non-infringing uses strongly 
suggests the drugs would be classified as ‘staple articles’ and therefore exempt from supply 
infringement liability. Thus, clear grounds exist indicating the US ‘staple articles’ test would alter 
liability in these cases. 
The case of Lambert is more complicated. The market for the non-infringing use of pregabalin in 
preventing seizures was government approved,146 but the quantity of use for this non-infringing 
purpose was also described as ‘very small’.147 The exact amount of the non-infringing use was not 
accurately determined by the Court, but it did consider that there was ‘essentially no market for 
pregabalin in Australian as an anti-seizure medication’.148 This means it is difficult determine with any 
confidence whether the non-infringing uses of pregabalin would qualify it as a ‘staple article’ or not. 
But it does raise the possibility that such use could be classified as ‘occasional’ or ‘aberrant’. On this 
point, the Federal Circuit case, i4i Ltd Partnership v Microsoft Corp,149 illustrates how a legitimate use 
may not qualify a product as a ‘staple article’. In this case, although the defendant supplied software 
that could be used for an infringing use, they contended that it was a ‘staple article’ because it had 
non-infringing uses.150 On this point, the Federal Circuit unanimously upheld the jury’s finding that 
the non-infringing uses were not substantial because there was insufficient evidence that the non-
infringing uses were practical or useful.151 Regarding the facts in Lambert, if the non-infringing uses 
were classified as ‘occasional’ or ‘aberrant’ then, supply of pregabalin would raise the possibility of 
supply infringement liability under this test.152 Nevertheless, regardless of the exact application of 
the test to the facts in Lambert, the analysis in this section does show that the US ‘staple articles’ 
mechanism could have resulted in a different outcome on s 117(2)(b) liability for the Australian 
cases, albeit perhaps only two of them. 
143 See, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [200]–[249] (Yates J). 
144 Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2013) 100 IPR 285, 408–9. 
145 See for eg, Department of Health, Australian Statistics on Medicine 2011, (2013), 158 < 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/statistics/asm/2011/australian-statistics-on-medicines-2011.pdf>; Department of Health, 
Expenditure and Prescription Twelve Months to 30 June 2013 (2013) 11 <http://www.pbs.gov.au/statistics/2012-2013-
files/expenditure-and-prescriptions-12-months-to-30-06-2013.pdf>. 
146 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 638. 
147 Ibid 647–8, 653 (Allsop CJ, Jagot and Nicolas JJ). 
148 Ibid 648. 
149 i4i Ltd Partnership v Microsoft Corp, 598 F 3d 831 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
150 Ibid 851. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Other non-infringing uses for treating depression, anxiety and bipolar disorders also exist, but no substantial evidence 
was led of them: Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 638, 650. 
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C. Implied Licences 
The basis for the implied licence arguments in the UK is the passage in s 60(2) of the Patents Act 1997 
(UK), ‘supplies… a person other than a licensee’. Section 117(1) of the Patents Act does contain a 
passage relating to whether suppliers are licensed, but it does not contain an equivalent passage to 
this UK phrase, referring to whether persons supplied are licensed. Notwithstanding this lack of 
explicit legislation, there is quite a strong line of reasoning that suggests implied licences affect the 
operation of s 117 in a similar manner to the way they do in the UK.  
The starting point for arguing implied licences under s 117 is that, in the High Court case of Northern 
Territory v Collins, Crennan and Hayne JJ (in separate judgments), specified that supply infringement 
under s 117 can only occur when infringement within the meaning of s 13 also occurs. 153 It follows, 
then, that since a person cannot infringe a patent if they are licensed,154 by corollary, supply 
infringement cannot be found when the person supplied with a product is licensed to use it in a way 
that is otherwise infringing. Once it is established that supply of a product to a person who is licensed 
to use the product for a purpose protected by patent rights does not give rise to infringement liability 
under s 117, the next relevant question is, in what circumstances are implied licences found in 
Australia? 
Although implied licences are infrequently argued in Australian patent law, they are quite well 
established. In National Phonograph Co of Australia v Menck (a Privy Council case on appeal from the 
High Court of Australia),155 the unanimous Privy Council said that patented goods, once purchased 
with the patentees authorisation, can be used for any means the buyer desires except for any 
restrictions that may be put in place by the patentee and are bought to the purchaser’s attention.156 
The significance of this conclusion by the Privy Council is that it is broadly analogous to Lord 
Hoffman’s explanation of the law in United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd). As outlined 
above in more detail, Lord Hoffman said that, in the absence of a restriction bought to a purchasers’ 
attention, implied licences permit purchased products to be used in any way purchasers please.157  
153 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 629 (Hayne J), 642 (Crennan J, with whom Heydon J agreed: at 630, 634; 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’); see also, Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd 
(2013) 304 ALR 176 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 79 (Gageler J agreeing with Crennan and Kiefel JJ on this point); Chapter 3 pt II 
C. 
154 National Phonograph Co of Australia v Menck (1911) 12 CLR 15, 21–4. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid 23–24. See also, Interstate Parcel Express Co v Time-Life International (Nederlands) BV (1977) 138 CLR 534, 540–01 
(Gibbs J), 548–53 (Stephen J), 555–6 (Jacob J agreeing with Stephen J); Copyright Agency Ltd v New South Wales (2008) 233 
CLR 279, 304; Beck v Montana Constructions Pty Ltd (1963) 5 FLR 298, 304 (Jacobs J); see generally, Peter Heerey and Nicole 
Malone, ‘RPM for RPM: National Phonograph Company of Australia v Menck’ in Kenyon, Richardson and Ricketson, 
Landmarks in Australian Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 37. 
157 United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353, 357. The outcome that they have similar 
operation is not all that surprising given the case of Betts v Wilmott,157 is a well precedent in Australia and the UK, see, 
United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353, 358; National Phonograph Co of Australia v Menck 
(1911) 12 CLR 15, 24–5. 
 
 
161 
                                                          
Chapter 5 
Despite the fact similar law is likely to direct how and when implied patent licences will be found in 
Australia and the UK, since implied licences were not raised in AstraZeneca, Otsuka, or Lambert it is 
useful to consider how this legal mechanism might have influenced the outcomes of these cases. On 
this point, an argument could be put forward that if a patient obtains a drug without notice of any 
restrictive conditions, they are impliedly licensed to use it as they please, and therefore supply 
infringement cannot arise. However, this argument misunderstands the operation of implied 
licences. As specified in National Phonograph Co of Australia v Menck, implied licences only arise 
when a patentee impliedly licenses a purchaser to use a product158 - a supplier who is not a patentee 
cannot grant a license (impliedly or otherwise). Thus, given the cases of AstraZeneca, Otsuka and 
Lambert do not involve supply of drugs (or any other products) by patentees, implied licence 
arguments are irrelevant, and therefore it is difficult to see how they could alter liability. 
D. Means Suitable for Putting the Invention into Effect 
As outlined in part 2, the phrase in s 60(1) of the Patents Act 1997 (UK), ‘means suitable for putting … 
the invention into effect’, has been interpreted to require direct infringement as a necessary element 
in proving supply infringement. In Schütz and Nestec, this requirement then led to the intricate 
interpretation of ‘make’ by the Courts in those cases. These outcomes raise the prospect that if the 
UK passage existed in s 117(2)(b), it might alter the operation of the provision and require Australian 
courts to consider a similar issue. However, notwithstanding that s 117(2)(b) does not include the 
specific UK legislative language that led to this interpretation, like the argument for implied licences 
in s 117, there is quite a strong argument that the UK approach to ‘make’ already exists in Australian 
law in some form too.  
Before describing this argument, though, a short aside needs to be made. As the s 117(2)(b) actions 
in AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert all involved method claims, any argument that the claims were 
‘made’ is irrelevant because such claims are infringed when they are ‘used’, not ‘made’.159 ‘Make’, as 
Schütz and Nestec demonstrate, is only relevant to product claims.160 However, despite the 
irrelevance of ‘make’ arguments to the Australian cases, it is still useful to outline how ‘make’ 
arguments operate with regard to s 117. There are two reasons for this. First, it is useful to 
understand all dimensions of the provision when considering law reform. Second, similar problems to 
those described in chapter 4 in regarding AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert could also arise with 
product claims. For example, as illustrated between the Court of Appeal decision and the Supreme 
158 National Phonograph Co of Australia v Menck (1911) 12 CLR 15, 24–5. 
159 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’); infringement of method patents can also be found if the 
‘product resulting’ from use of the method is sold or used (see Chapter 3 pt II A), however, this type of infringement by 
exploitation was not argued in the Australian cases: see generally, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd 
(No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015); AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324; Warner-Lambert Co LLC v 
Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632. 
160 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1), sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
 
 
162 
                                                          
Chapter 5 
Court appeal in Schütz,161 the arguments concerning whether the invention was ‘made’ was the only 
issue that prevented a finding of infringement.162 Thus, in this sense, arguments concerning ‘make’ 
illustrate important limits on the operation of the provision that have not been articulated in case 
law in Australia. Indeed, as explored below, such arguments are important in balancing the ability of 
non-patentees to supply parts that are used to repair patented items, with the right of patentees to 
prevent infringement of their rights. 
The starting point for ‘make’ style arguments in s 117 is the passage in s 117(1), ‘[i]f the use of a 
product by a person would infringe a patent’. High Court decisions have held that this passage 
requires that infringement by exploitation has, or will, occur as a necessary element of supply 
infringement. 163 Thus, in this sense, it is equivalent to the passage in s 60(1) of the UK Act, ‘means 
suitable for putting … the invention into effect’, which the Court in Schütz held required direct 
infringement. Also in like manner to the UK legislation, Australian patentees are equipped with the 
right to exclude others from ‘making’ their invention.164 Accordingly, the requirement for 
infringement by exploitation in s 117(1), coupled with the right to exclude others from ‘making’ the 
invention, means that the Patents Act effectively has the same legislative framework that led to the 
intricate ‘make’ arguments in the UK. Despite this, no Australian case has explored the definition of 
‘make’ in the same way as the UK cases.165 What perhaps explains this difference in decided cases is 
that no Australian court has had to consider facts like those in Nestec, in which the supply of 
consumables was necessary for an invention’s operation, or Schütz, which concerned the supply of a 
key structural component of an invention that had worn out.166 
Despite the fact Australian courts have not been charged with considering facts and arguments like 
those presented in Nestec and Schütz, there is basis to expect that if they were, a similar type of 
reasoning would be engaged with. A key element in the development of the current approach to 
‘make’ in the UK is the case of Solar Thomson Engineering Co Ltd v Barton.167 In this case, Graham J 
(with whom Orr and Goff LJJ agreed)168 held that purchasers had an implied licence to repair 
patented goods.169 This case is regularly cited in the UK,170 and it is also been approved of in 
161 Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2011] Bus LR 1510. 
162 See generally, ibid, especially, 1521–30 cf, Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177. 
163 Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619, 629 (Hayne J), 642 (Crennan J, with whom Heydon J agreed: at 630, 634); 
Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 304 ALR 176 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 79 (Gageler J agreeing with 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ on this point). 
164 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
165 Various cases have considered the definition of make, just not in the same way, see, Chapter 2 pt 1 A; in particular see, 
Walker v Alemite Corp (1933) 49 CLR 643, 657–8 (Dixon J); Bedford Industries Rehabilitation Association Inc v Pinefair Pty 
Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 458, 464 (Foster J), 469 (Mansfield J), 479–80 (Goldberg J). 
166 For a non-supply infringement context, see also, United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353. 
167 Solar Thomason Engineering Co Ltd v Barton [1977] RPC 537. 
168 Ibid 561. 
169 Ibid 547–8. 
 
 
163 
                                                          
Chapter 5 
Australia. In the Australian High Court case, Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments 
Pty Ltd, Kirby and Crennan JJ in obiter specifically approved of the right to repair articulated by 
Graham J.171 The importance of this case in both countries suggests a common thread in law. 
However, whereas no Australian case has pursued this point, UK decisions have continued to 
advance the concept. This advance was most visibly demonstrated in United Wire v Screen Repair 
Services (Scotland Ltd),172 where Lord Hoffman continued to develop the idea of the implied right to 
repair and characterised it as ‘a residual right, forming part of the right to do whatever does not 
amount to making a product.’173 In Schütz, Lord Neuberger approved Lord Hoffman’s distinction and 
in asking whether a product is ‘made’, considered the question of whether a product is ‘repaired’ as 
an indicator of whether it is ‘made’.174 
If the facts and arguments in Nestec or Schütz were before an Australian court, it is difficult to predict 
whether the court would apply reasoning akin to the UK approach to ‘make’, or, apply a ‘right to 
repair’ assessment (as appeared to be endorsed by Kirby and Crennan JJ). Nevertheless, for the 
purposes of this chapter, it is not relevant to pursue which line of reasoning should be preferred, or is 
likely to be adopted. To re-iterate, it is whether foreign law would assist in balancing the operation of 
s 117(2)(b). On this point, Lord Hoffman in United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) stated, 
‘[r]epair is one of the concepts (like modifying or adapting) which shares a boundary with “making” 
but does not trespass upon its territory’. If it is assumed that Lord Hoffman’s description of ‘repair’ is 
an accurate description of the boundaries of the (unconfirmed) implied right in Australian law, then, 
this would mean if a court did adopt a ‘right to repair’ approach, a finding of being impliedly allowed 
to repair an item would overlap with not ‘making’ it. Thus, the reasoning demonstrated in Nestec and 
Schütz is likely to exist in Australia in some form, regardless of whether an Australian court adopts a 
right to repair approach or incorporates such analysis into an assessment of ‘make’. 
E. Essential Element & Material Part 
The interpretation of the US ‘material part’ requirement, and the interpretation of the UK ‘essential 
element’ requirement, arguably both play similar roles in supply infringement. That is, both ensure 
that the product supplied is, on some level, part of the invention claimed. To briefly reiterate what 
was said above, in Fujitsu Ltd v Netgear Inc a data defragmenter was found not to be a ‘material part’ 
of a patented invention because it was not mentioned in the claims. In Nestec, Arnold J held that if a 
supplied product was ‘completely subordinate’ to the technical teachings of a patent, then it would 
not constitute an ‘essential element’. Applying this reasoning to the facts, his Honour found that 
170 It was analysed in some detail in Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177, see 190, 196; see also, United Wire v 
Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353, 357–8. 
171 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577, 596. 
172 United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland Ltd) [2000] 4 ALL ER 353. 
173 Ibid 358 (emphasis added). 
174 Schütz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] 2 ALL ER 177, 191. 
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because the coffee capsules in Nestec had a flange that guided them into the coffee extraction 
system, as specified in the claims,175 the capsules constituted an essential element.  
Neither the US or UK mechanism exists in s 117(2)(b), thus it is necessary to consider whether these 
requirements might have altered liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert. In Otsuka, aripiprazole 
was a key component of treating schizophrenia in infringing circumstances and was specifically 
mentioned in the relevant claims.176 Likewise, rosuvastatin was a key part of the patented method to 
lower cholesterol and was mentioned in the claims in AstraZeneca,177 and pregabalin was a key part 
of a patented method to treat pain and was mentioned in the claims in Lambert.178 It follows, then, 
that the drugs are likely to constitute a ‘material part’ of the inventions in question since they are 
mentioned in the claims of all three cases. Similarly, they are each likely to constitute an ‘essential 
element’ because they are pivotal factors in each patented treatment.179 As a result, if either of these 
mechanisms existed in s 117(2)(b), it is unlikely that they would have altered the outcomes of the 
Australian cases.  
F. Carve Out 
As outlined in part 2, the Australian Pharmaceutical Patent Review (the ‘PPR’) recommended 
introducing a US style carve out into s 117.180 The recommendation by the PPR was that a 
‘reasonable steps’ test should be incorporated into s 117, to relieve generic pharmaceuticals 
companies from supply infringement liability if they take reasonable measures to ensure that 
products supplied are only used for non-patented purposes.181 However, the PPR did not propose a 
specific amendment, stating, ‘[u]ltimately what constitutes a “reasonable step” will depend on the 
circumstances, and in the event of any infringement proceedings, would be a matter for the court.’182 
Despite this, the PPR did indicate that ‘clear labelling of indications which does not include infringing 
uses’,183 should generally satisfy the carve out. Whilst this carve out seems relatively simple to apply, 
before analysing whether it might change liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka, and Lambert, further 
preliminary details need to be outlined. 
First, it should be noted that the ‘reasonable steps’ test proposed by the PPR is not a carve out in the 
mould of the US legislation. As outlined above, the carve out in that jurisdiction operates via labelling 
175 Nestec SA v Dualit Ltd [2013] EWHC 923 (Pat) [69]. 
176 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [98]–[99] (Yates J). 
177 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324, 329, 335 (Besanko, Foster, Nicholas and Yates JJ). 
178Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 633 (Allsop CJ, Jagot and Nicholas JJ). 
179 Whether or not these mechanisms may solve other, related problems with the operation of s 117(2)(b) are something 
that should be borne in mind as future cases are decided. See also, Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process 
Patent under the Patents Act 1990: Does it Exist After Rescare?’ (1995) 6 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 228; 
Ann Dufty, Report to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (Monash University Law School, 1983) vol 1, 267–72. 
180 Australian Government, Pharmaceutical Patents Review (Canberra, May 2013) 138–40. 
181 Ibid 111, 138–40. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
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and the specific approval sought, and only exempts applications to supply generic drugs from liability 
under 35 USC 271(e)(2). The proposed Australian carve out does not operate in this way. As the PPR 
describes, it would carve out liability from s 117 and operate via a reasonable steps test, which, the 
PPR suggests, should be satisfied by labelling generic branded drugs with only non-infringing uses.184 
This distinction raises another point, namely, whether or not the carve out should only apply to 
drugs. The US carve out only applies to drugs,185 and the PPR only discussed it with reference to 
drugs.186 There is little doubt that pharmaceuticals are a particularly valuable type of ‘non-staple 
commercial product’ with both infringing and non-infringing uses. Despite this, though, presumably 
other valuable products exist that have these characteristics. For example, it is likely that various 
non-medicinal chemicals, such as herbicides or scientific reagents, would have such characteristics. 
Thus, in the absence of cogent reasons to limit the carve out to pharmaceuticals, it does appear it 
should apply to all products. 
With the ambit and operation of the carve out better defined, it is necessary to analyse whether it 
might have altered liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert or Otsuka. In Lambert, the generic pregabalin to 
be supplied was going to be labelled only for the non-infringing use of seizures.187 In addition, the 
generic party intended to send letters to doctors and pharmacists instructing them not to supply the 
drug for infringing purposes.188 Thus, there is a strong argument that the labels and letters would 
satisfy the reasonable steps test and supply would be exempt from infringement under s 117(2)(b) (if 
it incorporated a reasonable steps test). In AstraZeneca and Otsuka, no evidence was led of 
labelling.189 Despite this, the generic companies in AstraZeneca and Otsuka did propose sending 
letters to doctors and pharmacists instructing them to only prescribe (or dispense) the generic-
labelled drugs for non-infringing purposes.190 Supposing the contents of these letters could also be 
reproduced in labels, then it stands to reason that supply of these drugs could be exempt from s 
117(2)(b) liability as well. 
Table 5 summarises the analysis in this part on whether any of the foreign legal mechanisms might 
have altered supply infringing liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka, or Lambert . 
184 Ibid 140. 
185 35 USC 271(e)(2). 
186 Australian Government, Pharmaceutical Patents Review (Canberra, May 2013) 138–40. 
187 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 106 IPR 59, 62, 69–73. 
188 Ibid. 
189 In Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2014) 100 IPR 285 (2013) 100 IPR 285, the generic parties did propose excluding the 
infringing purpose of using 20 and 40mg dosages of rosuvastatin to treat a form of hypercholesterolemia from the label 
(see at 412), but infringement of this patent was not pursued on appeal. 
190 Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2014) 100 IPR 285 (2013) 100 IPR 285, 411; Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka 
Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 60–1. 
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Table 5 Legislative mechanisms from the UK and US, and whether they might alter s 117(2) infringement 
liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert or Otsuka 
Legal Mechanism  Comments Re: Altering liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert & 
Otsuka 
UK mental element  Unlikely to alter liability in AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert 
US subjective mental 
element  
 Irrelevant to permanent injunctive relief. Due to its wilful 
blindness component, probably not applicable to supply of drugs 
either 
Staple articles191   Would probably alter liability in AstraZeneca and Otsuka. 
Questionable whether it would alter liability in Lambert 
Implied licences  Likely to already exist in Australian law and not applicable to 
the facts in AstraZeneca, Lambert or Otsuka 
Means suitable for putting 
the invention into effect  
 Likely to already exist in Australian law in some form, and not 
applicable to the patent claims AstraZeneca, Lambert to Otsuka 
Essential element & material 
part 
 Unlikely to alter liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert and Otsuka  
Carve out   Likely to alter liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert and Otsuka 
 
IV. Which Mechanism(s) Best Fit the Benchmarks? 
In part 3, two mechanisms were identified that plausibly could have altered liability in at least one of 
the cases of AstraZeneca, Lambert or Otsuka. They were, the US ‘staple articles’ requirement and the 
carve out. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, this part evaluates whether these 
mechanisms enhance the legislature’s original justifications to enact supply infringement, namely, to 
create a more ‘certain’ and a ‘more effective, realistic and just’ enforcement system. The benchmark 
of a ‘more effective, realistic and just’ enforcement system was reasonably well articulated in the 
introduction – that is, balancing patent protection of second medical use patents, with the supply of 
generic-labelled drugs. Before proceeding though, it is useful to briefly revisit the conclusions that 
were reached in chapter 4 regarding ‘certainty’.192 
When the Australian government first mentioned the justification of ‘certainty’, it was prior to any 
type of supply infringement legislation existing, and was referring to whether liability could be found 
in any circumstances when non-patented products were supplied that could be used for infringing 
191 ‘Staple commercial products’ in the UK is not in this table because it is currently interpreted to operate the same way as 
in Australia. 
192 See Chapter 4 pt III B. 
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purposes.193 Clearly, this is not the case now, as s 117 specifically creates liability for supply in certain 
circumstances. However, the new issue with ‘certainty’ is that the case law is quite complex and, for 
lawyers and other parties that engage with patents, but who are not necessarily well versed in recent 
case law, the situation is likely to be quite confusing and less than certain.194 As summarised in 
chapter 4, whether supply of a drug will constitute infringement under s 117(2)(b) depends on a 
range of considerations including: whether doctors are advising patients to split pills; whether 
doctors will ignore labels; and knowledge of how doctors treat variations of certain diseases.195 Thus, 
the ‘certainty’ element of the law can be improved by making it easier to understand when supply of 
generic-labelled drugs will be infringing or not. 
As detailed above, if the US ‘staple articles’ mechanism existed in s 117(2)(b), supply of generic 
branded rosuvastatin (from AstraZeneca) and aripiprazole (from Otsuka) would likely be permitted. 
However, pregabalin (from Lambert) may still be restricted – the evidence of its non-infringing use 
suggested it was quite limited, thus whether or not it would be classified as a ‘staple-article’ is not 
clear. As a result, from the benchmark of ‘certainty’, the liability in AstraZeneca and Otsuka is quite 
clear (it will not arise) but in Lambert it is more ambiguous. Although liability for supplying pregabalin 
is not clear at the moment, there is substantial law on what constitutes a ‘staple product’ in the 
US.196 Consequently, it is quite likely that if better evidence of the non-infringing uses of pregabalin 
was tendered in evidence, then this question could be resolved with a relatively high degree of 
precision and therefore the mechanism would engender a high degree of certainty. 
On whether the US ‘staple articles’ mechanism would create a ‘more effective, realistic and just’ 
enforcement system, the primary consideration is whether patent protection for drugs with second 
medical uses is balanced with supply of the same drug for non-infringing uses. On this point, because 
rosuvastatin and aripiprazole have substantial non-infringing uses, a US ‘staple articles’ test will 
exempt supply from s 117(2)(b) liability without requiring suppliers to take any actions to avoid 
infringement. One outcome of this test suggesting that it is ‘realistic and just’ is that this test will 
mean generic pharmaceutical companies will not be held liable when doctors or pharmacists 
authorise or join in a common design with patients to infringe. However, this test also means that 
the ‘staple articles’ test does not offer any s 117(2)(b) protection for drugs in second medical use 
patents if they have substantial non-infringing uses. It follows, then, that although this mechanism 
avoids the problems articulated in chapter 4, it does not necessarily balance interests particularly 
193 Statement by the Minister for Science, ‘Government Response to the Report of the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee, “Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia”’, (1986) 56 Official Journal of Patents, Trade Marks and 
Designs 1462, 1477; see also Ann Monotti, ‘Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent under the Patents Act 1990: Does 
it Exist After Rescare?’ (1995) 6 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 217, 217–8. 
194 See, Chapter 4 pt III B. 
195 Ibid. 
196 See, Donald S Chisum, LexisNexis, Chisum on Patents (at Release 130-11/2011) § 17.03[3]. 
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well because without liability potentially arising under s 117(2)(b), many secondary medical use 
patents will have little effective protection. 
When the carve out is measured against the same rationales, the outcome is slightly different. As 
analysed above, the carve out would have likely altered liability in AstraZeneca, Lambert and Otsuka. 
This means that the supply of generic-labelled drugs, with appropriate labels, is likely to be exempt. 
Due to the simplicity of attracting the protection of the carve out through labelling, it also follows 
that the benchmark of certainty is likely to be met, because this outcome is quite clear and relatively 
easy to achieve. However, whether the carve out meets the rationale of a ‘more effective, realistic 
and just’ enforcement system is slightly more complicated, and warrants close examination.  
Ostensibly, the carve out effectively balances the interests of generic pharmaceutical companies and 
originator pharmaceutical companies. It does this by allowing generic companies to provide drugs 
with labels limiting them to non-infringing uses, and therefore only allows patentees to supply drugs 
with labels for patented uses. Thus, both problems articulated in chapter 4 are avoided. However, as 
the facts from AstraZeneca, Otsuka and Lambert demonstrate, whilst the carve out may balance 
interests on paper, it may not in practice. In AstraZeneca, the Full Federal Court held that is was likely 
rosuvastatin would be used for its infringing use because doctors and pharmacists knew it was 
cheaper to prescribe the generic drug and get patients to split the pills in half,197 thus it is 
questionable whether a label stating generic rosuvastatin is only to be used for a non-infringing use 
would affect this conduct. A similar analysis applies to Otsuka, except for a different reason. In that 
case, Yates J found that the infringing use would occur for therapeutic reasons, as doctors switched 
drugs to optimise patient responses.198 Thus, as there is no evidence of doctors referring to labels 
when making this switch, it is questionable whether labels, apparently delimiting certain products to 
non-infringing uses, will reduce the frequency of generic-labelled drugs being put to infringing uses. 
Moreover, this issue was perhaps most vividly demonstrated in Lambert. One of the Court’s reasons 
for finding a prima facie case of s 117(2)(b) infringement was that evidence from a pharmacist said 
that when dispensing, labels delimiting pregabalin to certain uses would not deter pharmacists from 
dispensing a generic version of the drug.199 
More broadly, off-label prescriptions are quite common and are particularly prevalent in some areas 
of medicine. A review of medical literature has found that it can vary from 7.5% to 40% of all 
prescriptions in adults.200 They are also common in paediatrics where drugs have been approved for 
197 AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 324, 418–419. 
198 Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 (29 June 2015) [52], [199], [214]. 
199 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 651–2. 
200 Gazarian et al, ‘Off-label Use of Medicines: Consensus Recommendations For Evaluating Appropriateness’ (2006) 185(10) 
Medical Journal of Australia 544, 544; see also, Krzyzanowska et al, ‘Off-Label Use of Cancer Drugs: A Benchmark is 
Established (2013) 31(9) Journal of Clinical Oncology 1125, 1125. 
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treating adults, but not yet for children.201 In these circumstances, off-label prescriptions may occur 
up to 90% of the time.202 While studies have delved into the occurrence of off-label prescriptions, 
demonstrating that they are quite commonly used, an examination of the literature does not show 
that authoritative data has been produced demonstrating how often off-label use results in patent 
infringement.203 Indeed, it is interesting to note how infrequently patent infringement issues are 
mentioned in off-label literature. In this context, then, originator pharmaceutical companies with 
patents for secondary medical indications may argue that a carve out will not sufficiently balance 
patent interests because the labelling requirement in the ‘reasonable steps’ test will not, in many 
circumstances, alter doctors prescribing (or pharmacists dispensing) generic-labelled drugs for 
infringing purposes. On its face, this is an influential argument given the cost of producing drugs is 
estimated in the billions.204 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the carve out is more ‘effective, 
realistic and just’ s 117(2)(b) for four reasons. 
First, as demonstrated above, the carve out offers more protection to patentees than the ‘staple 
articles’ mechanism does in the US under § 271(c). This is because, under a ‘staple articles’ test, 
generic pharmaceutical companies would be able to supply the drug without limiting uses of their 
product on the label. Second, although it is expected that some infringing uses of generic-labelled 
drugs would occur in Australia under a ‘reasonable steps’ tests, there is no data to suggest that the 
financial loses patentees suffer due to infringement of second medical use patents is significant. On 
the other hand, the Australian Government and patients together spent over $418 million on 
rosuvastatin in 2013, and testimony in AstraZeneca suggested that the non-infringing uses of it were 
more common than the infringing uses.205 Moreover, the PPR outlined that when generic drugs enter 
markets they reduce drug prices by 25-50%.206 It follows, then, that when generic pharmaceuticals 
enter markets for non-infringing uses, the public-orientated savings are significant. 
Third, it is likely that a Court will find that a ‘reasonable steps’ test is more nuanced than the PPR 
suggests. The reason for this is that a ‘reasonable steps’ test that is directed towards ensuring that 
201 Gazarian et al, ‘Off-label Use of Medicines: Consensus Recommendations For Evaluating Appropriateness’ (2006) 185(10) 
Medical Journal of Australia 544; Conti et al, ‘Prevalence of Off-label Use and Spending in 2010 Among Patent-Protected 
Chemotherapies in a Population-Based Cohort of Medical Oncologist’ (2013) 31(9) Journal of Clinical Oncology 1134, 1134-
5; Rebecca Dresser and Joel Frader, ‘Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and Government Oversight’ 
(2009) 37(3) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 476, 476–7. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Cf. Krzyzanowska et al, ‘Off-Label Use of Cancer Drugs: A Benchmark is Established (2013) 31(9) Journal of Clinical 
Oncology 1125, 1125. 
204 See generally, Joseph A DiMasi, Ronald W Hansen and Henry G Grabowski,, ‘The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs’ (2003) 22(2), Journal of Health Economics, 151; Matthew Herper, ‘The Cost of Creating a New 
Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma to Change’ (8 November 2013) Forbes < 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-
the-future-of-medicine/>. 
205 Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2014) 100 IPR 285 (2013) 100 IPR 285, 408–9. 
206 Australian Government, Pharmaceutical Patents Review (Canberra, May 2013) 37, 73–4. 
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products are only used for non-infringing purposes,207 is likely to allow courts to consider any factors 
which it considers relevant to generic pharmaceutical companies avoiding infringing uses of their 
drugs. Whilst labelling is one type of measure to avoid infringing use, it is quite likely that other steps 
should be taken. Sending letters is one example already identified. However, in circumstances where 
a pill-splitter can be easily used, a court may find that a reasonable step would be to create a pill in a 
shape that cannot be easily split evenly. Admittedly, if changing the shape of a pill is classified as a 
‘reasonable steps’ that should be taken, then there may be other steps that generic companies 
should take too. This may mean that the provision is less ‘certain’ than originally analysed. However, 
the primary reason to implement a reasonable steps test is to encourage companies to take all 
reasonable steps to avoid infringing use of their product. If changing the shape of a pill is cheap and 
effective and one that is apparent to generic pharmaceutical companies, then it makes sense that it 
is a step that should be taken. 
Fourth, the liability of prescribing doctors and dispensing pharmacists must be engaged with. As 
argued in chapter 4, it is quite likely that in some circumstances they may be liable for patent 
infringement.208 Clearly, pursuing doctors for patent infringement may not be a shrewd business 
decision for patentees. However, there are aspects to this liability that do not necessarily involve 
proving infringement in a court. Although these aspects take this discussion beyond patent law, and 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis, given the subject matter it is suitable to briefly consider 
them. Relevantly, the evidence in Lambert indicating that pharmacists would dispense generic 
pregabalin for treatment outside of the uses stipulated on the label (or those instructed in a letter), 
was, in part, underpinned by the witness’ belief that no ethical or legal obligations prevented them 
from doing so.209 The converse of this evidence suggests that if there was a legal or ethical obligation 
to ensure drugs were only dispensed for non-infringing purposes then the resulting use of infringing 
use by patients may fall.210 The logic here is that doctors and pharmacists are likely to follow ethical 
and legal obligations. Thus, it stands to reason that bringing the issue of doctors and pharmacists 
liability to the attention of relevant professional bodies, or perhaps just highlighting their key role in 
facilitating infringement by patients in a bid to change professional standards should be a way to 
reduce patent infringement. 
A second non-patent law avenue that can be pursued by pharmaceutical companies to prevent 
infringing uses of drugs has been recently demonstrated in the UK. In the case of Warner-Lambert Co 
LLC v Actavis Group PTC EHF,211 which concerned a second medical use patent for pregabalin, a 
207 Ibid 139. 
208 See, Chapter 4 pt III A. 
209 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632, 651. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Actavis Group PTC EHF [2015] EWHC 485 (Pat) (2 March 2015). 
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solution obtained by the patentee was to get the publicly funded health care system, the National 
Health Service, to issue guidance to doctors and pharmacists instructing them only to prescribe the 
originator’s drug for the patented use.212 The legal structure that permitted the Court to order the 
National Health Service to issue this guidance exists outside of patent law, 213 and it may be that the 
legal mechanisms that permitted this are limited to the UK. However, further research may show 
that such orders are desirable and feasible in Australia too. 
Another non-patent law avenue that may warrant further investigation is based upon commentary in 
Europe. Brian Cordery, a global patent litigator, describes how European law was designed to carve 
out supply of drugs if labelled for non-infringing uses.214 However, he also argues that this carve out 
provides insufficient protection for originator pharmaceutical companies because doctors and 
pharmacists will continue to prescribe and dispense generic-labelled drugs for infringing purposes215 
- a conclusion that overlaps with concerns described above. Indeed, Cordery asserts that, due to 
inadequate protection, originator pharmaceutical companies are now directing research and 
development resources towards new pharmaceuticals instead of investigating drugs with established 
safety records.216 Rather than amending patent law to provide greater protection to patentees to fix 
this issue, he argues that: 
it is likely that a fair solution to all parties cannot solely be achieved by revising pharmaceutical patent 
law and that it is necessary for there to be changes made to the way that medicines are prescribed, 
dispensed and reimbursed. For example, it is possible to conceive of a fair solution whereby a 
pharmacist is alerted to the indication for which a medicine is to be dispensed and will only be obliged 
to dispense the originator’s medicine where the indication is for the new patented medical use. This 
would give the originator the exclusivity for the new indication whilst giving the generics companies 
legal certainty. Such a system ought not to compromise the physician’s freedom to treat a patient 
according to the best of his or her skill and not place an undue burden on pharmacists or others 
involved in the supply of and payment for medicines.217 
The question of whether or not Cordery’s solution is actually possible would need to be pursued with 
input from various bodies, including doctors, pharmacists and government regulatory bodies. It 
would also require the production of software that could be updated remotely to notify pharmacists 
of changes in patents and uses of drugs. There is little doubt it would be a significant undertaking, 
212 Ibid [32]. 
213 Ibid [13]–[18]. 
214 Brian Cordery, ‘Use of Medicines for Carved Out Indications In Europe – Time For a Change in Approach?’ (2013) 19 
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 55, 57; this carve out is described in more detail in, Warner-Lambert Company LLC v 
Actavis Group Ptc EHF [2015] EWHC 72 (Pat) (21 January 2015) [17] (Arnold J). 
215 Ibid 57–8. 
216 Ibid 58. 
217 Ibid. 
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but it also has the capacity to better balance the various parties’ interests in production of drugs. 
Thus, it is something that requires further investigation. 
Putting the applicability of any non-patent law related mechanisms to balance the operation of s 
117(2)(b) to one side, the analysis in this part suggests that although the ‘staple articles’ test and the 
carve out both have the ability to fix the problems with the current operation of s 117, the carve out 
appears to be the best solution.  
Conclusion – A Partial Solution? 
The primary aim of this chapter was to identify a legislative amendment that could balance the 
operation of s 117(2)(b). Or, put more specifically, the aim was to balance the ability of generic 
pharmaceutical companies to supply drugs for non-infringing uses, without unfairly eroding 
protection for second medical use patents. To achieve this aim, this chapter has assessed how 
analogous legal provisions in the UK and US operate, and evaluated whether the legal mechanisms 
within them might have altered liability in the Australian cases that demonstrated the problems with 
s 117(2)(b). Following these steps, the mechanisms that could alter liability for those cases were then 
evaluated from the point of view of whether they met the legislature’s criteria of ‘certainty’ and a 
‘more effective, realistic and just’ enforcement system. At the end of this process, only the carve out, 
as recommended by the PPR as an equivalent to US legislation, appears to alter liability and meet the 
criteria. Although other non-patent law mechanisms may be needed to further balance the operation 
of interests in supplying drugs, the carve out balances the operation of the provision from a patent 
law point of view. Accordingly, law makers should proceed to drafting specific amending legislation 
as soon as possible. 
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Introduction 
In the four preceding chapters of this thesis, various issues concerning infringement causes of action 
were analysed. The remainder of this thesis now moves away from infringement causes of action and 
considers other elements of patent infringement law. This chapter considers an exemption to patent 
infringement.  
When infringement by exploitation is decided by a court in Australia, no recourse is made to the 
mental state of the alleged infringer.2  Patent infringement is a strict liability offence. However, a 
court has a discretion to refuse damages or an order for an account of profits if the infringer was not 
aware, and had no reason to believe that a patent for the invention existed. This mechanism is 
known as innocent infringement. It is not applicable to the granting of injunctions.  
Section 123 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the ‘Patents Act’) contains Australia’s current provisions 
on innocent infringement. Section 123(1) provides that, if a court is satisfied that at the time of 
infringement an infringer was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that a patent for the 
invention existed, then the court may refuse to award damages or an account of profits. Section 
123(2) provides that if patented products are ‘marked so as to indicate that they are patented in 
Australia’, and the products were sold or used in Australia ‘to a substantial extent’ before the date of 
the infringement, then the infringer is taken to be aware of the patent unless the contrary is 
established. The process of marking a product with patent related information is known as ‘patent 
marking’. This chapter is concerned with the satisfaction of the patent marking requirement. 
Since 1903, federal Australian patent law has included a provision dealing with innocent 
infringement.3 Yet in nearly 110 years, such provisions have received little academic, legislative or 
judicial attention.4 Innocent infringement under the Patents Act 1903 (Cth) was not subject to judicial 
interpretation until Philips v Myer Emporium Ltd in 1928.5 In that case, Irvine CJ criticised the 
provision, labelling it as ‘imperfectly drafted, and almost unintelligible’.6 This led to the provision 
being re-written in the Patents Act 1952 (Cth).7 The new provision was based on the British 
equivalent, which had been introduced in 1907.8 Since 1952, innocent infringement in Australian 
2 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 13, 120; M’Lean v Kettle (1883) 9 VLR (E) 145, 147–8 (Molesworth J); Proctor v Bennis (1887) 4 
RPC 333, 346 (Bristowe VC), 356–7 (Bowen LJ); Stead v Anderson (1846) 136 ER 724, 736 (Wilde CJ); see also Minnesota 
Mining & Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (1980) 144 CLR 253, 271–87 (Aickin J; Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ 
agreeing); Populin v HB Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 56 FLR 37, 41–47 (Bowen CJ, Deane and Elliott JJ). 
3 Patents Act 1903 (Cth) s 125. 
4 Colin Bodkin, Thomas Reuters, Patent Law in Australia – Annotated Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (at September 2015) [PA 
123.80]. 
5 Philips v Myer Emporium Ltd (1928) 34 ALR 76, 77 
6 Ibid 77. 
7 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 124. 
8 Patents Act 1907, 7 Edw 7, c 29, s 33; Report of the Committee Appointed by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth 
to Consider What Alterations are Desirable in the Patent Law of the Commonwealth, House of Representatives (1952) 41. 
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patent law has been the subject of a judicial opinion only once, and relatively recently in 2007.9 An 
argument could be made that the small amount of litigation and commentary indicates that the 
provision is working well. However, from the economic-based patent perspective discussed in this 
chapter, cracks in the operation of the provision appear. 
In Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer’s book, Patent Failure,10 the authors argue that 
patent law has failed to require patentees to notify and articulate the boundaries of their rights in 
technology, which therefore disrupts the operation of patents as incentives for economic growth. 
Bessen and Meurer build their ‘notice failure’ thesis on four arguments: 
(1) patent claim language is vague and unpredictable;11 
(2) patent claim laws allow technology to be claimed that is not adequately disclosed;12 
(3) some patent claim information is not readily available;13 and 
(4) the large numbers of patents and fragmentation of patent rights in technology, otherwise 
known as patent thickets, makes identifying technology already invented difficult.14 
Bessen and Meurer use these arguments to demonstrate how, in many instances, patents have not 
operated as well demarcated pieces of property, efficiently allocating resources,15 but as a ‘tax’ on 
innovation causing inefficiencies. Two particular types of inefficiencies the authors focus upon are: 
increased transaction costs in the form of search and information costs;16 and litigation. Both, they 
argue, could be avoided if rights in technology are unambiguous.17  The focus of this chapter is on 
Bessen and Meurer’s third argument: that patents fail to fulfil their economic role when information 
about the breadth of the property rights claimed cannot be readily accessed.18  In Patent Failure, 
Bessen and Meurer’s argument focuses on the ability, or strategy, of patentees to hide claims during 
the application process in the US.19 This chapter extends that reasoning to innocent infringement and 
patent marking. In short, the argument is that opaque patent rights created by inadequate marking is 
contrary to contemporary patent theory, causing unnecessary transaction costs and information 
asymmetries. 
9 Unilin Beeher BV v Huili Building Materials Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 74 IPR 345. 
10 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) ch 1. 
11 Ibid 54–62. 
12 Ibid 64–8. 
13 Ibid 62–3. 
14 Ibid 68–72. 
15 Ibid 47–52. 
16 Ibid 10–1, 50, 69–71. Although it should be noted Bessen and Meurer do not use the term ‘transaction costs’ to describe 
additional or increased search or information costs. However, Carl J Dahlman describes them this way in his seminal work, 
‘The problem of externality’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 141, 148. 
17 Ibid ch 2. Bessen and Meurer support their arguments with a survey of empirical evidence on tangible and intellectual 
property. They show that unlike tangible property in which there is little confusion about boundaries and has clear 
economic payoffs, no similar economic payoff has been observed for patent rights, see chs 4–6. 
18 Ibid 62–3. 
19 Ibid. 
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Part 1 of this chapter begins by outlining the concept and rationale for innocent infringement and 
patent marking in the context of contemporary patent law theory. In a later article, Meurer, together 
with Peter Menell, briefly address the issue of patent marking, but not in detail and not in reference 
to marking with patent numbers.20 US and UK patent law specifies that for notice to be effected 
through patent marking, a patent number must be included.21 One of the arguments advanced in this 
chapter is that patent marking with patent numbers reduces transaction costs and therefore 
increases the overall efficiency of the patent regime.22  However, Australian legislation does not 
specify that a patent number must be included when patent marking.  
The only post-1952 Australian judicial opinion on innocent infringement is that of Allsop J in Unilin 
Beeher BV v Huili Building Materials Pty Ltd (No 2), (‘Unilin’),23 in which he considered it in obiter. This 
chapter offers a more expansive interpretation of s 123 of the Patents Act, with particular focus on 
identifying what marks are sufficient to discharge notice requirements, including whether patent 
numbers are required by implication. It becomes clear from this statutory interpretation that patent 
numbers are not required when patent marking in Australia. The need for reform of innocent 
infringement is then considered with reference to the transaction costs that can be observed when 
patent numbers are not required. It is argued that s 123 should be amended: patent numbers should 
be required to satisfy patent marking requirements. Moreover, this should be achieved by a 
mechanism similar to that used in the UK. 
Part 2 of this chapter addresses ‘virtual patent marking’. Virtual patent marking refers to the practice 
of marking a patented product with the term ‘patented’, ‘together with an address of a posting on 
the Internet’.24 In the US, patent holders have recently been afforded the option to mark patented 
products using virtual patent marks.25 This is in addition to retaining the non-virtual, or ‘traditional’, 
way of marking (with the term ‘patented’ and a patent number).26 In principle, the case for 
implementing virtual marking in Australia is quite straight forward. Virtual marking can enhance the 
notice function of patent marking, while at the same time generally lowering its cost, and simplifying 
international trade. However, before instituting virtual marking amendments in Australia, legislators 
should consider additional aspects of virtual marking, and traditional marking, to create the most 
efficient innocent infringement law. 
20 Nor have any other authors. For a brief review of applications of ‘notice problems’, see, Peter S Menell and Michael J 
Meurer, ‘Notice Failure and Notice Externalities’ (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 4–5, 37–8. 
21 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 62(1); 35 USC § 287(a). 
22 By ‘patent number’ the author is referring to any number associated with a patent that can uniquely identify it and can 
be easily used to search websites to locate the patent. 
23 Unilin Beeher BV v Huili Building Materials Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 74 IPR 345; see also Woodbridge Foam Corp v AFCO 
Automotive Foam Components Pty Ltd (2002) 58 IPR 56, 59–60 where it was briefly assessed for whether material facts had 
been plead in support of the ‘defence’. 
24 35 USC § 287(a). 
25 Ibid as amended by America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L No 112-29, § 16. 
26 Ibid. 
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Before exploring the substantive arguments in this chapter it is necessary to briefly outline other 
issues that are relevant but beyond the scope of this work. First, under s 123(1), notice of patent 
rights can be established without a market product and therefore without patent marking. Notice of 
patent rights in scenarios without a market product raises a myriad of additional issues that have 
been outlined by Bessen and Meurer, and Meurer and Menell.27  In effect, the issue of patent 
marking a market product, as addressed here, is a relatively distinct ancillary issue. However, as 
explored in this chapter, these scenarios do overlap. Since the focus of this chapter is on patent 
marking of market products, it will be assumed that the law regarding the discharge of notice 
without a market product is, more or less, consistent with patent law theory, but still susceptible to 
reform. Meurer and Menell do discuss a broad range policy ideas and considerations for notice in 
circumstances of no market products, but make no specific recommendations.28 
Second, this chapter builds on the fact that the potential loss of monetary remedies when a product 
is not marked as patented, operates to incentivise patent marking. However, as innocent 
infringement does not affect the award of injunctions, the incentive may not always operate because 
some patent holders only require injunctions. Commentators have begun to investigate the role of 
notice in limiting the award of injunctions.29 However, the complex nature of injunctions, not least 
their equitable basis,30  means that many of the arguments required to evaluate this issue are not 
addressed here. 
Finally, the arguments in this chapter also have further implications for various aspects of patent 
practice, particularly patent marking obligations for licensees and licensors. Important questions 
include: when will licensees be required to mark with a licensor’s patent numbers; and in what 
circumstances will licensees be liable for financial relief a licensor is denied because the licensee 
failed to mark properly? While these considerations have been addressed in the US,31 their resolution 
in Australia is not immediately clear. Accordingly, further work may be needed to ensure innocent 
infringement law is achieving desired outcomes. 
27 See, Peter S Menell and Michael J Meurer, ‘Notice Failure and Notice Externalities’ (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 1; 
James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) chs 1–3, 10. 
28 Ibid 29–50. 
29 Herbert Hovenkamkp, ‘Response Notice and Patent Remedies’ (2011) 88 Texas Law Review 221, 224–31; Peter S Menell 
and Michael J Meurer, ‘Notice Failure and Notice Externalities’ (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 45–6. 
30 Relevantly, in considering whether to award an injunction various factors are taken into account including, laches (Cabot 
Corp v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 697, 709–711), dishonesty, unconscionablility (Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty 
Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 213, 241; Turner v General Motors (Australia) Pty Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 
352, 366 (per Isaccs J), 369–70 (per Dixon J)), and undue hardship that will be suffered defendants (Samsung Electronics Co 
Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257, 273–7). 
31 Amsted Industries Inc v Buckeye Steel Casing, 23 F 3d 374 (Fed Cir, 1994); Steve C Sereboff, ‘New Requirements in Patent 
Marking and Notice’ (1994) 76 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 793. 
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I. Traditional Marking 
A. The Concept and Rationale of Innocent Infringement 
The leading contemporary theory underpinning the existence of the patent system is that patents 
encourage innovation by providing an exclusive property right that allows a party to generate profits 
otherwise unobtainable without a patent.32  Although the profits generated are supranormal, they 
are, in theory, offset by the cost that would otherwise be encountered if the invention were not 
developed under the patent system, or not developed at all.33  Broadly speaking this is an economic 
utilitarian theory, designed to increase social and economic welfare.34 
One of the challenges with this utilitarian justification for patent rights is that they exist in the 
background of a market economy, which relies on free competition.35  Generally speaking, free 
competition leads to greater market efficiency and therefore increased social welfare.36  
Consequently, through a meta-economic lens, it is logical that patent infringement remedies should 
be limited to an injunction when an infringer is not aware, or has no reason to be aware of a patent, 
because there is a default state in the economy that market products are open to competition.37  
Patent marking signals a deviation from the default of free competition. It indicates to a competitor, 
or potential competitor,38 that a patent right is attached to a product. Without patent marking, or 
any other appropriate type of notice, competitors should be allowed to assume that if they are 
infringing a patent they are doing so innocently and will therefore not be held liable for damages or 
an account of profits. 
This type of reasoning is analogous to that of the US Supreme Court in Bonito Boats Inc v Thunder 
Craft Boats Inc.39 In that case, when discussing US intellectual property marking provisions, O’Connor 
J, writing for a unanimous Court stated:  
The availability of damages in an infringement action is made contingent upon affixing a notice of 
patent to the protected article. The notice requirement is designed ‘for the information of the public,’ 
and provides a ready means of discerning the status of the intellectual property embodied in an article 
32 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
13. 
33 Ibid 20. Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–8. 
34 William Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ in Stephen Munzer (ed), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of 
Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 168, 169. 
35 By free competition, the author is referring to markets that anyone can enter and are not regulated. 
36 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) 11–18; Economic Planning Advisory Council, ‘Promoting Competition in Australia’ 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989) 5–6; Philip L Williams, ‘Why regulate for competition?’ in 
Michael James (ed), Regulating for Competition? (The Centre for Independent Studies Ltd, 1989) 13, 13–6. 
37 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
23. 
38 For ease of reference the rest of this chapter will refer to a competitor and a potential competitor as simply a competitor. 
39 Bonito Boats Inc v Thunder Craft Boats Inc, 489 US 141 (1989). 
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of manufacture or design. The public may rely upon the lack of notice in exploiting shapes and designs 
accessible to all.40 
Connected to the economic utilitarian arguments for patent law is the justification that patent law 
encourages disclosure of new technology.41  One of the costs that may be encountered in an 
economy without a patent regime is that an explanation of how an invention operates is not 
provided.42 The exchange of an explanation of how a new invention works for exclusive rights in the 
technology is commonly known as ‘disclosure theory’.43  Patent marking has the capacity to enhance 
disclosure. If marking serves as a signpost of a detailed explanation of a technological advance that 
supports a market product, then it allows researchers and competitors to directly understand what 
has been achieved. Moreover, unlike trawling patent or scientific literature in a bid to obtain 
technological insight, patent marking serves as a physical embodiment of patent claims – more so 
than any preferred embodiment in patent specifications. 
To further explore the rationale for innocent infringement in patent law, it is interesting to compare 
the notice function in copyright. Copyright material typically carries a message about what is 
protected and for how long. For example, books, scripts, music, and art work usually have a 
publication/production date and it is implicit that the expression in such works is protected. As a 
result, there is no specific need to pinpoint any right that protects any given copyright work to put 
potential infringers on notice that such rights exist (although such notice is often included). This is 
unlike the situation with regard to patents, where being told a product is protected by a patent does 
not give notice to a third party as to what aspect of the invention is protected, nor how long for. 
B. Interpretation of s 123 
The patent in Unilin claimed a type of interlocking floor panel, and manufacturing thereof.44  
Pursuant to the patent, infringement proceedings were initiated against six parties that were 
involved in importing and selling floor panels not authorised by the patentee.45  All six respondents 
were found liable for infringement.46 The case primarily addressed the quantum of profits to be 
accounted for.47 On this point, the fifth respondent raised innocent infringement in its pleading but 
settled prior to the trial.48  Although the remaining respondents did not formally plead innocent 
infringement, Allsop J addressed the issue because it had been mentioned in response to a letter of 
40 Ibid 161–2 (citations ommitted); see also, Nike Inc v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 138 F 3d 1437, 1443 (Fed Cir, 1998). 
41 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
326–33; Mark Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709, 745.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Mark Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709, 711; Kamal Idris, Intellectual 
Property: A Power Tool for Economic Growth (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2004) 24. 
44 Unilin Beeher BV v Huili Building Materials Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 74 IPR 345, 361. 
45 Ibid 354–5. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 345–6. 
48 Ibid 361. 
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demand.49 In examining, innocent infringement, his Honour identified evidence that showed the 
applicant had significant sales and that the packaging on the applicant’s product had been labelled 
with patent related marks, including: ‘patented technology’, European and US patent numbers, and 
an Australian patent number.50 However, Allsop J did not discuss how the different marks discharged 
notice requirements under s 123(1) and (2). Instead, based on the totality of evidence, his Honour 
concluded the respondents were aware of the applicants’ patent during the course of infringement.51 
A thorough interpretation of s 123 is offered below using the markings from Unilin as guidance. 
Specifically, it evaluates whether the standalone phrase ‘patented technology’,52 or the term 
‘patented’ when followed by a foreign or Australian patent number is sufficient to satisfy the marking 
requirements in s 123(1) or (2).53 In addition, due to the drafting of s 123(2), the question of whether 
the phrase ‘patented in Australia’ is sufficient is also considered. The core elements and relevant 
tests from s 123 have been set out in the introduction to this chapter. However, to properly interpret 
the section, it is necessary to have reference to the full text:54 
(1) A court may refuse to award damages, or to make an order for an account of profits, in respect of 
an infringement of a patent if the defendant satisfies the court that, at the date of the infringement, 
the defendant was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that a patent for the invention existed.  
(2) If patented products, marked so as to indicate that they are patented in Australia, were sold or 
used in the patent area to a substantial extent before the date of the infringement, the defendant is to 
be taken to have been aware of the existence of the patent unless the contrary is established.  
(3) Nothing in this section affects a court’s power to grant relief by way of an injunction.55 
Section 123(2) is dealt with first because it specifically addresses patent marking. Before analysing 
each of the four marks at issue, though,56  it is necessary to note two contingent elements of the 
section. First, in Unilin no issue was raised with respect to marking the packaging of products. This is 
notable because this form of marking is not specifically provided for in the Patents Act, and therefore 
it could be questioned whether marking a product’s packaging is sufficient to discharge notice 
49 Ibid 368. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid 369. 
52 For most purposes the phrase ‘patented technology’ can probably be considered equivalent to ‘patented’. 
53 The standalone word ‘patented’ is not considered in this chapter because it is considered synonymous with the 
tautologous phrase ‘patented technology’. 
54 As the High Court stated in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46–7, 
‘[t]his Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the 
text itself’. 
55 Patents Act 1990 (Cth). It is also worth noting that Bodkin has mentioned that a literal reading of s 123 may mean that 
any infringement of a patent application is innocent. However, as Bodkin mentions, this would be inconsistent with s 57(1) 
of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). This chapter will proceed on the basis that s 123 applies to both patent applications and 
granted patents (see Colin Bodkin, Thompson Reuters, Patent Law in Australia – Annotated Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (at 
September 2015) [PA 123.100]. 
56 Namely ‘patented technology’, the European patent number, the US patent number and the Australian patent number. 
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requirements. However, marking a product’s packaging probably comes within the definition of 
‘product’ in s 123(2). The rationale for this conclusion is that it would be impractical if marking 
packaging and associated information distributed with products could not effect notice. Indeed, in 
some circumstances marking the actual product could affect its functionality, for example, 
toothpaste.57 Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will assume that marking packaging is 
sufficient to effect notice. Second, for patent marking requirements to be discharged under s 123(2), 
the marked products must be ‘sold or used in the patent area to a substantial extent before the date 
of infringement’.58 While this could be a contentious question of fact in litigation, this chapter is 
concerned with products that are widely used or sold, and will proceed assuming at least one of 
these requirements are satisfied. 
As a starting point, it is suggested that marking a product with either ‘patented technology’ or 
‘patented’ followed by a foreign patent number, do not discharge notice requirements under s 
123(2). This outcome is arrived at because the section explicitly states, ‘marked so as to indicate it is 
patented in Australia’,59  but ‘indicate’ is not defined in the Patents Act. The Macquarie Dictionary 
definition of ‘indicate’ is: (1) ‘to be a sign of; betoken; imply’; (2) ‘to point out or point to; direct 
attention to’; (3) ‘to show, or make known’; (4) ‘to state or express, especially briefly or in a general 
way’.60 Analysing each of these definitions, it is quite clear that the marks ‘patented technology’ or 
‘patented’ followed by a foreign patent number, are not signs of an Australian patent, nor do they 
‘point out’, ‘direct attention to’, ‘show, or make it known’ that a relevant Australian patent exists. 
While the marks indicate that a product is patented, there is no link to an Australian patent. The 
phrase could refer to patent protection anywhere in the world. 
There are two remaining arguments that the marks in question could establish notice under s 123(2). 
Both rely on arguing that an Australian patent is ‘indicated’ because it can be ‘implied’ from them. 
First, from the circumstances of a product being sold in Australia, use of the marks ‘implies’ an 
Australian patent exists. However, this argument appears to fall outside the test prescribed by s 
123(2). The required test is whether the mark indicates, or as the definition of ‘indicate’ suggests, 
whether the mark implies that the product is patented in Australia, not whether the circumstances 
do. The second argument is if it was generally acknowledged that a patent in another country implies 
that a patent existed in Australia, then it could be argued that a foreign mark indicates an Australian 
patent. However, no such relationships have been shown in patent literature, and for the 
jurisdictions mentioned in Unilin, data from the World Intellectual Property Organisation does not 
support such a contention. In 2011 the Australian Patent Office received 25,526 patent 
57 See also, 35 USC § 287(a); Sessions v Romadka, 145 US 29, 49–50 (1892). 
58 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123(2). 
59 Ibid (emphasis added). 
60 Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, Online 6th ed, 2013). 
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applications.61 By contrast, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) received 503,582 
and the European Patent Office, 142,793.62  In terms of patents in force by domestic office, as of 
2011: Australia had 105,463, the US 2,113,626, Germany 527,917 and the UK 445,380.63  Some 
jurisdictions have laws that influence the number of patents that are lodged, for example, unity of 
invention in the US,64 or methods of medical treatment in Europe.65  But it is unlikely such laws 
compensate for such dramatic differences. There are significantly more patents in the US and Europe 
compared to Australia. Consequently, it could not be implied that an Australian patent exists based 
on a US or European patent. 
In reference to the other marks, there is little doubt that ‘patented in Australia’ satisfies the test of 
‘marked so as to indicate it is patented in Australia’. It seems logical too that if the word ‘patented’ is 
followed by an Australian patent number, then this would be sufficient because the number 
‘signifies’ an Australian patent. A consequence of the phrase ‘patented in Australia’ satisfying the 
criterion for patent marking under s 123(2) is that there is no requirement to mark with a patent 
number. 
Turning to address whether the four marks contemplated satisfy s 123(1), the test is ‘if the defendant 
… had no reason to believe a patent for the invention existed’. A preliminary issue in interpreting this 
provision is whether the test is subjective or objective, that is, whether ‘reason to believe’ is 
evaluated from the subjective perspective of the defendant, or a ‘reasonable person’ in the position 
of the defendant. The UK test, on which the Australian provision is modelled, states, if the ‘defendant 
… at the date of the infringement … was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for supposing, 
that the patent existed’.66  The UK case of Lancer Boss Ltd v Henley Forklift Co Ltd,67 interpreted the 
use of the term ‘reasonable’ to imply an objective test.68  Looking to analogous provisions in the 
Patents Act, the phrase ‘reason to believe’ in s 117(2)(b) has been interpreted to impart an objective 
test.69 Indeed, the presence of a ‘reason’ suggests the search is for something external to the 
infringer, which can be objectively identified. Since s 123 concerns notification of people of patent 
rights, it seems sensible that it is an objective test. This would promote efficient passage of 
information about patent rights, and prohibit people from burying their heads in the sand and 
61 World Intellectual Property Office, World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO Economic and Statistics Series, 2012) 49. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid 79. Results from Germany and the UK were used because they are the European countries with the most patents in 
force. 
64 35 USC § 121. 
65 European Patent Convention, art 53(c). 
66 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 62(1). 
67 Lancer Box Ltd v Henley Forklift Co Ltd [1974] FSR 14. 
68 Ibid [27] affd Texas Iron Works Inc’s Patent [2000] RPC 207, 235.  
69 Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 59 (Emmett J), 73–4 (Bennet J), 90 (Greenwood 
J); Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549, 573 (French J); see also Chapter 2 pt II B; Chapter 4 pt II A. It has also 
been interpreted to be subjectively satisfied if evidence suggests that the person in question knew of the relevant facts, 
Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (2013) 296 ALR 50, 73–4 (Bennet J); see also Chapter 5 pt III A. 
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claiming subjective ignorance. As a result, this chapter will proceed assuming the test in s 123(1) is 
objective.  
On this interpretation of s 123(1), it seems clear that the phrases ‘patented in Australia’, and 
‘patented’ followed by an Australian patent number, would give reason to believe that a patent 
exists for the invention. More contentious enquiries are whether products marked with the phrases 
‘patented technology’, or ‘patented’ followed by a foreign patent number, provides a reason to 
believe a patent for the invention exists. However, before analysing these individual marks, there is a 
contingent issue of whether notice under s 123(1) can only be effected by notice of an Australian 
patent or any patent in the world. The text in s 123(1) refers to whether ‘a patent … existed’,70 not 
whether an Australian  patent existed. A literal reading of these words suggests that marking a 
product with the phrase ‘patented technology’, or ‘patented’ followed by any patent number, 
including a foreign patent number, will effect notice. However, since the dictionary in the Patents Act 
defines ‘patent’ to mean ‘a standard or innovation patent’ – which are, of course, references to 
Australian patents - notice under s 123(1) is logically limited to notice of an Australian patent. It is 
therefore relevant to ask whether the term ‘patented technology’, or the term ‘patented’ followed 
by a foreign filing number, can give an objective reason to believe an Australian patent exists. 
As a general rule, there appear to be strong arguments that either mark could give an infringer 
reason to believe that an Australian patent does exist. In the case of a product marked ‘patented 
technology’, this is based on the simple reasoning that if it is sold or used in Australia then a person 
may believe a patent exists because it is marked ‘patented’ and is sold within Australia. Similarly, the 
term ‘patented’ followed by a foreign patent number on the same product sold in Australia would 
provide a reason to believe an Australian patent exists because it is widely known that patent 
protection is obtained in multiple jurisdictions, and it makes sense that if the product is sold in 
Australia, there is similar protection to give the patent holder monopoly profits. Although these 
patent marks may generally convey a reason to believe a patent for an invention exists, the test 
would include any other relevant facts, and such facts could conceivably indicate a patent does not 
exist. For example, if a product looks like it is 50 years old then there may be no reason to believe 
that a patent exists. Or, if a product has existed for 10 years in another country, is generally not 
available in Australia, and is marked ‘patented technology’ or ‘patented’ followed by a foreign patent 
number, then there may also be no reason to believe an Australian patent exists.  
Another consideration in the interpretation of s 123 is its relationship with the false patent marking 
provision in s 178(2) of the Patents Act.  This provision is examined in detail in the next chapter of 
this thesis, but it is necessary to briefly address it here due to its relevance to marking with patent 
70 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123(1). 
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numbers.71 Section 178(2) specifies, ‘[a] person must not falsely represent that an article sold by him 
or her is patented in Australia, or is the subject of an application for a patent in Australia.’72  Section 
178(3) defines the terms ‘patent’, ‘patented’, ‘provisional patent’ and any other terms implying a 
patent has been obtained in Australia to constitute a representation that a patent has been obtained 
in Australia. This means that if a product is marked with one of the terms ‘patented technology’, 
‘patented in Australia’, or ‘patented’ followed by an Australian patent number, and there is, in fact, 
no relevant Australian patent then this section is probably contravened. 
On this basis, s 178(2) could operate as a restraint on patent marking in Australia, particularly the 
term ‘patented technology’. If exporters want to use this as a generic term on products exported to 
countries both with and without patent protection, they risk prosecution for false patent marking. In 
Australia, this could lead to a $10,200 fine.73 However, in reality the risk of prosecution for false 
patent marking is low.74  Since the equivalent of s 178(2) of the Patents Act was incorporated into 
Australian patent law in the Patents Act 1952 (Cth),75  there have been no recorded prosecutions for 
false patent marking, and communications with IP Australia indicate permission has never been 
sought to begin prosecution under the provision.76  As a result, the take home messages from this 
discussion, then, is that although s 178(2) has the capacity to prohibit some false marks, without 
having been used, it offers questionable utility. Similarly, s 178(2) will not operate to require patent 
marks include patent numbers. 
On the whole, the interpretation above of s 123(1) and (2) draws some interesting conclusions. 
Subject to context pointing away from patent protection in Australia, all four of the patent marks in 
Unilin are likely to give rise to notice under s 123(1). On the other hand, under s 123(2), the provision 
specifically designed for patent marking, only the marks ‘patented in Australia’ or ‘patented’ 
followed by an Australian patent number are sufficient to establish notice. On this basis, s 123(1) 
appears to be a much broader test. Moreover, whilst s 123(2) does present an infringer with the 
opportunity to rebut the presumption of notice under the subsection, an infringer is unlikely to 
garner innocent infringement protection in these circumstances for two reasons. First, if patent 
marking is effected, for an infringer to successfully plead innocent infringement they must prove that 
they were unaware a patent existed for the product – a difficult task given they have been found to 
infringe a market product that is sold or used to a substantial extent. Second, even if they do rebut 
the presumption they must prove that they had no reason to believe a patent for the product existed 
71 See generally, Chapter 7. 
72 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 178(2). 
73 See, Chapter 7 pt II A; see also, Johnathon E Liddicoat and Dianne Nicol, ‘Re-Evaluating False Patent Marking in Australia’ 
(2013) 22 Journal of Law, Information and Science 128, 145–6. 
74 See ibid 146. As described in ibid 147–51 litigation could also be brought under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) but this will not mandate patent numbers must be used when marking either. 
75 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 174. 
76 Email from Nathan Madsen, Senior Examiner of Patents, IP Australia, to Johnathon Liddicoat, 30 April 2013. 
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under s 123(1). As a side note, this breadth may explain why the provision has not been litigated 
much, given that most marks would appear to discharge notice requirements. 
C. Transaction Costs Related to the Current Operation of Innocent Infringement, and How s 123 
Should Be Amended 
Since s 123 is unlikely to require a product to be marked with a patent number to effect notice, it 
follows that although a person may be deemed to have notice of a patent, they do not know which 
patent, or what the limits of the patent rights are – a clear case of an information asymmetry. There 
are also various reasons why patentees may not want to mark products with a patent number. For 
example, patentees would have to mark products in each jurisdiction with different patent 
numbers,77 which immediately informs competitors what protection applies to their products, and 
there would be an aesthetic effect on the presentation and marketing of the product. As a result, 
unless patentees have an incentive to mark with a patent number, this suggests that in many 
situations they are unlikely to be used. 
Since, as established above, patent marking indicates a deviation from the default of free 
competition by indicating a property right is attached to an item, but competition and information is 
needed to create the most efficient market, then to the greatest reasonable extent, marking should 
delimit patent rights protecting a product. Clearly, printing the entire patent specification on a 
product is absurd,78 but marking with a patent number may be a fair compromise. This idea is 
explored in various scenarios below. 
It is risky for a competitor to operate without knowing the limits of patent rights protecting a market 
product because there is a chance an infringement action could be brought against them.79  In 
general, for a party to locate patent information without a domestic patent number, they must 
either hire a patent attorney, contact the manufacturer and ask for patent details (which the 
manufacturer is under no obligation to provide), or invest a significant amount of time searching a 
database on the Internet. Admittedly, Australian patent specifications are available for free on IP 
Australia’s AusPat website, as well as various other databases.80 By searching a database on the 
Internet there is a chance that a competitor will find the relevant patent, but there is also a 
77 This may be an expensive task, for example in, Pequignot v Solo Cup, 646 F Supp 2d 790, 793 it was estimated that it 
would cost over US$500,000 to change engraving moulds. 
78 Although this idea is on its face absurd, the second half of this chapter discusses virtual marking. If the approach this 
chapter advocates is endorsed then the outcome would be that every product marked would, in effect, be marked with the 
entire patent specification. 
79 The author acknowledges that, regarding a foreign patent number, it is possible to use a website such as the European 
Patent Office’s Escapenet <http://www.escapenet.com> to get an Australia patent number, which can then be used to 
search IP Australia’s Auspat website <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/auspat> to retrieve patent information. However, the 
author considers this to be beyond the capacity of the average competitor without expending too many resources. 
80 AusPat, IP Australia <www.ipaustralia.gov.au/auspat>; see also n 78. 
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significant chance they will not – patent searching is an often overlooked professional skill.81 Hiring a 
patent attorney will probably result in identifying all the relevant patents applicable to a product, 
however, highlighting the difficulty in patent searching, this is not certain either. Key patents are 
sometimes missed in such processes. Indeed, a crucial fact in the recent US Supreme Court case of 
Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA,82  was that patent attorneys failed to identify the patent 
infringed.83  Moreover, the financial cost of obtaining professional advice can be significant and for 
some competitors prohibitive, often costing thousands of dollars.84 
In the alternative that a patent number is provided, anyone can insert the number into AusPat and 
retrieve: patent specifications, bibliographic data, e-register, e-dossier, lifecycle details, 
fee/publication history, ownership details, and any details of oppositions, disputes and 
amendments.85  Moreover, with a patent number, a competitor can easily discover whether a patent 
has expired, or whether a patent relates to the whole product, a method to create a product, a 
specific use of a product, or an aspect of a product’s functionality. 
Since searching the AusPat database immediately reveals the status of a patent (that is, whether it is 
granted, lapsed etc), in some circumstances all that would be required for a competitor to ‘work 
around the patent’, or directly use the previously patent protected technology if the patent is no 
longer in force, is the patent number. This point, and others described above, can be illustrated using 
a hypothetical fact situation loosely based on the famous Australian case, National Research 
Development Corp v Commissioner of Patents (‘NRDC‘).86  This provides a good case study to illustrate 
the advantages of patent numbers, particularly to people unfamiliar with patent searching and 
prosecution. 
In NRDC the High Court held that a new use for a known chemical as an herbicide was patentable 
subject matter.87  As the patent in NRDC  was granted for a method to kill weeds, it is conceivable 
that a container for the herbicide could have ‘patented in Australia’ or something akin printed on it – 
a phrase likely to establish notice under s 123(1) and (2).88 If an agronomist uses this chemical and 
discovers a method that allows the chemical to be used as a selective pesticide, the agronomist may 
want to exploit the invention – with or without patent protection. To exploit the invention without 
81 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) 48–51; See, Stanley P Kowalski, 
‘Freedom to Operate: The Preparations’ in A Krattiger et al (eds), Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices (Oxford and PIPRA, 2007) 1329; Peter S Menell and Michael J Meurer, 
Notice Failure and Notice Externalities (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 2–6. 
82 Global-Tech Appliances Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060 (2011). 
83 Ibid 2060. 
84 A recent paper estimated the cost of an FTO for ‘a single patent’ to be around US$20,000 see, McKernan et al, ‘DREAMing 
of a patent-free human genome for clinical sequencing’ (2013) 31 Nature Biotechnology 884, 884. 
85 AusPat, IP Australia <http://pericles.ipaustralia.gov.au/ols/auspat/>. 
86 National Research Development Corp v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
87 Ibid 261, 279. 
88 See part I A. 
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the risk of patent infringement, the agronomist may have to try to negotiate a licence or work 
around the patent. This would be a cost intensive process due to the difficulties in identifying the 
patent. There is a chance the agronomist may abandon the idea. On the other hand, a patent 
number would make this significantly easier and probably allow the agronomist to see the patent 
only covers the use of the chemical as an herbicide.89 
A general argument against requiring patent numbers when patent marking is that since many 
patents are written in a language that is difficult to understand, there is little utility in making them 
more accessible. However, if patents are going to be understood, one of the classes of people who 
will understand them is competitors since they usually operate in the same field. Moreover, although 
specifics of an invention may be obscured in a patent to everyone but a patent attorney practising in 
the area, recognising whether a patent pertains to the whole product, an element of the product, a 
specific use of the product, or a method, is significantly easier and commercially valuable.  
In the event that the agronomist wanted to obtain patent protection for use of the chemical as a 
pesticide, then, during the application and examination processes, both the agronomist’s patent 
attorney and the relevant examiner would likely identify the NRDC patent. In this scenario it is 
possible the existing patent would not prevent the granting of a new patent for want of novelty or 
inventive step. However, in an alternate reality where the NRDC patent did prevent the agronomist 
from claiming the chemical for use as a pesticide, it would have been more simple and efficient for 
the agronomist to look up the patent using the patent number and see that use as a pesticide was 
already claimed. 
Beyond the patent marking scenarios already considered. It is also possible that a product is falsely 
marked as ‘patented’ and no patent actually exists.90 This situation is also dealt with in more detail in 
the next chapter, however its relevance to innocent infringement is that if false patent marking is 
completed with a patent number then an interested party can resolve this issue quickly. But if the 
number is not available, they must resort to identifying the patent themselves or paying someone 
else to. All of which is quite confusing since they are looking for something that does not exist.  
More broadly, it is necessary to acknowledge that much of the foregoing reasoning is implicitly built 
upon the idea of a lone, lay inventor; a misconception that perhaps many commentators and jurists 
share.91 The reality is that many patents are paid for and owned or controlled by companies that pay 
89 The author acknowledges that it may be beyond the average innovator to know of IP Australia’s AusPat website 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/auspat> but in the author’s experience, often inserting application numbers or serial 
numbers into Google retrieves the relevant patent. Moreover, conducting an internet search using search terms akin to 
‘search Australian patents’ or ‘Australia(n) patent(s)’ often returns links to the AusPat database. 
90 See generally, Chapter 7; see also, Johnathon E Liddicoat and Dianne Nicol, ‘Re-Evaluating False Patent Marking in 
Australia’ (2013) 22 Journal of Law, Information and Science 128. 
91 See generally, Mark Lemley, ‘The Myth of the Sole Inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709. 
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researchers to invent. The significance of this is that companies are likely to be more patent-savvy 
than lone inventors. Notably, companies often employ in-house IP managers to produce patent 
landscapes and freedom-to-operate analyses (‘FTOs’) before too much time and effort is invested in 
research and development.92 Indeed, FTOs are often part of routine risk management processes 
associated with the development of new products. In such scenarios, as projects develop, external 
parties (patent attorney or law firms) are also likely to be contracted to perform more detailed FTOs 
before a patent application is filed, and often before too many resources are invested in 
commercialisation. Moreover, when potential research and development partners consider joining a 
project they will often undertake additional FTOs and landscaping. This means that patent marking in 
these circumstances may be redundant because patent searches will be repeated numerous times 
and any patents will have already been identified through this process. 
While it is possible that patent marking may be redundant in some scenarios, as a general rule patent 
searching is expensive and may not be within the financial means of many inventors. This may be 
particularly problematic for backyard inventors, academics and cash-lean companies. Moreover, 
even if searching is affordable, it does not always occur. Indeed, in some industries it is common to 
ignore patents, whilst in others it is more common to undertake FTO analyses.93 Regardless, patent 
numbers will still simplify searches and make FTOs easier. In addition, a range of other useful 
information is provided once a patent entry is accessed. For example, in addition to the information 
listed above, patent entries contain relevant patent classification codes, names of inventors, citing 
patents and cited patents and names of applicants. The patent classification codes allow searches to 
be conducted using codes that have been applied to key patents. Similarly, citation lists quite often 
include the most relevant patents without having to look any further, and like all other good 
literature searching, forms a means of research itself. 
In other scenarios, where companies do not conduct FTOs and landscape analyses as a matter of 
course, they may still need to identify patent rights before they conduct certain activities. This may 
arise in circumstances of in-licensing, transferring technology, using a research tool or transitioning 
from basic experimental work to that which is commercially focused. In such situations a company 
may only need to identify the one or two patents that protect a product. In the author’s experience, 
if the product has a patent number this takes about two minutes, but if the patent is not marked, 
two hours.  
92 Tanya Bubela et al, ‘Patent Landscaping for Life Sciences Innovation: Toward Consistent and Transparent Practices’ (2012) 
31 Nature Biotechnology 202. 
93 Michael Meurer, ‘Patent Notice and Cumulative Innovation’ in Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright (eds), Competition 
Policy and Patent Law under Uncertainty (Cambridge, 2011) 331, 332. 
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The analysis above demonstrates that although phrases such as ‘patented in Australia’ may be legally 
sufficient to give notice of patent rights to third parties, they do not give sufficient notice of patent 
boundaries. This information asymmetry can cause significant cost to competitors, particularly in the 
form of transaction costs. Accordingly, Australian law on innocent infringement, where possible, 
should be amended to enhance the efficiency of the patents system. Patent numbers should be 
required when patent marking. This can be achieved by adopting the mechanism in the UK innocent 
infringement provision which limits patent marking from effecting notice unless a patent number is 
included.94 
As stated above, s 123 was based upon the equivalent UK section.95  At the time the UK section 
stated, and continues to state that:  
a person shall not be taken to have been so aware or to have had reasonable grounds for so supposing 
by reason only of the application to a product of the word ‘patent’ or ‘patented’, or any word or words 
expressing or implying that a patent has been obtained for the product, unless the number of the 
patent accompanied the word or words in question.96 
In short, if patent marking is attempted in the UK using the word ‘patented’, and not followed by a 
patent number, then such marking cannot, by itself, discharge notice requirements. This appears as a 
relatively simple template solution for Australian legislators to adopt.  
Against this solution, is an argument that because Australia is, economically speaking, a small 
jurisdiction, it is not cost efficient to have specific patent marking requirements for such a territory. 
However, this argument is fallacious for two reasons. First, as of 2013, Australia has the 12th largest 
GDP in the world,97  and, as of 2012, ranks 11th for the most patents in force.98  Second, this analysis 
of ‘cost efficiency’ puts the cost of patent marking on the wrong side of the ledger. Patent marking, 
as described above, is a principled position based on the efficiency and organisation of the patent 
system itself. Any system of allocation of resources through property rights requires demarcation of 
those rights for efficiency.99 Otherwise, participants in the system do not know the boundaries of the 
property rights and costs will be unnecessarily expended in attempting to identify them, mitigating 
against efficiencies the system is supposed to confer.100  Correct marking is part of the cost of 
94 Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 62(1); Lancer Boss Ltd v Henley Forklift Ltd [1974] FSR 14, 27. 
95 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth to Consider What Alterations are 
Desirable in the Patent Law of the Commonwealth, House of Representatives (1952) 41. 
96 Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 87, s 59(1); Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, s 62(1). 
97 International Monetary Fund, Report for Selected Countries and Subjects (October 2013) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx>; GDP (Current US$), World Bank 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_v
alue–last&sort=desc>. 
98 World Intellectual Property Office, World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO Economic and Statistics Series, 2012) 79. 
99 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
11–24. 
100 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press, 2008) ch 1. 
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obtaining and enforcing a patent. Moreover, because a patentee who uses patent marks will 
encounter almost no extra cost if a patent number is included from the beginning of a production 
run, but third party transaction costs will be significantly reduced, cost analysis, from this point of 
view, actually favours marking with patent numbers.101 
II. Virtual Marking 
A. Advantages and Implementation in Australia 
The enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 2011 (the ‘AIA’)102 resulted in significant 
changes to US patent law. Included in the Act was a provision for virtual marking. US patent law now 
explicitly states that a patent holder can give notice that a product is patent protected by:  
fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat’, together with the number of the patent, or 
by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat’ together with an address of a posting on 
the Internet, accessible to the public without charge for accessing the address, that associates the 
patented article with the number of the patent.103 
In his article tracing the AIAs legislative passage, Corey McCaffrey notes that, apart from brief 
supporting statements for virtual marking from the US Department of Commerce and clarifications 
from Senator Leahy (one of the sponsors of the AIA), the virtual marking amendments went 
unremarked.104   
The rationale for virtual marking is simple. It serves as notification of patent rights like traditional 
marking, but has two major advantages: it signposts the reader to a repository of patent information; 
and this repository can be edited over time. This contrasts with traditional marking that uses 
immutable manufacturing and printing processes to convey only what is marked.105 If a patent 
application lapses or is abandoned, if a granted patent expires, is not renewed, found invalid, 
rejected, if claims are invalidated or if claims are interpreted to not include a product, then it is likely 
that patent marks should be amended. Similarly, when a patent is granted but products are already 
marked ‘patent pending’, then those products and future products, should be marked differently. In 
a recent  US case the defendant indicated that it would have cost the company over US$500,000 to 
update their patent marking when the patent in question expired.106 
101 For an economic perspective on internalising notice externalities see, Peter S Menell and Michael J Meurer, ‘Notice 
Failure and Notice Externalities’ (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 9–15. 
102 America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L No 112–29. 
103 35 USC § 287(a). 
104 Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent Reform’ (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 367, 
379. 
105 For a thorough US perspective on the advantages of virtual patent marking see, Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual 
Marking in Patent Reform’ (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 367, 384–94. 
106 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (ED Va, 2009). 
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For products such as modern mobile devices, it is possible that there are hundreds of applicable 
patents.107  If a product line has a minor patented improvement, it is costly and inconvenient to 
change marking to reflect the new patent. Virtual marking obviates the difficulties associated with 
altering marks or with many patents protecting a patent. There are no space restrictions on a website 
and when a new patent is granted or, more generally, its status changes, all that need be done is to 
update the website.108  
One significant advantage of virtual marking for Australian patentees is that it can simplify the import 
and export of patented goods. Altering patent marks can be expensive, but one website can contain 
patent listings for all applicable jurisdictions, thereby synergistically removing the need for specific 
territorial markings. If Australia’s marking laws are harmonised with those in the US to include virtual 
marking, whenever an Australian company wants to export to the US, they will not have to alter their 
physical patent marking to reflect their US patent number. All that need be done is update their 
website. This results in a much cheaper and more efficient process, making the export of Australian 
inventions easier. The reasoning also works in the other direction, making any importation of goods 
simpler. It is also envisaged that as the world adopts virtual marking laws, it will simplify global trade.  
An argument against amending the Patents Act to specifically include virtual marking is that 
interpretation of s 123(1) and (2) of the Patents Act indicate that virtual marking is already likely to 
be sufficient to effect notice. As discussed in part I A of this chapter, s 123(1) probably imparts an 
objective test: whether in the circumstances a defendant had ‘no reason to believe that a patent for 
the invention existed’. If a product marked with the phrase ‘patented technology’ is sufficient to give 
a reason to believe that a patent protects the product, it follows that labelling a product with 
‘patented www.yyy.com/zzz’, would also be sufficient because it offers more information.  
It has also been argued above that if a product is marked to indicate it is patented in Australia then 
the requirements for notice under s 123(2) are discharged. On this basis, the mark ‘patented 
www.yyy.com.au/zzz’ would appear to be sufficient because the ‘au’ indicates Australia. Whether or 
not the phrase ‘patented www.yyy.com’ would be sufficient is more contentious. However, if it is 
assumed the repository contains an Australian patent number, the mark would ‘direct attention 
to’109  the fact an Australian patent does exist. As a result, there are strong arguments under both 
innocent infringement provisions that virtual marking is already permitted in Australia. 
107 Steve Jobs, Keynote address (Speech delivered at Macworld, San Francisco, 1 September 2007). Steve Jobs stated over 
200 patent protected the iPhone 1. Note that this figure may be slightly misleading due to pending applications and the fact 
that in the US ‘patent’ also refers to registered designs. 
108 See also, Peter S Menell and Michael J Meurer, ‘Notice Failure and Notice Externalities’ (2013) 5 Journal of Legal Analysis 
1, 37–8. 
109 One of the definitions of ‘indicate’, Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, Online 6th ed, 2013); 
see part I B.  
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While statutory interpretation does suggest that virtual marking is sufficient to establish notice under 
current Australian innocent infringement law, there is one critical legal reason that necessitates 
specifying virtual marking in legislation. If a mark such as ‘patented www.yyy.com.au/zzz’ discharges 
notice requirements just as ‘patented in Australia’ does, there is no need to actually host a website. 
This defeats the purpose of providing a web address and the rationale underpinning innocent 
infringement. Moreover, despite the fact that such marks appear to discharge notice requirements 
under s 123(1) and (2), there are several other factors that remain to confuse the issue. First, 
because there is little or no current adoption of virtual patent marking in Australia,110 the Internet 
address could be misinterpreted to be the product’s website rather than referring to patents 
protecting the product. Second, people may also assume that because virtual marking is not explicitly 
included in s 123, it is not sufficient for notice. Third, if a patentee wants to virtually mark their 
products but is not sure if it is sufficient for the purpose of s 123, they may have to obtain costly legal 
advice. 
The result is that it makes sense to amend s 123 for the following reasons: business abhors 
uncertainty; the risk of limited remedies being available to a patent holder is significant; and it will 
save time and money. Importantly, using US law as a model, virtual marking could be simply and 
uncontroversially implemented. However, before this is done there are additional considerations 
that should be taken into account. 
B. Additional Considerations 
There are three additional issues that legislators should engage with before virtual marking is 
specified in the Patents Act. These concern how patent marking is evaluated for the purposes of 
discharging notice, what content a website must have, and whether a government body should 
create template websites and host them for patentees to use. 
For the full utility of virtual marking to be realised in Australia, a change in the way patent marking is 
evaluated must occur. As argued above, if the mark, ‘patented www.yyy.com.au/zzz’ by itself 
discharges current notice requirements, there is no need to establish a website. To realise the full 
benefit of virtual marking then, a paradigm shift must occur from the provision only requiring an 
‘appropriate mark’, to it requiring an ‘appropriate mark and sufficient content’. Or more specifically, 
not only must virtual marking take an appropriate form, but the website must contain sufficient 
information. 
Requiring ‘appropriate mark and sufficient content’ sounds straightforward, but can lead to unusual 
outcomes. For example, notice will be effected if the form and content of the mark and website 
meets legislative criteria, even if an infringer never accesses the website and observes the patent 
110 The author is unaware of any Australian company using virtual marking to discharge notice requirements in Australia. 
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number. Alternatively, if virtual marking is appropriate on a product and the infringer sees it, but the 
website is inaccessible or the content of the website does not satisfy all ‘sufficient content’ criteria, 
then although the infringer may have reason to believe a patent exists, notice will not be found 
effected. Both of the scenarios described do appear contrary to some reasoning articulated in this 
chapter. That is, in the first scenario the infringer has not observed the patent number but cannot 
plead innocent infringement. And in the second, the infringer may believe a patent exists but is able 
to plead innocent infringement. However, both results are logical and desired. One of the purposes 
of the rebuttable presumption of patent notice is to create a factual situation in which it is fair and 
efficacious to presume something has taken place. In the first example, the infringer is provided with 
information that makes it easy to access the relevant patent specification. In the second example, 
the infringer may believe a patent exists but it is resource intensive to find out which. 
What generally constitutes appropriate content for a virtual marking website is less straight forward. 
From the analysis in part 1 of this chapter, it seems logical that a website listing all patent numbers 
relevant to a product is the minimum required; this is effectively the same as labelling a product with 
a patent number. However, companies have already experimented with listing patents on websites 
with varying degrees of success.111 The limitless space of the Internet provides patent holders with 
almost infinite ways of providing information, enabling them to construct websites overburdened 
with information, which means it can be virtually impossible to gather anything meaningful from it. 
For example, if Apple or Google listed all their patents on a web page and stated that all products are 
protected by at least one patent in the list, it would take an inordinate amount of time to determine 
what patents protect which products. The website would lack clarity and effectively defeat the 
rationales for innocent infringement. 
In the US, a number of cases have been decided that are relevant to this limitless space issue. For 
example, in 1951 a District Court in Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co v Hughes Tool Co,112 held that 
providing a list of patents and stating that ‘one or more’ applied to a product, was sufficient to effect 
notice.113  Additionally, in 1931, the Second Circuit in Trussel Manufacturing Co v Wilson Jones Co,114 
held that a mark that could only be seen through a magnifying glass was not sufficient to effect 
notice.115 In the US there is also a requirement that patent marking is consistent and continuous.116 If 
111 For a non-exhaustive review see, Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent Reform’ (2011) 105 
Northwestern University Law Review 367, 380–4. Or for a current example see Symantec’s patent marking website 
<http://www.symantec.com/about/profile/policies/virtual_patent_marking.jsp>. 
112 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co v Hughes Tool Co, 192 F 2d 620, 625–6 (10th Cir, 1951); See also, United States v General 
Electric Co, 92 F Supp 753, 817 (DNJ, 1949). 
113 Ibid 625–6. 
114 Trussel Manufacturing Co v Wilson-Jones Co, 50 F 2d 1027 (2nd Cir, 1931). 
115 Ibid 1030. 
116 Nike Inc v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 138 F 3d 1437, 1446 (Fed Cir, 1998); American Medical Systems Inc v Medical Engineering 
Corp, 6 F 3d 1523, 1538 (Fed Cir, 1993). 
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a website ceases to exist or a link becomes inactive, is this legally conclusive evidence that no patent 
is in force?  
In McCaffrey’s article, he analysed several companies’ attempts at virtual marking and found that 
virtual marking by the golf company, Callaway, would probably not have satisfied the consistent and 
continuous requirement because some links were not active.117 Although US courts have not 
elaborated on the reasoning behind the consistent and continuous requirement, it can be presumed 
it is to avoid confusion and to ensure it is fair to assume everyone has seen the marking. Australia 
lacks jurisprudence on these, and other related issues.118 Decisions from other jurisdictions offer 
some guidance, but the dearth of case law in Australia does create a lack of clarity and possibly could 
lead to unintended outcomes. In particular, a logical resolution would require that Internet addresses 
be legible, specify which product is protected by what patent, and require that marking be consistent 
and continuous. It would be antithetical to the rationales for innocent infringement discussed in this 
chapter to find notice effected if Internet addresses do not work, or if a company can list all the 
patents they control and put a message at the top stating, ‘one or more patents may apply’ to the 
product. 
There are also significant advantages if a government organisation, like IP Australia, creates template 
marking websites for patent holders to fill in, and that are hosted on IP Australia’s servers.119  This 
type of service has been suggested as a cost effective mechanism for patent holders,120 and may be 
attractive for those who do not have a significant online presence or Internet-savvy background. If 
desired, IP Australia’s site could then link in the relevant AusPat entries. Interestingly, since the 
passage of the AIA in the US, numerous virtual marking companies have emerged. These are 
companies specialising in managing virtual marking websites for patent holders.121  It is foreseeable 
that companies would emerge in Australia too, and standards should be set expecting this. 
Conclusion 
The recent succession of patent reform and government intellectual property inquiries in Australia 
indicates that the government is continually looking to improve and update the patent system.122 It 
117 Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent Reform’ (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 367, 
380–4. 
118 For a more thorough US perspective on this issue see, Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent 
Reform’ (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 367, 380–84. 
119 For a more thorough US perspective on this issue see, Corey McCaffrey, ‘The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent 
Reform’ (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 367, 394–7. 
120 Letter from Gary Locke, Secretary of Commerce, Department of Commerce, to Patrick J Leahy, Chairman, and Members 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 5 October 2009, 
<http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/111Documents.cfm>. 
121 For example, ‘vMarked’ offering specific services <www.vmarked.com/>, or ‘PatentStatus’ specific virtual marking 
software that tracks relationships between products and patents <www.patentstatus.com/>. 
122 For example, Intellectual Property Amendment Act (Raising the Bar) 2012 (Cth); Intellectual Property Laws Amendment 
Act 2006 (Cth); Productivity Commission, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, Report No 61 (2013) 
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would be consistent with these efforts to consider amending innocent infringement law to 
specifically provide for virtual marking and require traditional marking with patent numbers. 
Although much more research is needed to correct other elements of patent notice failure as 
identified by Bessen and Meurer, in the interim, there are clear advantages to starting the process of 
correcting patent notice failure through the process of patent marking with virtual marks or patent 
numbers. Advantages that are likely to flow from this include a reduction in transaction costs for 
other inventors and easing trade of patent protected products. Moreover, the cost to patentees of 
providing this information is, especially in the case of virtual marks, low and outweighs the 
transaction costs otherwise encountered by follow-on inventors. Such amendments will also 
harmonise Australia’s innocent infringement laws with relevant US and UK provisions and are 
consistent with contemporary patent law theory.  
The fact that patent marking and innocent infringement issues have not been significant questions 
for Australian courts to decide could be seen as providing evidence that the marking system is 
working well. Alternatively, as suggested in this chapter, because the Australian requirements for 
notice are so easily discharged, it is not worth contesting the point. Regardless, the Internet age that 
the world now exists in is not so much about fixing things that are broken, but rather it is about 
improving them.  
 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/patents>; Review of Pharmaceutical Patents in Australia (3 April 2013) IP Australia 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/public-consultations/review-pharmaceutical-patents/>. 
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Introduction 
The final chapter of this thesis addresses law directed to preventing false representations about 
patents. More specifically, it analyses laws that prohibit parties falsely marking goods as protected by 
a patent. As examined below, this directly complements the previous chapter on innocent 
infringement, but it also complements the thesis more generally. Whereas the rest of this thesis has 
focused on arguments that could be made by litigants concerning how and when infringement 
occurs, this chapter deals with an aspect of the law that is designed to prohibit parties from 
representing to the world that a patent protects their product. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the process of marking a product as patented is known as ‘patent 
marking’, and it is commonly achieved in Australia by marking a product with the terms: ‘patented’; 
‘patented in Australia’; or ‘patented’ followed by a patent number. Patent rights holders use such 
marks because they can serve as notice of their patent rights, thereby preventing infringers from 
pleading innocent infringement.2 Innocent infringement, as explored in detail in the previous 
chapter, refers to a scenario in which patent rights are infringed, but the infringing actions are 
completed when the infringer is unaware of, and has no reason to believe, they are infringing patent 
rights.3 If innocent infringement is proven, a court may limit or refuse financial relief; that is, 
damages or an account of profits may be refused.4 When patent marking is properly achieved, a 
rebuttable presumption arises: it is presumed that infringers are aware of the relevant patent rights 
unless the contrary is established.5 On the other hand, when a product is marked with a patent but 
no patent rights actually apply to the marked product — otherwise known as ‘false patent marking’ 
— people may incorrectly believe that the technology in the product is protected by a patent and 
therefore think that infringement is risked if they copy technical aspects of the product.  
False patent marking has recently come to prominence due to a ‘boom and bust’ cycle of litigation in 
the United States. As explored in this chapter, legal reasoning and litigation trends suggest that the 
boom was triggered by a change in understanding of the penalty for false patent marking.6 Legal 
reasoning and litigation trends also suggest the bust was caused by judicial interpretation 
heightening the pleading requirements for the action, in combination with changes to the provision 
brought about by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 2011 (the ‘AIA’).7 Between January 2010 and 
2 For example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123. 
3 Ibid s 123(1)–(2); see generally, Chapter 3. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 35 USC § 292(a). 
7 For an overview see, Nicholas W Stephens, ‘From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes 
Full Circle’ (2011–2012) 97 Iowa Law Review 1003, 1007–25; Richard A Crudo, ‘A Patently Public Concern: Using Public 
Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking Statue After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’ (2012) 80 George 
Washington Law Review 568, 570–87; Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 
Texas Law Review 477, 477–93; Kevin Zickterman, ‘Pa-Trolling the False Marking Frontier: Giving Section 292 the Proper 
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July 2011, around 1000 false patent marking cases were filed in the US.8 At the boom’s peak, 
between March 2011 and April 2011, 109 cases were settled at a total estimated cost to wrongdoers 
of almost US$4.5 million.9 Prior to, and after the boom period, cases were filed far less frequently;10 
for example, between 2007 and 2009, 21 cases were filed.11 By contrast, the Australian false patent 
marking provision under s 178(2) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the ‘Patents Act’)12 has not been 
litigated, and only one false marking case has been decided under the equivalent of what is now s 18 
misleading and deceptive conduct in the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’).13  
In this chapter the causes of the US boom-bust cycle form the basis for an enquiry into whether false 
patent marking exists in Australia, and whether it is negatively affecting Australian businesses or 
consumers. There is no indication that Australia is ever likely to be exposed to the clogging nature of 
the false patent marking litigation observed in the US during the boom. But the sheer volume of 
cases in the US does tend to suggest that false patent marking may be a common problem more 
globally, including in Australia.  
Part 1 of this chapter examines false patent marking law in the US. It is necessary to briefly touch on 
certain key cases to illustrate the causes of the boom and bust. Much of the cycle is influenced by 
what is called a ‘qui tam’ action.14 ‘Qui tam’ is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase, qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which translates to, ‘who as well for the king as 
for himself sues in this matter’.15 It is an old common law writ that allows a private individual to 
prosecute offences in place of the crown and receive all, or part, of the penalty.16 In England, qui tam 
actions emerged as a common law enforcement mechanism in the 14th century.17 By enabling any 
person in the population to enforce laws on behalf of the state and receive part of the penalty, qui 
Makeover in Wake of the American Invents Act’ (2012) 190 Northern Illinois University Law Review 189, 190–200; Justin E 
Gray, False Marking – New Case Update (3 August 2011) Gray on Claims 
<http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/8/3/false-marking-new-case-update.html>; America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L 
No 112-29, 120 Stat 284. 
8 Justin E Gray, False Marking – New Case Update (3 August 2011) Gray on Claims 
<http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/8/3/false-marking-new-case-update.html>. 
9 These figures were calculated using US government data. See, US Department of Justice, Settlement Payments Received 
for Section 292 Cases - 2011, 
<http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2011/FalsePatent%20Marking%20Summary%202011.pdf>. 
10 Laura N Arneson, ‘Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should Not Be False 
Marking’ (2011–2012) 95 Minnesota Law Review 650, 660; Kirsten R Rydstron, Maria N Bernier and Joseph D Fillloy, 
‘Burning Down the Courthouse: Qui Tam Action under Section 292 of the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 11 Pittsburgh 
Journal of Technology Law and Policy 1, 1; Elizabeth Winston, ‘The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Statute’ (2009) 77 
Tennessee Law Review 111, 133; Bonnie Grant, ‘Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: 
Controlling Use of the term “Patent Pending”’ (2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 283. 
11 Michael R O’Neill, ‘False Patent Marking Claims: The New Threat to Business’ (2010) 22 Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law Journal 22, 28. 
12 Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
13 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 18; Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries (1991) 32 FCR 491. 
14 Black’s Law Dictionary (West Group, 9th ed, 2009). 
15 Ibid. 
16 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Harper & Brothers, 1850) vol 3, 161–2. 
17 See, J Randy Beck, ‘The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539, 565–70. 
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tam actions were seen as a practical way to enforce laws with scarce resources over quite large 
geographic areas.18 Qui tam actions were used to enforce a wide range of laws, including 
performance of public functions, counterfeiting, consumption of alcohol, bribery of jurors and 
religious observance.19 The plaintiff in a qui tam action is commonly referred to as a relator. Qui tam 
actions have a long history in the US,20 and continue to operate there.21 Between 1842 and 2011, 
false patent marking in the US operated as a qui tam action.22 Although this interesting artefact of 
English law was transplanted to the US,23 to the author’s knowledge, it never made it to Australian 
shores. 
The wealth of US case law provides clear guidance on the interpretation of the false patent marking 
provision in that jurisdiction, particularly the relevant physical and mental aspects of the offence, as 
well as procedural issues. In contrast, the lack of case law in Australia means that there is no judicial 
guidance on how to interpret s 178(2) of the Patents Act, and the rudimentary scholastic 
commentary from commercial law firms provides little assistance.24 However, the rich body of US 
case law provides guidance in examining how the Australian provisions might be interpreted. 
Moreover, by identifying the legal causes of the boom and bust in the US, they can then be used to 
examine whether the scant Australian case law results from the operation of the law, or from a 
genuine lack false patent marking in Australia. That is, since there has been minimal litigation in 
Australia, if the legal causes of the boom in the US are present in Australia, then the evidence tends 
to indicate that false patent marking does not exist in Australia. With this in mind, part 2 of this 
chapter analyses s 178(2) of the Patents Act against the backdrop of US cases. Sections 18, 29 and 33 
under the ACL are also included in this analysis because they arguably provide additional causes of 
action and, if applicable, would offer an enhanced range of remedies. 
Although the the comparison of US and Australian law does not conclusively deduce that false patent 
marking does not exist in Australia, it does suggest that if false patent marking is occurring, it is not 
causing significant competitive harm. Nevertheless, when the results of this comparison are 
evaluated from a realistic assessment of harms caused by false patent marking, cracks appear in the 
operation of the Australian false patent marking provisions. Part 3 of this chapter considers the 
18 Ibid 567. 
19 See generally, ibid 565–73, 592–601. 
20 See generally, ibid 566. 
21 Ibid 553–65. 
22 35 USC § 292(a), as amended by America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L No 112–29, § 16, 120 Stat 284, 329. 
23 J Randy Beck, ‘The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539, 548. 
24 For example, David Hughes and Georgina Higginbotham, ‘False Marking Stakes Raised in the US’ (2010) Intellectual 
Property Law Bulletin 115; Mark Summerfield, Reintroduced US IP Bill to Slay the False marking Troll (11 January 2011) 
Patentology <http://blog.patentology.com.au/2011/01/reintroduced-us-ip-bill-to-slay-false.html>; John Swinson, Selling 
Goods in the US: The Importance of Correct Marking (12 January 2010) King & Wood Mallesons 
<http://www.mallesons.com/publications/marketAlerts/2010/SellinggoodsintheUStheimportanceofcorrectpatentmarking/
Pages/default.aspx>. 
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punishment for false patent marking in Australia, focusing on an economic approach to the provision 
and a calculation of penalties. This approach, posited by a leading legal-economic scholar, is based on 
the wrongdoer disgorging any benefit obtained through false patent marking. Drawing on the 
analysis throughout this chapter, this part also considers other amendments for improving the 
operation of s 178(2). Ultimately this chapter concludes that various changes should be implemented 
to create more effective laws prohibiting false patent marking.  
I. The US Experience 
The cases discussed in this section have been selected because they illustrate key aspects of the 
boom-bust cycle pertinent to the operation of false patent marking in Australia. There are numerous 
other factors relevant to the US cycle, for example unique US constitutional issues, but they are not 
addressed in this chapter because they are not relevant to the Australian provision.25 The three 
aspects discussed are: the physical requirements of the offence; the mental requirements of the 
offence; and, the penalty.  
Prior to the passage of the AIA, the US provision on false patent marking, 35 USC § 292, stated: 
(a) …26 
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented article, 
the word “patent” or any word or number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of 
deceiving the public; or  
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any article, the words 
“patent applied for,” “patent pending,” or any word importing that an application for patent has been 
made, when no application for patent has been made, or if made, is not pending, for the purpose of 
deceiving the public-  
Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.  
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which even one-half shall go to the person suing and 
the other to the use of the United States.27 
In 2005, prior to the boom, the Federal Circuit in Clontech Laboratories Inc v Invitrogen Corp 
(‘Clontech’)28 held that to succeed in a false patent marking action, two elements had to be proved. 
25 For a more thorough account of the legal causes of the boom and bust, including the numerous US constitutional and 
standing issues see, Kevin Zickterman, ‘Pa-Trolling the False Marking Frontier: Giving Section 292 the Proper Makeover in 
Wake of the American Invents Act’ (2012) 190 Northern Illinois University Law Review 189, 190–218; Nicholas W Stephens, 
‘From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes Full Circle’ (2011–2012) 97 Iowa Law Review 
1003, 1007–25; Richard A Crudo, ‘A Patently Public Concern: Using Public Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking 
Statue After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’ (2012) 80 George Washington Law Review 568, 570–87; Christopher G 
Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 477–93. 
26 The first paragraph of 35 USC § 292(a) deals with imitating a patentee. 
27 35 USC § 292. 
28 Clontech Laboratories Inc v Invitrogen Corp, 406 F 3d 1347 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
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First, it had to be shown that the marked article was ‘unpatented’.29 That is, the article had to be 
shown not to be protected by the patent it was marked with — determined by interpreting the 
claims of the patent that the product was marked with.30 Second, the marking party had to have the 
relevant mental state, that is, an intention to deceive the public.31 In classic legal terminology these 
elements can be described as the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.  
On the actus reus element of the action, until the Federal Circuit case of Pequignot v Solo Cup (‘Solo 
Cup’),32 there was no decision on whether the phrase ‘unpatented article’ was satisfied by products 
marked with an expired patent that previously protected them. There are strong arguments that 
marking articles with expired patent numbers should not constitute ‘unpatented’ because people can 
look up the patents on the Internet and see they are expired.33 Indeed, the marks may even be 
beneficial because they indicate where information about technological advances used in the 
product can be found and freely used.34 However, the Federal Circuit found in Solo Cup that marking 
an article as patented in reliance on an expired patent that previously protected it was sufficient to 
satisfy the physical element of false patent marking.35  
Prior to the decisions of Solo Cup and Clontech, the mens rea requirements that could be inferred 
from the physical aspects of false patent marking were not well defined. Characterising the law in 
this area, the Federal Circuit in Clontech stated that: 
intent to deceive is a state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient knowledge that what it is 
saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the 
statement is true.36  
The Court then continued:  
Intent to deceive, while subjective in nature, is established in law by objective criteria. Thus, ‘objective 
standards’ control and the fact of misrepresentation coupled with proof that the party making it had 
knowledge of its falsity is enough to warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent 
intent.37 
In Solo Cup, the Federal Circuit took up this reasoning from Clontech, stating that false patent 
marking, combined with knowledge that the marking was incorrect, creates a rebuttable 
29 35 USC § 292(a). 
30 Ibid; Clontech, 406 F 3d 1347, 1352 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
31 35 USC § 292(a); Clontech, 406 F 3d 1347, 1352 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
32 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 608 F 3d 1356 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
33 Ibid 1362. 
34 Laura N Arneson, ‘Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should Not Be False 
Marking’ (2011–2012) 95 Minnesota Law Review 650, 668–70. 
35 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 608 F 3d 1356, 1361–2 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
36 Clontech Laboratories Inc v Invitrogen Corp, 406 F 3d 1347, 1352 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
37 Ibid (references omitted). 
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presumption of intent to deceive the public.38 While the defendant was able to rebut the 
presumption in Solo Cup,39 the case was important because it established clear guidance on how to 
address the mens rea requirement for false patent marking. As a result, the rebuttable presumption 
of intention to deceive eased the process for future plaintiffs in false patent marking actions.40  
A. The Boom  
Although Solo Cup provided clarity on the interpretation of the false patent marking provision in US 
patent law, the most influential development leading to the false patent marking boom in litigation 
was a change in the understanding of the penalty. In 2009, the Federal Circuit in Forest Group Inc v 
Bon Tool Company (‘Forest Group’)41 comprehensively interpreted the provision setting out the 
penalty for false patent marking: ‘shall not be fined more than $500 for every such offense’. Prior to 
Forest Group, a variety of approaches to determining penalties for false patent marking existed.42 
Since the Circuit Court of Appeals case of London v Everett H Dunbar Corp (‘London’) in 1910,43 the 
orthodox approach to determining the penalty was that individual acts of continuous false patent 
marking constituted a ‘single offence’.44 However, the Court in Forest Group was presented with a 
slightly different penalty provision to that in London, allowing it to distinguish the earlier case in its 
reasoning.45 The Court in Forest Group gave a literal meaning to the phrase ‘every such offense’,46 
which meant that every article falsely marked could be penalised up to $500.47 The result of this 
approach to calculating penalties is significant: the reasoning in London meant that a single 
manufacturing run of 500 falsely marked widgets would result in a fine of up to $500, but under 
Forest Group, the fine could be assessed at up to $250,000.  
It has been convincingly argued by many commentators that this increase in potential fines was 
instrumental in the proliferation of false patent marking cases.48 For example, data on the number of 
false patent marking cases filed during the boom period have been compiled by Justin Gray on his 
38 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 608 F 3d 1356, 1361–2 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
39 Ibid 1363. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
42 Ibid 1301–02; Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 
486–7. 
43 London v Everett H Dunbar Corp, 179 F 506 (1st Cir, 1910). 
44 Ibid 508; Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295, 1301–2 (Fed Cir, 2009); Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the 
Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 486–8. 
45 Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295, 1302 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
46 Ibid 1301–2. 
47 Ibid 1303. 
48 See eg, Michael R O’Neill, ‘False Patent Marking Claims: The New Threat to Business’ (2010) 22 Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law Journal 22, 22–3; Maria N Bernier and Joseph D Fillloy, ‘Burning Down the Courthouse: Qui Tam Action 
under Section 292 of the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 11 Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy 1, , 3–4; Nicholas 
W Stephens, ‘From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes Full Circle’ (2011–2012) 97 Iowa 
Law Review 1003, 1011–12. 
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blog ‘Gray on Claims’.49 Gray produced this data using a commercially provided patent litigation 
database.50 Gray’s data shows that the boom in filings began in January 2010, immediately following 
the Federal Circuit decision of Forest Group, which was handed down on 28 December 2009.51 
Together with the boom in filings, a boom in settlements also occurred. As the US government 
received half the financial penalty, settlement data have been authoritatively recorded. These data 
show that at the peak of the boom during March and April 2011, 109 cases were settled, each at an 
average value of around US$41,000, a total penalty of almost US$4.5 million in two months.52 In 
total, between May 2010 and December 2011, 512 complaints were settled at a total of just over 
US$22 million.53 The types of items that false patent marking claims applied to were many and 
varied, ranging from bow-ties,54 and stilts,55 to motor oil,56 and laboratory reagents.57 In many 
instances the patent marks were only false because the relevant patent(s) had expired.58 
Analysis of the government data shows that a side-effect of the boom was that a class of professional 
relators emerged. Table 6 shows the average settlement value of the top 10 companies per number 
of false patent marking claims settled. The table is headed by Patent Group LLC which grossed 
US$1.44 million and Promote Innovation LLC, which grossed US$1.85 million. This overlaps with 
Gray’s data which shows the number of cases filed by these companies. In Gray’s data, as of 3 August 
2011, Patent Group LLC had filed 178 cases and Promote Innovation LLC, 70.59  
  
49 Justin E Gray, False Marking – New Case Update (3 August 2011) Gray on Claims 
<http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/8/3/false-marking-new-case-update.html>. 
50 Doctor Navigator (2013) <http://home.docketnavigator.com/>. 
51 Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295, 1296 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
52 US Department of Justice, Settlement Payments Received for Section 292 Cases - 2011, 
<http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2011/FalsePatent%20Marking%20Summary%202011.pdf>. 
53 Ibid. These figures were calculated using US government supplied data. See, US Department of Justice, Settlement 
Payments Received for Section 292 Cases - 2010 
<http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2010/292%20Payment%20Chart%202010%20through%20Dec%2031%20
2010.pdf>. 
54 Stauffer v Brooks Brothers Inc, 619 F 3d 1321 (Fed Cir, 2010). 
55 Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
56 Re BP Lubricants USA Inc, 637 F 3d 1307 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
57 Clontech Laboratories Inc v Invitrogen Corp, 406 F 3d 1347 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
58 See, eg, Re BP Lubricants USA Inc, 637 F 3d 1307, 1309 (Fed Cir, 2011); Stauffer v Brooks Brothers Inc, 619 F 3d 1321, 1322 
(Fed Cir, 2010). 
59 Justin E Gray, False Marking – New Case Update (3 August 2011) Gray on Claims 
<http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/8/3/false-marking-new-case-update.html>. 
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Table 6 Average settlement value for the top US companies by number of false patent marking cases settled60 
# Relator 
No. of 
Cases 
Settled 
Total Value 
Rec’d by 
Gov’t/Relator 
Total Value Paid 
by Defendants 
Mean Settlement Value 
Received by 
Government or Relator 
Mean Settlement 
Value Paid by 
Defendant 
1. Patent Group 112 1 438 987.11 $2 877 974.22 $12 848.10 $25 696.20 
2. Promote Innovation LL 53 1 853 000.00 $3 706 000.00 $34 962.26 $69 924.53 
3. San Francisco Technology LLC 44 579 325.41 $1 158 650.82 $13 166.49 $26 332.97 
4. Main Hastings LLC 40 473 250.00 $946 500.00 $11 831.25 $23 662.50 
5. Tex Pat 29 712 250.00 $1 424 500.00 $24 560.34 $49 120.69 
6. GHJ Holdings LLC 29 429 000.00 $858 000.00 $14 793.10 $29 586.21 
7. 
Unique 
Product 
Solutions 
17 235 375.00 $470 750.00 $13 845.59 $27 691.18 
8. Patect LLC 15 343 750.00 $687 500.00 $22 916.67 $45 833.33 
9. Thomas A Simonian 13 683 750.00 $1,367,500.00 $52 596.15 $105 192.31 
10. Kilt Resources LLC 10 74 000.00 $148 000.00 $7400.00 $14 800.00 
 
The rise of professional relators is particularly interesting because of its similarity to the historical use 
of qui tam actions. With significant financial gain to be made, it is perhaps not surprising than an 
industry of professional relators has emerged on more than one occasion.61 During the use of qui 
tam actions in England, it became common for relators to reach settlements that were illegal,62 to 
entrap victims, and to use the threat of a qui tam action as blackmail.63 As a result, relators gained a 
poor reputation. Sir Edward Coke in his seminal books, ‘Institutes of the Laws of England’, describes 
60 These figures were calculated using US government supplied data. See, US Department of Justice, Settlement Payments 
Received for Section 292 Cases - 2010 
<http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2010/292%20Payment%20Chart%202010%20through%20Dec%2031%20
2010.pdf>; and US Department of Justice, Settlement Payments Received for Section 292 Cases - 2011,  
<http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/elecread/2011/FalsePatent%20Marking%20Summary%202011.pdf>. 
61 J Randy Beck, ‘The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539, 576–9; see also, Elizabeth Winston, ‘The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Statute’ (2009) 77 Tennessee Law 
Review 111, 138–9; Craig Deutsch, ‘Restoring Truth: An Argument to Remove the Qui Tam Provision from the false Marking 
Statute of the Patent Act’ (2010) 11 Minnesota Journal of Law Science and Technology 829, 846–51; Christopher G 
Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 489–91. 
62 J Randy Beck, ‘The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539, 580–1. 
63 Ibid 581–3; William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen & Co, 1903) vol 4, 355–6.  
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relators in the 17th century as ‘viperous vermin’ and a disordered class of men.64 As a side note, 
Professor Beck, in his treatise on qui tam actions, remarks that as a result of abuses and the 
establishment of a more comprehensive professional police force and public prosecutors, the 
number of qui tam actions contained in UK legislation declined.65 In 1951, to almost universal 
support,66 the Common Informers Act 1951 eliminated them completely.67  
While describing modern false patent marking relators as viperous vermin is unduly harsh, some 
commentators have labelled them as ‘patent marking trolls’,68 opportunistically obtaining finances 
through litigation that often corrects no harm to society, and serves only to clog the courts.69 
B. The Bust  
There are two events which have been linked to the bust phase of the US litigation. The first is the 
Federal Circuit decision in Re BP Lubricant’s USA Inc (‘BP Lubricants’).70 The second is the enactment 
of the AIA, particularly the provisions amending 35 USC § 292.  
The defendant in BP Lubricants argued that the pleading requirements for false patent marking had 
not been met.71 The relevant court rules require that when alleging fraud — which includes an 
intention to deceive the public72 — the plaintiff must ‘plead in detail “the specific who, what, when, 
where, and how” of the alleged fraud’.73 The relator’s pleadings in BP Lubricants stated that the 
defendant was a sophisticated company and knew, or should have known, that the relevant patent 
had expired.74 Applying the Court’s rule, the Federal Circuit did not accept that this was sufficient to 
64 Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institute of the Laws of England (W Clarke & Sons, 1628) 194. 
65 J Randy Beck, ‘The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539, 592–3. Although not directly relevant to false patent marking, the reader should be aware that qui tam actions 
played their own part in the development of the Statute of Monopolies in 1624. Prior to the Statute of Monopolies, 
monarchs would award monopolies to enforce qui tam actions to certain people. The arbitrary nature of these awards 
frustrated the utility of qui tam actions and their general abuses (detailed in the text) influenced the drafting of the Statute 
of Monopolies to stop monarchs from making such awards: at 589. 
66 See, ibid 605–8. 
67 Common Informers Act 1951, 14 & 15 Geo 6, c 39. 
68 See eg, Mark H Anania and Carissa L Rodrigue, ‘Combating the Rise of False Marking Trolls’ (2011) 29 Intellectual Property 
& Technology Law Journal 3; Donald W Rupert, ‘Trolling for Dollars: A New Threat to Patent Owners’ (2009) 21 Intellectual 
Property & Technology Law Journal 1; Richard M Assmus, Robert J Kriss and Jeffrey W Sarles, Watch Out for the Patent 
Marking Trolls (2010) Mayer Brown <http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/watch-out-for-the-patent-marking-trolls-
03-01-2010/>. 
69 Marla Grossman and Adam Lerner, Out of Balance: The False Patent Marking Landscape Post-Bon Tool and Solo Cup (2 
August 2010) Institute for Policy Innovation <http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/out-of-balance-the-false-patent-marking-
landscape-post-bon-tool-and-solo-cup>; Charles R Macedo, ‘Intent Must be Pleaded with Particularity for False Marking 
Claim in Use’ (2011) 7 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 425, 425; Kevin Zickterman, ‘Pa-Trolling the False 
Marking Frontier: Giving Section 292 the Proper Makeover in Wake of the American Invents Act’ (2012) 190 Northern 
Illinois University Law Review 189, 239–40. 
70 Re BP Lubricants USA Inc, 637 F 3d 1307 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid 1309–10. 
73 Ibid 1309 
74 Ibid 1311. 
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prove they knew the patent marks were false, stating much more specific factual evidence was 
needed.75 Accordingly, the relator’s action failed.76  
The outcome of BP Lubricants meant that obtaining the required evidence to prove a plaintiff knew 
the marks were false became more difficult. BP Lubricants was handed down on 15 March 2011, and 
the number of filings dropped almost immediately.77 While the decision in BP Lubricants is linked to 
the drop in filings, the AIA also played a role. Indeed the greatest settlement for a false patent claim, 
US$2,000,000, occurred after BP Lubricants had been decided.78 
The AIA first passed the Senate, its originating chamber, on 8 March 2011.79 From then onwards the 
sections in the AIA amending false patent marking were not altered, and they were always designed 
to end pending cases that did not fit the new criteria.80 Post-AIA, the definitions of the offence were 
retained in § 292(a) but the penalty altered and standing requirements changed. The relevant 
sections of § 292(a), (b) and (c) now state: 
(a)… 
Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense. Only the United States may sue for the 
penalty authorized by this subsection. 
(b) A person who has suffered a competitive injury as a result of a violation of this section may file a 
civil action in a district court of the United States for recovery of damages adequate to compensate for 
the injury. 
(c) The marking of a product, in a manner described in subsection (a), with matter relating to a patent 
that covered that product but has expired is not a violation of this section.81 
In addition, the AIA specifies that in relation to 35 USC § 292, ‘[t]he amendments … shall apply to all 
cases, without exception, that are pending on, or commenced on or after, the date of the enactment 
of this Act [Sept. 16, 2011].’82  
The AIA was signed into law on 16 September 2011. Between October 2011 and May 2013, nine new 
false patent marking suits had been filed,83 and only one proceeded to an order of financial relief. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid; Nicholas W Stephens, ‘From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes Full Circle’ (2011–
2012) 97 Iowa Law Review 1003, 1013; Justin E Gray, Decrease in New False Marking Cases Filed Post In re BP Lubricants (31 
March 2011) Gray on Claims <http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/3/31/decrease-in-new-false-marking-cases-filed-
post-in-re-bp-lubr.html>. 
78 Justin E Gray, False Marking – Settlement Update (9 August 2011) Gray on Claims 
<http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2011/8/9/false-marking-settlement-update.html>.  
79 AIA Implementation Information (2013) The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
<http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/resources.jsp>. 
80 35 USC § 292(a), as amended by America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L No 112-29, § 16(4), 120 Stat 284, 329. 
81 35 USC § 292(b)–(c). 
82 America Invents Act, Pub L No 112–29, § 16(b)(4), 125 Stat 284, 329. 
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The retrospective effect of the false patent marking provision of the AIA also resulted in the winding 
up of cases already on foot that did not fit the new standing criteria, including those on appeal.84 
Consequently, BP Lubricants, and the AIA have reduced false patent marking cases filed to numbers 
similar to those observed pre-Forest Group. The AIA achieved this through: limiting standing to 
plaintiffs who suffered competitive injury; limiting financial relief to correcting competitive injury 
suffered; and defining false patent marking to exclude marks that refer to expired patents that once 
applied to the marked product. 
II. Comparison of US and Australian False Patent Marking Law  
A. Section 178(2) of the Patents Act 
A provision penalising false patent marking was introduced into Australian patent law with the 
passage of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth).85 This provision has changed very little over the years and has 
never been litigated.86 Including recent amendments to the penalty resulting from the Intellectual 
Property (Raising the Bar) Act 2011 (Cth),87 the section now states: 
(2) A person must not falsely represent that an article sold by him or her is patented in Australia, or is 
the subject of an application for a patent in Australia. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units 
(3) Without limiting subsection (2): 
(a) a person is to be taken to represent that an article is patented in Australia if the word 
“patent” or “patented”, the words “provisional patent”, or any other word or words implying 
that a patent for the article has been obtained in Australia, are stamped, engraved or 
impressed on, or otherwise applied to, the article; and 
(b) a person is to be taken to represent that an article is the subject of an application for a 
patent in Australia if the words “patent applied for” or “patent pending”, or any other word 
or words implying that an application for a patent for the article has been made in Australia, 
are stamped, engraved or impressed on, or otherwise applied to, the article. 
83 Search completed using Docket Navigator, <https://www.docketnavigator.com/entry/home>. 
84 FLFMC LLC v Wham-O Inc, 444 Fed Appx 447, 448 (Fed Cir, 2011). 
85 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 174. 
86 A variety of trivial changes have occurred, the penalty changed currency under the Statute Law Revision (Decimal 
Currency) Act 1966 (Cth) s 3, consent had to be sought from the Attorney General instead of the Minister until the 
Administrative Changes (Consequential Provisions) Act 1976 (Cth) s 3, the description of the penalty was changed from 
words to numbers under the Patents Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) sch 1 item 3, a separate fine was instituted for natural 
persons and corporate entities under the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No. 1) 1985 (Cth) s 3 but this was 
changed to one fine regardless of the incorporation in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 178(2) and the Intellectual Property 
Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2011 sch 4 item 12 changed the penalty from a static financial penalty to 60 penalty units. 
87 Intellectual Property Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2011 (Cth). 
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(4) A prosecution must not be started for an offence against subsection (1) or (2) without the consent 
of the Minister, or a person authorised by the Minister.88 
Comparing the Australian provision to features of the US equivalent, the Australian section imposes a 
60 penalty unit fine ($10,800),89 but on what basis it is to be calculated – that is, the number of 
articles marked, or production runs - is not specified. Similarly, the provision does not explicitly 
require a mens rea element, nor is it clear whether it applies to expired patents that once protected 
a marked product. Thus, to compare comprehensively Australian and UK law, each of these issues 
are analysed below in connection with the boom of litigation in the US.  
In light of the US decision in Solo Cup it is necessary to consider whether s 178(2) would be 
interpreted to apply to marks that refer to an expired patent that once protected the article. The key 
phrase in s 178(2) is, ‘[a] person must not falsely represent that an article … is patented in 
Australia…’.90 ‘Patented’ is not defined in the Patents Act, but ‘patented process’ and ‘patented 
product’ are: both definitions specifically refer to a patent that has ‘been granted and is in force’.91 
Moreover, since the Patents Act broadly divides inventions into two categories that match theses 
definitions – that is, processes and methods92 - this definition suggests that the term ‘patented’ 
refers to any patent that is currently in force. Consequently, it seems likely that the actus reus 
element of provision will be satisfied when a product is marked indicating it is patented but a patent 
does not actually apply to the product. By corollary, this also means that if a patent is marked with an 
expired patent that once protected it, then that also satisfies the actus reus element. 
As demonstrated in BP Lubricants, the mental element that must be proved and the level of detail 
that is required in the pleadings can affect the outcome of false patent marking cases. The use of the 
term ‘offence’ in s 178(4) combined with the relatively low level fine (compared to other criminal 
offences) indicates that false patent marking is a summary offence. Relevantly, the Patents Act states 
that, ‘[c]hapter 2 of the Criminal Code applies to all offences created under the Act’,93 therefore false 
marking must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.94 But, unlike the US provision, no mental aspect 
is mentioned. Whether it is intended to be a strict liability offence is not clear. On this point, the 
phrase ‘falsely represent’ is used in s 178(2). The term ‘represent’ is partially defined in sub-ss (3)(a) 
and (b), but ‘falsely’ is not. In this sense, ‘falsely’ is the adverb of ‘false’. The Macquarie dictionary 
defines ‘false’ to include being ‘deceitful’, as well as ‘erroneous’. ‘Deceitful’ is defined to mean 
88 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 178(2)–(4). 
89 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA. 
90 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 178(2) (emphasis added). 
91 Ibid sch 1 (definition of ‘patented product’ and ‘patented process’). 
92 Ibid sch1 (definition of ‘exploit’). 
93 Ibid s 12A. 
94 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1, 13.2. 
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knowing that a representation is not true, while ‘erroneous’ includes being mistaken.95 The 
consequence of this dual definition is that the denotation of ‘falsely represent’ encompasses the 
possibility of the offence being one of strict liability, that is, it need only be proven that the mark is 
false. But it also encompasses the possibility of it requiring a mens rea examination, that is, it must 
be proved the representor knew the mark was false. 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is also instructive on mens rea elements. It specifies that if a:  
law creating an offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consist only of 
conduct [as opposed to a physical element that consists of a circumstance or result], intention is the 
fault element for that physical element.96  
This provision overlaps with the common law presumption of mens rea in all offences.97 However, 
the presumption of mens rea can be rebutted.98 In the High Court case of He Kaw Teh v R (‘He Kaw 
Teh’),99 Gibbs CJ (with whom Mason J agreed100) outlined four factors that need to be assessed to 
determine whether the presumption is rebutted: (1) the language of the section creating the offence; 
(2) the subject matter of the statute; (3) the consequences for the community of an offence; and (4) 
the potential consequences for an accused if convicted.101  
In examining the language of the section describing the offence, Dawson J in He Kaw Teh discussed 
the use of the words ‘knowingly’ and ‘wilfully’ as indicating a subjective intent element.102 That such 
terms are not present in s 178(2) suggests that it is a strict liability offence. However, Dawson J also 
stated the absence of such words is not determinative.103 
In the same case, Brennan J considered the subject matter of the statute. His Honour stated, ‘[t]he 
purpose of the statute is the surest guide of the legislature’s intention as to the mental state to be 
implied.’104 On this point, the Patents Act primarily concerns an administrative regime to incentivise 
innovation,105 not to create criminal liability. On this basis, it might be argued that it was not the 
intention of the legislature to criminalise all acts of false patent marking, but rather to capture only 
those acts that intentionally extend the patent monopoly beyond permissible limits. This suggests 
that there should be a mens rea element to the offence. However, in discussing the subject matter of 
95 Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, Online 6th ed, 2013). 
96 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1, 5.6(1). 
97 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523, 528 (Gibbs CJ), 546 (Mason J), 565–6 (Brennan J), 594 (Dawson J). 
98 Ibid 528–30. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid 546. 
101 Ibid 528. In various ways, each of the remaining judgments in this case engaged with these ideas, see, 546–563 (Wilson 
J), 563–590 (Brennan J), 590–604 (Dawson J). 
102 Ibid 594.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid 576. 
105 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 May 1990, 1271 (Robert Ray); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 10 October 1990, 2565–7 (Simon Crean). 
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the statute in issue in He Kaw Teh, Gibbs CJ approved of a passage from the classic strict liability case 
of Sherras v De Rutzen.106 In that case, Wright J stated that the presumption of mens rea is displaced 
when the acts are ‘not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are 
prohibited under penalty’.107 False patent marking generally fits that description, there is no real 
possibility of physical distress, and is not within the common understanding of what a criminal act is. 
As a result, this line of reasoning, quite persuasively, tends to favour a strict liability interpretation.  
In terms of consequences to the community arising due to the offence, some market participants 
may be confused about patent protection, thereby causing them to not enter a market, delay 
entering a market, or spend money clarifying that no patent protects a product. Alternatively, a 
consumer may buy a product believing a falsely marked product includes technology not available in 
other products. On this basis, the offence is effectively a market-based one, which, as a general rule 
do not normally require a fault element.108  
With regards to the consequences for the accused, in He Kaw Teh, Gibbs CJ indicated that the more 
serious the penalties the less likely Parliament intended that a person who had no intention or 
knowledge of doing anything wrong should be found guilty.109 In the spectrum of penalties, $10,800 
is not severe, especially when compared to other market offences such as false or misleading 
representations about goods,110 which carry pecuniary penalties of up to $1,100,000 for body 
corporates and up to $220,000 for persons that are not a body corporates.111 Moreover, false patent 
marking it is not an indictable offence, and there is no chance of gaol time.112 Similarly, offenders will 
not suffer the type of stigma that, as Gibbs CJ noted, can occur with other criminal offences.113 There 
is also no real problem of a ‘luckless’ victim in false patent marking (that is, one who accidentally 
marks a product as patented);114 patent rights holders either write the patent claims or acquire them 
knowing what has been specified.  
Looking more broadly to statutes with similar subject matter and language, the phrase ‘false or 
misleading representation’ in consumer law has been interpreted to include representations contrary 
to fact, meaning that such a representation can be made even if the representor does not know their 
representation is false.115 Furthermore, although a strict liability regime raises the prospect of 
106 Sherras v De Rutzen [1985] 1 QB 918; He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523, 530. 
107 Ibid 922.  
108 Under the ACL there are provisions for criminal prosecutions but these are reserved for the ‘most blatant, harmful or 
dishonest conduct’, see Stephen G Corones, The Australian Consumer Law (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2013) 523. 
109 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523, 530. 
110 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, 29(1)(a), s 151(1)(a). 
111 Ibid sch 2, ss 224, 151(1), 155(1). 
112 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523, 576.  
113 Ibid 530. 
114 Ibid 530. 
115 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 29(1)(a); Given v C V Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 29 FLR 212, 217 
(interpreting Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 53, the precursor to s 29). 
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liability for wholesalers, retailers and second-hand sellers of falsely marked goods, the defence of 
honest and reasonable mistake of fact applies.116 In many scenarios it seems clear that retailers, 
wholesalers and second-hand sellers would generally attract this defence. It would probably also 
apply to patent rights holders who, after reading patent claims, honestly and reasonably apply patent 
marks. On balance, then, considering that the fine for false patent marking is quite low, that it is 
market-based offence, that there is interest in preventing false patent marking under penalty and 
that there is no clear intention from the legislature to require a mental element, it seems likely that 
false patent marking is a strict liability offence. 
Despite the conclusion that false patent marking is likely a strict liability offence, in light of BP 
Lubricants, it is necessary to consider the consequence of a mens rea requirement on pleadings. As 
illustrated by US filings post-BP Lubricants, if pleadings are required with exacting particulars of 
knowledge that the marks were false, then false patent marking can become very difficult to 
establish. If s 178(2) is interpreted to be a strict liability offence, then a respondent’s state of mind is 
irrelevant and regular pleading requirements apply.117 However, if it must be proved that a 
respondent knew that what they marked was false, then that is classified as fraud and a higher level 
of pleadings apply in Australia.118 
Federal Court Rule 16.43 requires that when a ‘condition of the mind’ (which includes knowledge and 
fraud119) is pleaded, the particulars of the facts upon which the party relies must be stated. 
Moreover, there is well established authority for the proposition that pleadings of fraud must be 
made ‘specifically and with particularity‘ and ‘the pleading must make plain that the person made 
the statement knew it to be false or was careless as to its truth or falsity’.120 On this basis, a scenario 
akin to BP Lubricants may arise. If a mens rea examination is required in Australia and it must be 
proved that the representor knew the mark was false, then the facts proving this element must be 
pled with specificity and particularity. Consequently, although the actus reus elements of false patent 
marking may be easy to identify, articulating sufficient particulars of how a company knew or a 
person knew that the marking was false, without evidence of what decisions were made when the 
product was marked, would be difficult.  
In light of the pre-AIA qui tam provision in the US, it is also necessary to consider the standing 
requirements in Australia. When false patent marking was introduced into the Patents Act 1952 
116 Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536, 540; Jiminez v R (1992) 173 CLR 572, 581–3; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 
6.1(1)(b), 9.2. 
117 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) pt 16. 
118 Ibid rr 16.41–3. 
119 Ibid r 16.43(3).  
120 Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 291 ALR 399, 407; Wallingford v Mutual Society 
(1880) 5 AC 685, 697, 701, 704, 709; Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhill Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279, 285. 
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(Cth), it was based on the false marking provision in the Designs Act 1906 (Cth).121 A notable addition 
to the designs law provision was that before a false patent marking prosecution could be 
commenced, consent from the Attorney General was required.122 Although consent is now required 
from ‘the Minister’,123 the reason why permission has always been a feature of the Australian action 
is unknown and extrinsic materials do not shed light on the matter.  
Related to this standing issue, an oft forgotten, but important feature of criminal provisions, is that 
they can be privately prosecuted. Section 13 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) states that any indictable 
or summary offence can be prosecuted by ‘anyone’.124 Indeed, technically all criminal Australian 
prosecutions are private.125 Private prosecutions have been described in a modern UK case as an 
important constitutional safeguard from executive partiality.126 It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that false patent marking was designed to be prosecuted by the government and private 
parties, otherwise there would be no need for the Minister’s consent. It is plausible to suggest that 
the reason false patent marking has not been litigated in Australia is that consent has been refused. 
However, communications with IP Australia indicate this is not the case: there is no record that 
consent from the Minister has been requested.127 As a result, the consent mechanism appears to be 
an unnecessary bureaucratic requirement. 
The change in interpretation of the false patent marking penalty in Forest Group warrants a closer 
look at the Australian penalty as well. Section 178(2) states that ‘[a] person must not falsely 
represent than an article sold by him or her is patented in Australia’,128 and stipulates that the 
penalty for this for is 60 penalty units ($10,800).129 Despite this, whether the Australian false patent 
marking penalty applies to each individual article is not clear. The section refers to ‘an article’, as 
opposed to a product line or a time period, and as such it is possible to argue that the penalty applies 
to every falsely marked article. However, the Australian penalty is not as explicit as the US penalty, 
which prohibits false marking of ‘any unpatented article’ with a penalty of up to ‘$500 for every such 
offense’.130  
121 Designs Act 1906 (Cth) s 45; Report of the Committee Appointed by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth to 
Consider What Alterations are Desirable in the Patent Law of the Commonwealth, House of Representatives (1952) 42. 
122 Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 174. 
123 Ibid s 174, as amended by Administrative Changes (Consequential Provisions) Act 1976 (Cth) s 3. 
124 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 13. 
125 Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth (2008) 13–5. 
126 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers (1977) 3 All ER 70, 79. It should also be noted that with respect to all private 
prosecutions, federal prosecutors have power to take over the prosecution, and if required, discontinue them (Prosecution 
policy of the Commonwealth (2008) 14–5). 
127 Email from Nathan Madsen, Senior Examiner of Patents, IP Australia, to Johnathon Liddicoat, 30 April 2013. 
128 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 178(2) (emphasis added). 
129 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA. 
130 35 USC § 292 (b) (emphasis added). 
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Apart from the explicit language in § 292(b), the Court in Forest Group had three other reasons to 
find that the penalty applied to every article: (1) there was no language in the statute to allow time-
based or product-run calculation of fines;131 (2) the provision gave leeway for fines up to $500 per 
article;132 and (3) a fine of $500 overall would render the provision useless.133 The Australian 
provision does not explicitly contain language indicating time-based or product-run calculations of 
fines, nor is there language to indicate a fine of ‘up to’ 60 penalty units. However, what appears to be 
a compelling argument against a Forest Group style approach is that if the penalty is calculated on a 
‘per article basis’ a company found guilty of falsely marking 10,000 articles, a relatively modest 
number, would be penalised $108 million. This is an incongruous amount and likely to render the 
interpretation of the penalty to a fine for each different type of product that is falsely marked, or 
possibly each production run.  
It is also relevant to note that although $10,800 is substantially more than $500, from a private 
litigant’s point of view, it is low. This is pertinent considering that it is not immediately apparent to all 
private litigants that they can prosecute a criminal offence, and it would cost many times more to 
mount all the interpretation hurdles (discussed here) and prosecute the provision. Moreover, even if 
a prosecution is successful, the penalty goes to the government. The only potential benefit to the 
litigant is if the respondent is a competitor. It therefore seems plausible to suggest that the reason 
the Ministers’ consent has not been requested is that no private litigant has sufficient incentive to 
prosecute the provision. 
B. False Patent Marking Liability under the ACL? 
There are three provisions under the ACL that could create liability for false patent marking: ss 18, 29 
and 31. When any of these provisions are litigated, the context of the facts can be crucial. However, 
while the context of a false patent marking may determine the outcome of a case, this analysis will 
consider what inferences can be drawn from a patent mark by itself. 
Section 18 states, ‘[a] person must not … engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely 
to mislead or deceive’.134 Misleading and deceptive conduct under s 18 will be found when, 
objectively viewed, the conduct complained of is capable of leading a person into error.135 Section 18 
has previously been found to create liability for false patent marking. In Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard 
Industries (‘Elconnex’)136 the respondent marked products with ‘pat pending’ when no patent 
application was ever lodged. The respondent did ‘not seriously contend’ that they had not 
131 Forest Group Inc v Bon Tool Company, 590 F 3d 1295, 1302 (Fed Cir, 2009). 
132 Ibid 1304. 
133 Ibid 1303. 
134 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 18. 
135 Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198. 
136 Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries (1991) 32 FCR 491. 
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contravened s 52 of the Trade Practices Act (the precursor to s 18).137 Burchett J stated that the 
phrase ‘patent pending’, in the context of misleading and deceptive conduct, ‘is likely to produce the 
impression that it has made an invention, or acquired the benefit of an invention for which a patent 
will issue, or at least is expected to issue’.138 
Section 29 is drafted to capture false or misleading representations about goods or services,139 and s 
33 is drafted to capture misleading conduct as to the nature of goods.140 It is necessary to consider ss 
29 and 33 because they offer additional remedies compared to s 18 (and s 178(2) under the Patents 
Act). The primary difference is that, under ss 29 and 33, litigants can pursue pecuniary penalties of up 
to $1,100,000 for body corporates and up to $220,000 for persons that are not body corporates.141 
There are two subsections of s 29 that may be infringed by false patent marking: s 29(1)(a) which 
captures false or misleading representations ‘that goods are of a particular standard, quality, value, 
grade, composition, style or model or have had a particular history or particular previous use’;142 and 
s 29(1)(g) which captures false or misleading representations ‘that goods or services have 
sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits’.143 Under s 29(1)(a) 
it could be argued that a false patent mark is a false or misleading representation of a particular 
standard or quality.144 Under s 29(1)(g) it could be argued that false patent marking is a false or 
misleading representation that the marker has approval to use the patent mark.145 
To determine whether false patent marking falls under s 29(1)(a), there are two words that must be 
characterised: ‘standard’ and ‘quality’.146 ‘Standard’ has been interpreted to mean ‘a definite degree 
of any quality viewed as a prescribed object of endeavour’.147 ‘Quality’ has been interpreted broadly 
to extend ‘beyond just the degree or grade of excellence which a thing can be said on physical 
examination to possess in comparison with others of a similar kind, and includes the virtues, 
attributes, properties and special features of the thing.’148 Clearly, although there is overlap between 
these two definitions, ‘standard’ appears to refer to an application of an object and, ‘quality’ to an 
object’s stationary, non-applied physical characteristics. It is generally well known that patents are 
granted for innovative inventions and that they carry an ability to exclude others from using the 
invention. Consequently, two arguments can be raised under the term quality in s 29(1)(a): (1) that 
137 Ibid 494. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 29(1)(a). 
140 Ibid s 33. 
141 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, ss 224, 151(1). 
142 Ibid s 29(1)(a). 
143 Ibid s 29(1)(g). 
144 Ibid s 29(1)(a). 
145 Ibid s 29(1)(g). 
146 Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd (1988) 82 ALR 415, 423–4. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ducret v Chaudhary’s Oriental Carpet Palace Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 562, 577. 
 
 
215 
                                                          
Chapter 7 
false patent marks falsely indicate an advanced technology is included in the item; and (2) that false 
patent marks falsely indicate that a technology does not exist in other competing products. However, 
for either argument to succeed it would have to be accepted that bona fide patent marks indicate an 
advanced technology is included in an item or that they indicate technology does not exist in other 
competing products; otherwise a false mark cannot be deceptive. 
In reference to the first argument, that patent marks indicate advanced technology, one 
commentator has reasoned:  
A patent confers no government endorsement as to the quality of the invention … A patent merely 
recognizes that an invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and disclosed in compliance with a number 
of statutory requirements.149  
This means that it is difficult to assign any quality or standard-based meaning to a patent mark, 
because a patent does not, by itself, indicate an attribute, property, or special feature. A patent may 
disclose a new way of making an old thing, or a new, inventive but ultimately inferior way to achieve 
an outcome already achieved. 
With regard to the second argument under s 29(1)(a), that patent marks indicate a technology is not 
used in other products, although the property right enables a patent holder to exclude others from 
the technology, it does not mean any exclusions have actually occurred or that everyone is excluded. 
For example, empirical research indicates many holders of gene patents in Australia do not enforce 
them,150 and that patented technology may be available through patent pools such as that used in 3G 
technology, or DVDs.151 Consequently, there appear to be reasonable arguments that false patent 
marking, by itself, does not contravene s 29(1)(a). 
Under s 29(1)(g), arguing that false patent marking is a false or misleading representation that the 
marker has approval to use the patent mark, is not compelling either. In the default judgment of 
ACCC v Marksun Australia Pty Ltd (‘Marksun’),152 the Court held that using the logo, ‘Made in 
Australia’, when a party is not approved to use the logo, is a misleading representation.153 By 
analogy, it could be argued that a false patent mark could be a misrepresentation because without a 
patent it is an offence under the Patents Act to mark an article as patented. However, the approval 
process is quite different for using the ‘Made in Australia’ logo, and using a patent mark. The 
149 Craig Deutsch, ‘Restoring Truth: An Argument to Remove the Qui Tam Provision from the false Marking Statute of the 
Patent Act’ (2010) 11 Minnesota Journal of Law Science and Technology 829, 843. 
150 Dianne Nicol and John Liddicoat, ‘Do Patents Impede the Provision of Genetic Tests in Australia?’ (2013) 37 (3) Australian 
Health Review 281. 
151 David Serfino, ‘Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structure’ (4 June 2007) 
Knowledge Ecology International <http://goo.gl/QMs76Z>; Ted J Ebersole, Marvin C Guthrie & Jorge A Goldstein, ‘Patent 
Pools and Standard Setting in Diagnostic Genetics’ (2005) 23 Nature Biotechnology 937, 937. 
152 ACCC v Marksun Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 695 (23 June 2011). 
153 Ibid [77]–[81]. 
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Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘approval’ to mean ‘approbation’, ‘sanction’ or ‘official permission’,154 
all which imply that some sort of positive act is taken to give approval. Thus, there is a strong 
argument that false patent marking is not a misrepresentation of approval, because patent marking 
is not positively and specifically granted by IP Australia.  
An alternative action for false patent marking is ‘misleading conduct as to the nature of goods’ under 
s 33 of the ACL. This cause of action has its origins in 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property;155 it was designed to supplement IP protection.156 The section states: 
a person must not … engage in conduct that is liable to mislead the public, as to the nature, the 
manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any 
goods.157  
It could be argued that false patent marking misleads with regard to the nature, or characteristics of 
goods. Previously, successful actions under this section, or its predecessor,158 have focussed on the 
characteristics of goods. The cases include: falsely marking a bicycle helmet stating it met certain 
standards, when it had not actually been tested;159 and falsely marking a children’s car booster seat 
stating that it complied with a certain standard when it did not.160 However, unlike these actions, 
false patent marks do not indicate a physical characteristic. In the US case, Sheldon Friedlich 
Marketing Corporation v Carol Wright Sales Inc (‘Sheldon Friedlich’)161 the Court, under a similar 
provision, held that advertising stating a patent had been applied for, did not refer to a quality or 
characteristic of the product.162 Since a patent mark only indicates a property right, it is difficult to 
see how false patent marking would violate this section. 
In terms of the comparison between US and Australian law conducted in this chapter, ss 29 and 33 
do not offer clear liability and, although s 18 offers clear liability, the remedies are very different to 
those in the US prior to the AIA. Successful applications under s 18 attract a variety of remedies,163 
the most relevant of which to a false patent marking applicant would be injunctions,164 damages,165 
and compensatory orders.166 Clearly injunctions are relevant to competitors, but most false patent 
marking cases in the US were not litigated by competitors, rather, they were litigated by ‘professional 
154 Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, Online 6th ed, 2013). 
155 Stephen G Corones, The Australian Consumer Law (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2013) 304–5. 
156 Ibid 304. 
157 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 33. 
158 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 55. 
159 Lennox v Megray Pty Ltd (1986) 6 IPR 543, 543.   
160 Temperley v Playground Supplies Pty Ltd (1980) ATPR ¶40–164, 42 296. 
161 Sheldon Friedlich Marketing Corporation v Carol Wright Sales Inc, 219 USPQ 883 (SD NY, 1983). 
162 Ibid 890. 
163 Stephen G Corones, The Australian Consumer Law (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2013) 132–3. 
164 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 232. 
165 Ibid s 236. 
166 Ibid s 237. 
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relators’. Moreover, between October 2011 and May 2013 (post-AIA) only one false patent marking 
case demonstrated a proven competitive injury,167 indicating that damages and compensatory orders 
(relief synonymous with competitive injury) are not suffered or generally not sufficient to attract 
litigation in the US.  
Section 178(2) of the Patents Act probably provides broad liability (including all expired patents) and 
probably operates via a strict liability mechanism. However, between the lack of clarity in the liability 
mechanism and the limited nature of the financial relief (probably limited to $10,800, all of which 
goes to the government), there would appear to be insufficient incentive for a private litigant to 
commence a prosecution. 
One inference that can be drawn from the comparison of Australian and US law then is that the 
absence of litigation does not provide definitive guidance on whether false patent marking is present 
in Australia or not. Only if false patent marking liability was easily established and offered financial 
incentives for private litigants could this outcome have been logically drawn. Despite this, the 
availability of broad liability and injunctions under s 18 does suggest that either false patent marking 
is not present or is not causing harm to competitive markets. However, before this finding can be 
concluded upon, a closer examination of the harms caused by false patent marking is required. 
III. Harms and Reform 
A. What is the Harm? 
Before embarking on the exercise of determining the harm caused by false patent marking, it is 
pertinent to note that there is little empirical data on its effect, and no authoritative evidence.168 The 
only empirical data available is from the US case of Sheldon Friedlich. In that case, market survey 
evidence was adduced showing that when the phrase ‘patent applied for’ was used in 
advertisements for air coolers, the advertisements were less successful.169 However, the reliability of 
this data is questionable. The judgment stressed that the survey evidence included other variables 
than just the mark, such as the colour of the air cooler.170 Moreover, because the survey 
methodology was not available to the Court, it is questionable whether this evidence has any value 
at all.171 
167 Big Pond Products LLC v Team Marine USA LLC (ND Fla, No 4:11cv511-RH/CAS, 12 July 2012). 
168 See also, Bonnie Grant, ‘Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of 
the term “Patent Pending”’ (2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 283, 291. 
169 Sheldon Friedlich Marketing Corporation v Carol Wright Sales Inc, 219 USPQ 883, 886–7 (SD NY, 1983). 
170 Ibid 890. 
171 Ibid. 
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Typically, when commentators discuss harms caused by false patent marking they focus on the harm 
to competition and to consumers.172 The classic conception of competition-based harm caused by 
false patent marking has been summarised by Brinkema J, the first instance judge in Solo Cup, when 
her Honour stated that an invention marked as patented is in effect a ‘no trespassing sign’.173 In the 
context of patents, this summary suggests it is a warning, notifying the world that if technical aspects 
of the product are copied, infringement may occur. From a competition point of view, then, a greater 
market share could be obtained because competitors may believe the product is protected by a 
patent. Alternatively, a company may choose not to improve a product due to perceived transaction 
costs in negotiating a licence, or because it is believed that the invention is too difficult to invent 
around.174 In short, when false patent marking occurs, an illusory patent monopoly may arise due to 
the concomitant threat of infringement. 
One commentator, when discussing harms caused by false patent marking, has described a 
theoretical scenario in which a pharmaceutical company falsely marks its drugs, which in turn deters 
other companies from competing with them.175 However, this analysis may be a little simplistic. The 
reality is that effectively all pharmaceuticals are, or have been patented.176 Moreover, a company 
does not simply consider making a generic pharmaceutical, see that the original drug is marked as 
patented and abandon the project. Such a company knows beforehand that there is likely to be 
patent related issues and through a due diligence process will identify the dimensions of the 
protection. Thus, for a generic drug company in the situation of valid patent protection, it will be a 
matter of contesting the patent, working around the patent, or waiting for it to expire. Alternatively, 
if a product is falsely marked, this will be discovered by the generic company during due diligence. 
The only harm, in this situation, would be the small resource loss incurred by the generic company in 
having to work out the mark is false.  
Although this drug scenario suggests that false patent marking may have limited, negative 
competitive effects, in other markets and circumstances, harm might be more pronounced. If 
innovators are not patent savvy, do not normally undertake freedom-to-operate analyses, or do not 
have sufficient resources to spend on patent searching or due diligence, false patent marking may 
172 See, eg, Bonnie Grant, ‘Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of 
the term “Patent Pending”’ (2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 283, 289–92; Richard A Crudo, ‘A Patently Public 
Concern: Using Public Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking Statue After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’ 
(2012) 80 George Washington Law Review 568, 576–9; Thomas F Cotter, ‘Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking’ (2010) 17 
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 181, 185–8. 
173 Pequignot v Solo Cup, 540 F Supp 2d 649, 654 (ED Va, 2008). 
174 For example, Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 
480–1. 
175 Richard A Crudo, ‘A Patently Public Concern: Using Public Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking Statue After the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’ (2012) 80 George Washington Law Review 568, 578. 
176 See, Christie et al, ‘Patents Associated with High-Cost Drugs in Australia’ (2013) 8 PLoS One 4 
<http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0060812>. 
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foreclose a market and/or stifle innovation. This class of innovators may include cash-lean companies 
or university-based researchers. Indeed, for an organisation that does not routinely conduct patent 
due diligence analyses, false patent marking would require them to spend thousands on conducting a 
patent clearance analysis which it would otherwise not need to do.177 While data does not exist 
showing the utility of false marks, the number of companies who have engaged with it in the US, 
does tend to indicate that it has some value. It may be in these classes of innovators that is has more 
noticeable competitive effects. 
Another possible advantage of false patent marking may be the short-term advantage created while 
competitors complete their freedom-to-operate or patent clearance analyses. Since the passage of 
the AIA, the case of Big Pond Products LLC v Team Marine USA LLC (‘Big Pond’)178 has proceeded, in 
part, to a default judgment. The judgment elucidated a clear benefit to the false patent marker.179 
Unopposed evidence led the Court to find that false patent marking caused the plaintiff to delay the 
launch of their patented product by five weeks. In compensation for this delay, the plaintiff was 
awarded damages of almost US$1 million.180 
From a consumer point of view it has been argued that because a patent is only awarded if 
technology contains an inventive step,181 it could indicate that there is a technological advance in an 
article that is unique to it.182 This may influence a consumer into choosing one product over another 
based on incorrect information, and possibly paying more for it.183 As discussed by Bonnie Grant, this 
causes two harms, one consumer-based and the other economic: the customer is deceived into 
thinking they have obtained a superior product, and a competitor is otherwise deprived of a sale.184 
However, whether consumers actually notice patent marks is an important question. It is possible 
that the consumer-based effects arise so infrequently that they are negligible. It is also possible that, 
in some markets, false patent marking may actually harm the marker. Indeed, as noted above, the 
results of the ‘quasi’ study in Sheldon Friedlich suggest that patent marking can decrease sales. 
Supposing that the reduction in sales in Sheldon Friedlich was due to patent marking, there are a 
number of reasons why this may have occurred. For example, it is well known that repairing and 
maintaining cutting edge technology often carries with it expensive bills. Similarly, with patents often 
177 McKernan et al, ‘DREAMing of a patent-free human genome for clinical sequencing’ (2013) 31 Nature Biotechnology 884, 
884. 
178 Big Pond Products LLC v Team Marine USA LLC (ND Fla, No 4:11cv511-RH/CAS, 12 July 2012) slip op. 
179 Ibid slip op, 3. 
180 Ibid slip op, 4.  
181 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1)(b)(ii). 
182 Also discussed in Elizabeth Winston, ‘The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Statute’ (2009) 77 Tennessee Law Review 
111, 133; Bonnie Grant, ‘Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of the 
term “Patent Pending”’ (2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 283, 289. 
183 Ibid 133. 
184 Bonnie Grant, ‘Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of the term 
“Patent Pending”’ (2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 283, 289. 
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come higher prices. Consequently, it is possible that the reduction in sales in Sheldon Friedlich were 
due to consumers believing that the product was too expensive or contained technology that would 
be difficult to maintain.  
Whether the economic and consumer-based effects of false patent marking actually arise and if so, 
how subversive they are, is speculative. One certainty is that articles once validly marked and sold 
pursuant to a patent that has now expired do exist in the market. It is short-sighted to suggest that 
these articles should be recalled and the mark removed, because all the products are unlikely to be 
returned and the cost would likely outweigh any gains. This means there will always be articles in 
markets that are marked as patented when they do not actually have patent protection because it 
has expired. 
The effect of false patent marking on consumers and markets is certainly an important consideration. 
However, there is a final aspect of patent marking that is commonly overlooked: the integrity of the 
patent system. The purpose of the patent system is to incentivise technological innovation by 
allowing applicants to obtain exclusive rights in inventions. A logical but unsubstantiated assessment 
of patent marking is that it is probably the most common activity undertaken to communicate patent 
rights. While there is no data on the incidence of people accessing patent specifications, and it is 
expected that few do, there is nevertheless value in ensuring that patent marks on articles are 
accurate. Allowing parties to mark products as patented when no patent has ever existed reduces 
trust in the patent system. 
Overall, the analysis of harms in this part allows a few conclusions to be drawn. Significant 
competitive harm is only likely to be experienced by cash lean or patent inexperienced innovators. 
This reduces the concern of false patent marking, and may also explain the low level of litigation. 
However, false patent marking may still affect consumers, reduce trust in the patent system and 
cause inefficiencies that patent savvy innovators may encounter. Furthermore, with the exception of 
expired patents, there is no good reason why false patent marking should exist and therefore no 
reason why parties should be affected by it. As such, Australian laws prohibiting false patent marking 
need to be reviewed and, where necessary, reformed to reflect a modern understanding of false 
patent marking.  
The following review and suggestions for reform builds upon the foregoing comparative analysis of 
false patent marking laws. Given that data on Australian false patent marking does not indicate it is 
having significant negative effects, the focus of the review is to provide a rational basis for fines, and 
improve enforcement of the current laws. 
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B. Appropriate Fines? 
An economic perspective on setting optimal false patent marking fines has recently been provided by 
Professor Thomas Cotter.185 As Cotter mentions, the appropriate fine for false patent marking has 
received surprisingly little attention.186 Cotter accepts that negative competition and consumer 
outcomes can arise from false patent marking, but states that only a nominal fine should be imposed 
in instances where harms are unlikely to have occurred.187 He stresses that with regard to penalties, 
a balance should be reached between over deterrence and under deterrence. If penalties are 
excessive then firms may stop patent marking, making it more difficult for other innovators to 
identify patent rights, and reducing the patent holder’s ability to recover financial relief. On the other 
hand, if fines are too low then there is little incentive to mark correctly or instigate false patent 
marking litigation.188 
Cotter recommends looking to competition law and consumer law to identify optimal fines.189 In 
particular, he argues the highest fines should be awarded for instances in which significant consumer 
or competition harm has been observed and in which the culpability of the marker is highest,190 the 
objective being to disgorge any gains made by false patent marking.191 Such an approach would 
therefore include a range of considerations, such as whether the false patent marking: stifled 
innovation or was likely to stifle innovation; increased sales or was likely to increase sales; prevented 
competition or was likely to prevent competition; or delayed or was likely to delay development of 
products. Other factors include: how many items were falsely marked; how long for; whether the 
mark could be easily removed; and whether a patent number was included in the mark.192 Since the 
primary effects of false patent marking relate to competition and consumer harm, this approach is 
sensible. It also serves as a much more logical basis to decide fines, rather than the vacuum that 
currently exists.  
C. Are Australia’s Laws Sufficient?  
The analysis above indicates that only s 178(2) of the Patents Act and s 18 of the ACL will create 
liability for false patent marking. This means that, broadly speaking, the approach to enforcement 
endorsed by Cotter exists in Australia. That is, Australian law provides a nominal fine through s 
178(2) and the possibility of much higher fines, proportionate to injuries caused to consumers or 
185 Thomas F Cotter, ‘Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking’ (2010) 17 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law 
Review 181. 
186 Ibid 188. 
187 Ibid 195–6. 
188 Ibid 190–1; Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123.  
189 Thomas F Cotter, ‘Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking’ (2010) 17 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law 
Review 181, 190–2. 
190 Ibid 191–2. 
191 Ibid. 
192 For a more in depth review, see ibid 189–98. 
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competitors, through s 18. Whilst these basal aspects are complied with, a range of problems still 
exists with the regime. These problems are identified in this section and some minor legislative 
amendments recommended. However, in the absence of empirical data showing significant negative 
effects of false patent marking, major amendments that would see Australian false patent marking 
provisions comply with what Cotter describes as an ‘optimal’ system, are not currently required. 
The first two problems with Australian false patent marking laws are the lack of clarity on the penalty 
and mental state requirement in s 178(2). The penalty in s 178(2) does not create a great incentive 
for private prosecutors and this incentive is only reduced with the lack of clarity. This is exemplified 
in Elconnex in which the applicant did not argue false patent marking under the Patents Act 1952 
(Cth), even though no patent had been applied for and the finding of misleading and deceptive 
conduct was clear.193 To enhance the operation of the provision, a mens rea requirement should be 
specifically excluded due to the difficulty in proving intention and the onerous nature of the pleading 
requirements for fraud. The penalty should be clarified as a large nominal fine, consistent with 
Cotter’s rationale. Additionally, the Minister’s consent requirement should be removed because it is 
unnecessary.  
In post-AIA US, it has been suggested that a public body should enforce false patent marking.194 The 
governments in Australia and the US have always had the power to enforce these laws but have not 
done so. There are three main reasons why governments should enforce false patent marking. First, 
private parties may not have sufficient incentive to litigate because it is difficult for them to quantify 
harms they suffer.195 Second, even if false patent marking causes no consumer or competitive harm, 
it still undermines trust in the patent system. Third, if it is known that the government is willing to 
litigate this may deter patent marking in the future. The Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions currently has jurisdiction under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth),196 
but with such a broad portfolio it seems sensible to confer jurisdiction on the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) which has expertise in the area and complements its s 18 ACL 
powers. 
An additional feature of conferring jurisdiction on the ACCC would be to have it exercise its 
associated enforcement provisions from the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).197 In 
particular the ACCC can require claims promoting goods to be substantiated.198 In the circumstances 
of patent marking this attribute is highly desirable because it gives the ACCC a cheap and simple 
193 Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries (1991) 32 FCR 491, 493–4. 
194 Nicholas W Stephens, ‘From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes Full Circle’ (2011–
2012) 97 Iowa Law Review 1003, 1025–7. 
195 Christopher G Granaghan, ‘Off the Mark: Fixing the False Marking Statute’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 477, 496–8. 
196 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 6(d). 
197 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, pt 5-1. 
198 Ibid s 219. 
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mechanism to compel parties to inform the ACCC which patent(s) they believe apply to their product. 
For example, if a patent holder produces an article that states ‘patented in Australia’ on it, the ACCC 
can request the patent holder supply them with details of the patent that protects it. 
Whether or not $10,800 can be considered a nominal fine is open to debate. For a large commercial 
company with millions of dollars of intellectual property related expenditure it may seem minor, but 
for a start-up company, severe. On the other hand, the value to society of deterring false patent 
marking should not be overlooked. Companies should know what patent rights protect their 
products in each jurisdiction and mark accordingly. If there is confusion over whether a patent 
protects a product, it is of the patent holder’s own making. Patent rights holders acquired or 
articulated the bounds of their own patents, and expiry dates are normally self-evident. 
Consequently, a nominal fine towards the higher end of what may be considered ‘nominal’ may be a 
good deterrent against false patent marking that is self-inflicted and should be easily avoided. 
Moreover, patent holders who mark products genuinely believing patent claims protect a product 
will be afforded the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact.  
An additional problem with s 178(2) arises when patents expire. One amendment brought into effect 
by the AIA was that products marked with expired patent numbers that once protected the product 
no longer constitute false patent marking. One of the key reasons for this amendment was that using 
the patent number, a person could look up the US Patent Office’s website and see the patent had 
expired.199 Similarly, it provides a means to discern how the invention works.200 It has been argued in 
the US that expiration dates on patents can sometimes be hard to calculate and therefore confuse 
the issue of expiry.201 But in Australia expiry dates are much more obvious: the bibliographic data on 
IP Australia’s AusPat website informs readers if a patent has expired, and if not lists the expiry date. 
As analysed above, articles marked with patents that previously protected them will likely constitute 
false patent marking in Australia under s 178(2). However, based on the fact there is limited evidence 
of false patent marking negatively effecting consumers or competitive markets, and no evidence at 
all that expired patents that once protected products do, Australia’s false patent marking laws should 
be harmonised with those in the US on this point. This would exclude liability for false patent 
marking arising when an expired patent is applied to a product it once protected, but only in the 
circumstances the mark includes the Australian patent number. However, it should also be noted 
that if, consistent with the arguments in the previous chapter, virtual marking is permitted in 
Australia, then false patent marking should not arise if a virtual mark is used either.  
199 Laura N Arneson, ‘Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should Not Be False 
Marking’ (2011–2012) 95 Minnesota Law Review 650, 668–70. 
200 Ibid 670. 
201 Clontech Laboratories Inc v Invitrogen Corp, 406 F 3d 1347, 1367 (Fed Cir, 2005). 
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Throughout this chapter, the absence of empirical data on false patent marking in Australia has been 
highlighted. The amendments presented in this section are based on the best data available. If, in the 
future, empirical data shows that false patent marking has more pervasive effects on competitive 
markets or consumers, then it may be necessary to amend ss 29 or 33 of the ACL to create liability 
for false patent marking and thereby allow applicants to pursue pecuniary penalties. This would also 
broadly align with what Cotter would consider ‘optimal’. However, in the absence of such data these 
amendments, which are much more substantial, are not currently warranted.  
Conclusion 
The comparison of US and Australian law conducted in this chapter, although not conclusive, 
generally indicates that false patent marking is not having a significant negative effect on Australian 
competitors or consumers. However, the analysis of Australian laws in light of the US boom-bust 
cycle, and what has been described as an optimal enforcement mechanism, does indicate a lack of 
clarity and other imperfections in the Australian provisions. 
In the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating negative effects caused by false patent marking, 
modest amendments are recommended to improve the enforcement of the current system; namely: 
the penalty should be clarified as a large nominal fine; the ACCC should be given jurisdiction to 
enforce s 178(2) under the Patents Act; the requirement in s 178(2) that the Minister’s consent be 
obtained before prosecution can be commenced should be removed; and marking a product with a 
patent number that is now expired, but prior to expiry validly applied to the product, should not 
constitute false patent marking. 
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Conclusion 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to examine whether Australian patent law, in light of 
emergent issues, operates consistently with its economic justifications. Pursuant to this this aim, 
emergent issues from diverse aspects of patent infringement law have been investigated in this 
context. At this stage, it is opportune to briefly review the analyses and conclusions reached in each 
chapter. 
Chapter 1 examined standing to initiate patent infringement proceedings and was instigated by 
recent judicial decisions on the definition of ‘exclusive licensee’ in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the 
‘Patents Act’). The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that the current law prohibits some parties 
who exclusively control elements of patent rights from beginning litigation, and that this outcome is 
actually inconsistent with the justifications for patent law. As a result, the chapter concluded by 
recommending that the definition of ‘exclusive licensee’ should be broadened to include licensees 
who exclusively control any sphere of patent rights.  
Chapter 2 was prompted by recent technological advances in 3D printing. The chapter examined 
whether the creation or distribution of files that could instruct 3D printers to create physical objects 
could give rise to patent infringement. This issue is relevant because with the digital distribution of 
such files, there is concern that patentees may not be able to efficiently enforce their rights. Overall, 
the analysis in this chapter found no immediate fault in the operation of the law, because two 
secondary infringement causes of action are quite fitted to creating liability in these circumstances. 
As a result, no recommendations for law reform were made. However it is suggested that a watching 
brief be kept on this topic. 
Chapter 3 considered recent US case law on ‘divided performance’ of method patents. As detailed in 
this chapter, divided performance is linked to Internet technologies and raises the possibility that 
patented inventions can be effectively performed without being infringed. Although no definite 
conclusions could be drawn on whether divided performance of method patents would give rise to 
infringement liability in Australia, the analysis still led to recommendations for law reform. To ensure 
patent law protects all classes of inventions, a recommendation was made that procured 
infringement should be codified in the Patents Act, with the specific intention that it create liability 
for divided performance. 
Chapters 4 and 5 analysed specific issues relating to the operation of s 117(2)(b) of the Patents Act. 
Broadly, chapter 4 outlined problems with the provision that recent judicial decisions on second 
medical use patents have exposed. A central concern described was the ability of the provision to be 
used by patentees to foreclose markets that should be open to competition. Following this, chapter 5 
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analysed potential international-based solutions to these problems. Chapter 5 concluded by 
recommending that a ‘carve out’, as broadly recommended in the Australian Pharmaceutical Patents 
Review,1 should be inserted into s 117(2)(b) to help balance the operation of the provision.  
Chapter 6 examined the topic of innocent infringement. In light of a recent Australian case and 
recent US law reform, this chapter primarily focused on the role of marking products as patented to 
notify the public that patent rights protect a product. The analysis demonstrated that the likely 
operation of the law does not accord with its justifications. Thus, the chapter concluded by 
recommending that patent marking law should require that patent numbers be used, and that patent 
marking using appropriate websites should be permitted.  
Chapter 7 explored the phenomenon of false patent marking. This topic has come to prominence due 
to recent litigation in the US. The analysis in this chapter showed that deficiencies in the operation of 
the Australian provision prohibiting false patent marking exist. However, it also argued that in the 
absence of significant issues with false patent marking in Australia, only minor legislative 
amendments are required to simplify and enhance the operation of the provision. 
This thesis did not aim to conduct a comprehensive review of patent infringement law. But through 
analysing issues at the boundaries of the law, some comments can be made beyond the specific 
conclusions reached in each chapter.  
Interestingly, at various stages of this thesis, it was not clear what the purpose and underlying theory 
of various provisions in the Patents Act were. This meant that to resolve whether the law was 
operating as it should, it was necessary to extend economic-based justifications for the patent 
system to the issue at hand. This was achieved, for example, in chapter 1 with regard to to standing 
for partitioned exclusive licensees, and in chapter 6, it with regard to innocent infringement. This is 
noteworthy because, although economic justifications for patents have existed at least since the 
Statute of Monopolies nearly 400 years ago,2 it demonstrates that how exactly these underpinning 
ideas apply to specific provisions is still being understood.  
Overlapping with the previous observation, although there are parts of the Patents Act that are 
considered to be of such universal application that they are continually litigated (for example 
inventive step or patentable subject matter), there are many other provisions that are not regularly 
interacted with, but still have an important role to play in fulfilling the economic justifications for the 
patent system. Laws concerning innocent infringement and false patent marking are two such 
examples. Since, as explored in chapters 6 and 7, these laws play important roles in how patent law 
operates in a market economy, researchers should be mindful of this and be conscious that 
1 Australian Government, Pharmaceutical Patents Review (Canberra, May 2013) 138–40. 
2 Statute of Monopolies 1624, 21 Jac 1, c 3; see generally, Chris Dent, ‘“Generally Inconvenient”: The 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies as Political Compromise’ (2009) 33(2) Melbourne University Law Review 415. 
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provisions such as these require review from time to time. This will help ensure that the entire 
patent system is operating consistently with its underpinnings. 
In light of the law reform advocated in this thesis, and the expected continual emergence of new 
technological and new legal issues in the future, there is little doubt that patent law should continue 
to be reviewed at regular intervals. However, reviews of the law, no matter how compelling, are 
largely futile without legislative action. The introduction to this thesis began with a reference to 
Professor Ricketson’s paper on the past, present and future of intellectual property reform. One of 
Professor Ricketson’s concerns was that intellectual property law-making at the executive level was 
not as efficient and efficacious as it should be. Whilst many of Professor Ricketson’s 
recommendations have not been realised, there has been some activity in the Australian patent law 
reform context in the last 10 years.3 As also noted in the introduction, this process will continue into 
the future with the recent announcement of a new review of Australia’s intellectual property 
systems, which will be conducted by the Productivity Commission.4 Coinciding with the scholarship in 
this thesis, this review is charged with ensuring that Australia’s intellectual property laws sufficiently 
cater for new technology. It is also charged with comparing them to Australia’s major trading 
partners’ laws, and, overall, to recommend changes that may improve the ‘wellbeing of Australian 
society’.5 Thus, this reference has distinct capacity to continue to improve Australia’s patent laws in a 
manner similar to that conducted in this thesis, except on an goverernmental level. 
One of the most desirable outcomes from academic research is for it to contribute to law reform. 
Where appropriate, this thesis has attempted to fulfil this desire. Where technological or legal issues 
have posed controversies in Australian patent law that warrant change, an attempt has been made 
to articulate recommendations for reform consistent with underlying economic rationales. As noted 
throughout this thesis, the economic rationales for patents are open to debate. However, if the 
Productivity Commission’s review of intellectual property systems in Australia comes to the 
conclusion that these rationales continue to be the main driving force behind patent law, then the 
recommendations for reform in this thesis are likely to be of utility and this thesis may inform that 
review. 
3 See, eg, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 2006 (Cth); Intellectual Property Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 
2012 (Cth). 
4 Intellectual Property Arrangements (18 August 2015) Productivity Commission 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/intellectual-property/terms-of-reference>. 
5 Ibid. 
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